Self-Reliant Subjects of Finance:  Investing and Borrowing in Working-class Households in Contemporary Capitalism by Mulcahy, Niamh
Self-Reliant Subjects of Finance:  
Investing and Borrowing in Working-class 
Households in Contemporary Capitalism 
Niamh Aislinn Gray Mulcahy  
King’s College 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2018 
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 i 
Declaration 
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome 
of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It 
is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is concurrently submitted for 
a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other 
University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. 
It does not exceed the prescribed word limit of 80 000 set by the Department of Sociology.  
Abstract  
Self-Reliant Subjects of Finance: Investing and Borrowing in Working-
class Households in Contemporary Capitalism 
 
This thesis examines the integration of households within finance markets in the United 
Kingdom, through increasing reliance on personal investment and borrowing, in order to 
understand how finance and risk have been rationalised as effective ways to make ends 
meet in the subjectivation of individuals and households. Against declining public 
provision of welfare services, many households invest in unit trusts and private pensions 
to provide for their futures, while the expansion of retail banking services during the 1980s 
has enabled the proliferation of borrowing for loans, mortgages and credit. These 
developments accompany a growing discourse in the UK about the importance of self-
reliance and entrepreneurialism among the middle and working classes in creating a 
prosperous economy. I thus draw on accounts of financial restructuring in Britain, as well 
as national indicators on investment and borrowing patterns among households, to chart 
the rise of the entrepreneurial subject leading up to the financial crisis of 2008. These 
accounts, however, reveal striking disparities between middle- and working-class 
engagements with finance, with the latter overwhelmingly saving and investing less for 
their futures, while they tend to borrow more than they can reasonably expect to repay. 
This, I argue, represents the limits of financial subjectivity, with working-class subjects of 
finance restricted in their ability to save and borrow by structural inequalities such as 
stagnating wages or precarious employment. The thesis therefore approaches the issue of 
contemporary financialised inequality from a critical realist perspective, in order to 
examine the causal mechanisms underlying the shift to financial subjectivity, and the 
potential for change contained within new forms of stratification.  
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Introduction: 
Indebted investors as subjects of finance 
Introduction 
The signs of staggering personal debt across the United Kingdom emerging as a problem 
of concern within public discourse are easy to spot. As one Guardian article summarising 
recently released Bank of England figures declares, Britain is facing a ‘debt timebomb’ as 
financially squeezed households add to their ‘debt mountain’ in such a way that ‘puts the 
ratio of household debt to GDP heading back towards the peak seen in the boom years 
before the financial crash’ (Inman and Barr, 2017). Likewise, fears over dwindling 
household savings and stagnant wages have led commentators to conclude that Britons are 
increasingly relying on, and consequently depleting savings to make ends meet, as ‘the 
amount being set aside as savings has now slipped to just 1.7% of disposable income – the 
lowest level on record, and a fraction of the near-10% average for the last 50 years’ (Elliot, 
2017). The perception is undoubtedly one of looming economic instability, fuelled by a 
reliance on credit and debt against a backdrop of insufficient income and savings. 
 The reality of debt as a facet of daily life in the United Kingdom is evident in the 
fact that 48% of households and 35% of individuals have some form of financial liability 
(Office of National Statistics, 2016). Additionally, the Financial Conduct Authority 
estimates that three quarters of the adult population have some kind of financial product 
or loan on which they make payments, meaning the issue of debt is not entirely absent 
even among the roughly 29% of people who make regular on time payments toward their 
liabilities (2017). But the involvement of individuals and households within capital markets 
does not stop at the acquisition of debt, as British households now have some 20.5% stake 
in the UK stock market, through the indirect ownership of equities including investments 
in private pensions, unit trusts, and insurance. As a result, personal savings are inherently 
tied to market performance.  
 Some form of direct or indirect involvement within financial markets has thus, in 
the span of about 40 years, become commonplace for managing household finances. But 
the successful navigation of risk and reward relative to existing income and assets is 
undoubtedly related to income. According to Collinson (2016), over 1 million households 
with incomes below £30 000 are in ‘extreme debt’, with unsecured debt (excluding 
mortgages) rising from £48 billion to £353 billion from 2012 to 2015. The issue is 
compounded by a decline of real wages by 10.4% between 2007 and 2015, making the 
repayment of debt more difficult (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, those with higher levels of debt 
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are also less likely to be saving, with low-waged workers less likely to enrol in pension 
schemes or to contribute very little when they do (Clark, Strauss, and Knox-Hayes, 2012). 
The trend toward individual and household involvement in financial markets is thus a 
compelling phenomenon from the perspective of social stratification and the experience of 
inequality. 
   Within academic literature, there exist detailed accounts of individual and 
household involvement in capital markets that seek to explain rising debt and dwindling 
savings. In the first instance, savings are more aligned with market fluctuations as 
individuals increasingly invest savings in defined contribution pension plans, unit trusts, 
and insurance in the hope of generating larger returns for future security than traditional 
forms of saving or occupational welfare might provide. They likewise also borrow more 
through credit, loans, or mortgages, to make up in some cases for stagnating wage levels 
in the United Kingdom. The idea of a self-governing entrepreneurial subject who embraces 
financial risk because of the spread of neoliberalism has been advanced by Randy Martin 
(2002) and Paul Langley (2008a) among others (e.g., Lazzarato, 2012). They want to 
understand how financial instruments of investment and debt serve to regulate the conduct 
of individuals through their classification as potential risks and the infliction of a punitive 
system of repayment on delinquent borrowers. However, the issue of class, in the context 
of widening inequality, is less often addressed, as accounts focus on the processes that 
individualise subjects rather than the effects of income and job security on the ability of 
certain subjects to perform as successful entrepreneurs. Taking account of social 
stratification amid financial liberalisation within the United Kingdom since the end of the 
1970s, this thesis offers an analysis of the engagement of precarious working-class 
individuals and households, or the ‘precariat’ (Standing, 2014) with capital markets as a 
means of understanding this emergent ‘financial subjectivity’, couched in the navigation 
of risk for reward. An account of the stratification of financial subjectivity along class lines 
is important in light of questions about whether there is, properly speaking, an 
entrepreneurial subject, given perilously high levels of borrowing and low levels of saving 
(Clark et al., 2012), since these practices belie the notions of responsibility and the 
understanding of risk.  
I argue that the precarious working class, characterised as it is by employment in 
precarious jobs with few employer benefits and low wages, is disproportionately 
encumbered by debt as a limit on the ability to save, as well as invest financially and in 
personal development. To put it another way, future returns are heavily limited by 
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repayment on past obligations, as a result of financial insecurity in the present. The 
question of the financial subject therefore must be situated in the context of class and 
inequality to understand the full operation of disciplinary policies aimed at regulating 
responsible conduct. As Michel Feher (2009) notes, when one’s genetic and individual 
dispositions, family background, social milieu, abilities and talents are mobilised in an 
overall attempt to understand earning potential and financial stability, the financial subject 
is not merely an investor in markets in the literal sense, but in him or herself, measured as 
successful according to the kinds of investments they make in education, training, 
wellbeing, and so on. As a consequence, it is unsurprising that so many policies aimed at 
dealing with problem debt focus on money management and financial literacy rather than 
the broader question of income and job markets, intervening precisely at the level of self-
conduct and ‘inciting [people] to adopt conducts deemed valorizing and to follow models 
for self-valuation that modify their priorities and inflect their strategic choice’ (ibid., 28).  
 The thesis works within the critical realist tradition, in contrast to other work done 
within the sociology of everyday finance which adopts a nominalist outlook in seeking to 
describe a neoliberal subjectivity that works through interconnected networks of finance 
and governance (e.g., Langley, 2008a). I maintain a distinction between structure and 
agency, to illustrate how changes in social structures and institutions give rise to changing 
subjectivities. I supplement Foucault’s notion of governmentality in power relations with 
Althusser’s concept, ‘overdetermination’ (1969), which suggests that multiple 
contradictions—for instance, the expectation of financial self-discipline with limited 
savings—condense into a unity of pressures associated with being part of the precariat. 
This makes it possible to understand how, in spite of the individualisation which has 
marked people out according to their identities and personalities since the end of the 
twentieth century (Bauman, 2001; Bell, 1973; Giddens, 1991; Lash and Urry, 1994), 
financial subjectivity is still inherently stratified along socioeconomic lines. The thesis is 
therefore also a theoretical investigation into the efficacy of nominalist approaches like 
actor-network theory (Latour, 1993; 1996; Callon, 1998; Langley, 2008a) relative to critical 
realism in accounting for socioeconomic stratification.  
 
 
The financialisation of daily life 
The term ‘financialisation’ has gained prominence in discussions of the economic period 
between 1980 – 2010 (Palley, 2013), referring as it does to the ‘increasing importance of 
INTRODUCTION  Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 4 
financial markets, financial motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the 
operation of the economy and its governing institutions, both at the national and 
international level’ (Epstein, 2001: 1). The world economy has been transformed, not only 
through the emergence of a huge services industry that now surpasses productive industries 
for employment in Western countries (Lash and Urry, 1994; Rhodes, 2017), but also as a 
result of the immense profits generated in financial sectors worldwide (Krippner, 2005). 
As Thomas Palley puts it, financialisation 
transforms the functioning of the economic system at both the macro and micro 
levels. Its principle impacts are to (1) elevate the significance of the financial sector 
to the real [productive] sector, [and] (2), transfer income from the real sector to the 
financial sector (2013: 17).  
 
It is unsurprising, then, that financialisation is also marked by a rapid increase in household 
debt, from which profits can indeed be derived as increasingly more individuals and 
households are drawn into the market. As wages are disconnected from already low 
productivity growth (Rhodes, 2017), causing stagnation, individual households begin to 
experience greater inequality (Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegreto, 2007; Palley, 2013), as 
well as a greater reliance on credit and debt to make ends meet. Indeed, levels of debt 
within the United Kingdom have risen substantially over the last 40 years as credit cards 
and borrowing become commonplace in managing household finances. As of 2014 in 
which nearly half of UK households were in debt (Office of National Statistics, 2016), 
overall household debt in the United Kingdom amounted to £1,432bn including loans, 
mortgages and credit, of which £158.9bn was unsecured consumer credit (The Money 
Charity, 2014). By comparison, at the beginning of the 1970s and prior to the 
implementation of policies encouraging financial liberalisation, credit card debt was only 
£32 million as credit cards were mostly unavailable until the end of the 1980s (Block-Lieb, 
Wiener, Cantone and Holtje, 2009: 155). Mortgage debt among working adults in the 
United Kingdom has also increased with the expansion of the financial services industry: 
in the post-war period (1952) there were 1.65 million borrowers, which had risen six-fold 
to 10 million by 2012. The Council of Mortgage Lenders attributes this increase to a shift 
in ideas about saving for and buying a home: before 1970 the majority of buyers, at 58%, 
could purchase a house using just savings, whereas after 2000 only 37% did.1 Likewise, 
before 1970 buyers did not necessarily think of their homes as investments for future 
                                                        
1 In this context, it is also worth noting that currently, fewer people are purchasing their own homes with 
nearly a third of the population (29%) renting either privately or socially (Office of National Statistics, 
2016).  
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improvements, since only 21% relied on income from a home sale to fund a new purchase, 
whilst after 2000 56% of buyers relied on this money (Clarke, 2012). For Costas Lapavitsas 
(2011), the financialisation of national and international economies is thus inherently 
bound up with a similar process occurring in daily life, as wages of the workforce represent 
a source of profit for financial institutions. 
 The study of the ‘financialisation of daily life’ (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright, 
2011) has thus become an important subfield within economic sociology and the study of 
finance more broadly, although its importance has only been recognised more recently 
(ibid.; Lapavitsas, 2011). This literature ‘has emerged from culturally inflected sociological 
accounts that take as their focus the ways in which money and finance shape and format 
life within everyday cultural economies’ (French et al., 2011: 804). For instance, Randy 
Martin first acknowledges in 2002 the embedding of finance into daily life when he argues 
that ‘people from all walks of life [have] to accept risks into their homes that were hitherto 
the provenance of the professional’ (2002: 12). The welfare state has been restructured over 
40 years, including cuts to benefits that require many claimants to dip into income set aside 
for other necessities such as rent payments and other basic needs (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 2017). Martin (2002) therefore finds that the emergence of private sector 
solutions, such as private pensions to make up for collective insurance and welfare, or 
increased access to credit to account for decreases in wages, has led to greater household 
involvement in financial markets. Following on from this, Paul Langley (2006; 2007; 
2008a; 2008b; 2008c) illustrates how the technologies of financialisation, such as credit 
scoring and reporting which enable the pricing of risk, have created self-disciplined subjects 
of finance who begin to monitor their own behaviour in accordance with the norms of 
financial markets. For Langley, individuals become subjects through these technologies, 
which encourage responsible borrowing and repayment practices, as they monitor and 
adapt their behaviour to conform with expectations of high credit scores that will enable 
them to borrow at lower interest rates.  
In addition, ‘technologies such as the securitization of mortgages, the shift from 
defined benefit to defined contribution occupational pension schemes, and the rise of 
personal pensions have helped bring forth new investor subjects and financially self-
disciplined subjects’ (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright, 2011: 804). To be sure, financial 
discipline covers not only borrowing, but also securing a future under insecure conditions. 
This is perhaps most clearly evidenced for scholars of everyday finance by changes to the 
pension system which mean that, in general, employee pension contributions are invested 
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in portfolios in the hope of generating a large return, rather than matched by employers 
throughout the tenure of a career. Defined benefit plans were a hallmark of the British 
occupational welfare model from the 1950s to the 1980s, with employer contributions to 
occupational welfare schemes serving as a complement to personal savings and the Basic 
State Pension. However, the Office of National Statistics notes that the Social Security Act 
of 1986 created favourable market conditions for the development of the defined 
contribution scheme which saw employee pension contributions invested in a portfolio; 
indeed, prior to 1980, only 5% of occupational pensions were of the defined contribution 
variety, while after 2000 53% of newly established private pension plans were defined 
contribution (2013: 7). The upshot, for Langley (2008a), is a subject disciplined as an 
investor in their own future, and personally affected by financial risk insofar as they rely 
on the performance of investments. 
Within the Marxist tradition, Maurizio Lazzarato likewise conceives of debt and 
the financial turn as productive in the Foucauldian sense in their ability to create subjects. 
According to Cesare Di Feliciantonio ‘the debt economy always involves a “work on the 
self” that is able to conjunct together economy and ethics’, so that Lazzarato’s ‘”indebted 
man” represents a specific form of homo oeconomicus based on the control of subjectivity’ 
(2016: 1209; emphasis in original). Key for Lazzarato (2012) is the way in which the 
creditor-debtor relation supersedes the more traditional power relation between capital and 
labour, so that workers are not simply labourers seeking to sell labour to those with capital, 
but have also become debtors with a moral promise to repay their debts. This obligation 
links individuals to social relations and social reproduction, and the resulting subjectivity 
is heavily governed by a conscience of repayment. As Di Feliciantonio puts it,  
indebtedness creates an individual subject that feels responsible and indebted  
towards its own creditor, this process concerning the whole society through the 
mechanism of public debt, so future generations will already be indebted when 
being born. Indebtedness creates a specific temporality of promise and repayment 
interconnecting the present and the future through an objectification of the future 
itself (i.e. the debt that has to be repaid) (2016: 1210; emphasis in original).  
 
Also in the Marxist tradition, Michel Feher (2009) has picked up on the constant work that 
neoliberal subjects must perform on themselves as a function of the constant valuation of 
their ‘human capital’, which is to say, the skills they possess and the backgrounds that 
inform their abilities as they contribute to potential earnings. As in Lazzarato (2012), then, 
financial relations have fundamentally altered previously enshrined relations between 
capital and labour, as the workforce is no longer conceived in general as labourers free to 
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sell their time and ability to whomever will pay for it, but instead become investors who 
are not the owners of a commodity for sale so much as they are ‘managers of a portfolio of 
conducts pertaining to all the aspects of their lives’ (Feher, 2009: 30). Wendy Brown echoes 
a similar sentiment when she writes that  
consumption, education, training, mate selection, and more are configured as 
practices of self-investment where the self is the individual firm; and work as well 
as citizenship are configured as modes of belonging to the business (‘team’) one 
works for or the nation of which one is a member (2016: 3).  
 
As a result, subjects and citizens are conceived as ‘member[s] of a firm and as [themselves] 
a firm, and in both cases appropriately conducted by the “governance” strategies relevant 
to firms’ (ibid.).  
 My work in this thesis picks up on the altered status of the worker as not simply a 
seller of labour power, but also an indebted investor. I am particularly interested in how 
the working class, against a backdrop of unstable employment, income and benefits, is 
encumbered by debt as a constraint on what working-class individuals and households 
can accomplish where investment and personal development are concerned. This is 
particularly important in order to understand how, although the process of subjectivation 
encourages individualism and personal responsibility, financial subjects are still 
embedded within highly unequal relations of gaining skill and education, job prospects, 
income, and assets that can promote as much as constrain the success of individuals 
depending on their economic status. After all, the process of subjectivation itself involves 
the creation of subjects and the fostering of self-conduct through productive (rather than 
repressive) power relations (Foucault, 1994). It is not simply enough to study how, in the 
manner of the revitalisation of elite studies, an expanding ‘rentier class’ is able to 
mobilise vast amounts of financial capital and political influence (Davis and Williams, 
2017) resulting in a recomposition of ‘elite classes’ (Savage, 2016). Similarly, although 
studies of a ‘squeezed middle class’ (Carré and Heinze, 2013; Mishel and Shierholz, 
2013; Parker, 2013; Smith-Ramani and Mehta, 2013) allude to declining living standards 
for a formerly stable class as a result of cuts to even higher level managerial jobs, flexible 
labour contracts, and stagnating wages, this work does not yet deal with those whose 
debt finances basic necessities rather than a standard of living.  
After all, each of these developments is relational, in the context of an economy 
undergoing financial liberalisation and accumulating profits through capital markets, 
which leads to stagnating wages and precarious or short-term employment (Palley, 2013). 
The correlation between indebtedness and low income is clear, with the Office of 
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National Statistics positing that 58% of households and 46% of individuals with incomes 
below £15,000 are in debt, borrowing at least 83% of their annual income on average. 
This is higher than the national average, in which 48% of households and 35% of 
individuals are in debt; and certainly also than those households and individuals in the 
highest earning quintile with average annual earnings of nearly £1,000,000, where 36% of 
households and 23% of individuals have debt, borrowing only 12% of their annual 
income (Office of National Statistics, 2016). The working class is therefore hugely 
intertwined with the financialised economy, even if many individuals and households 
struggle to perform as entrepreneurs who successfully manage their household risks. This 
interest in class-based inequality differs from the work of those such as Langley (2008a), 
French, Leyshon and Wainwright (2011), who follow the actor-network theory of Latour 
(1993; 1996) and Callon (1998) in a kind of ‘cultural economy’ (du Gay and Pryke, 
2002). Cultural economy focuses on the performance of economic markets by actors such 
as economists, policy-makers, and even everyday investors as well as non-human actors 
such as technologies and predictive models alike. Instead I approach economic inequality 
as a structural facet that informs personal experience through the use of a critical form of 
political economy, in order to parse out the continuing effects of class stratification. 
However, it is also the case that the notion of class is fraught with academic tensions 
through multiple and varied approaches. Despite its resurgence at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century as once again a useful concept in academic debate and public discourse 
(Savage, 2016), definitions and categorisations of people within a class structure differ 
greatly. The classical Marxist definition of class division as a binary opposition between 
exploitative bourgeois interests over proletarian basic needs (Coole, 1996) inspired the 
class politics of twentieth century Britain, with a ‘traditional working class’ located 
squarely in productive industries heralded as the ‘harbinger of progressive social change’ 
(Savage, 2016). But the decline of productive industry in the United Kingdom since the 
1970s, and with it, traditional working-class culture, has ostensibly undermined such 
analyses, leading to perhaps more ‘scientistic’ schemas meant to classify individuals and 
households within professional hierarchies of employment relationships rather than in and 
through the language of exploitation (cf. Goldthorpe, 1980, in Savage, 2016). These 
classifications tend to assign ‘people to social classes based on their occupational title and 
responsibilities over the workforce’ (Chandola, 2000: 641); the landmark study was 
Goldthorpe’s Nuffield class schema, out of which came the National Statistics Socio-
economic Classification, used in the UK census from 2001 onward as a way of gauging 
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class position. Savage (2015; 2016) has recently attempted to diversify these classifications 
with a Bourdieusian-inflected cultural sociology, highlighting the effects of social and 
cultural capital in the diversification of groups and individuals through a wide range of 
classes between the elites at the top of the structure and the precariat at the bottom.  
My own definition of class picks up on the relational characteristics emphasised by 
Louis Althusser, Etienne Balibar, and Nicos Poulantzas within the critical tradition, who 
argue that class as a system of stratification is an effect of the mechanisms of distribution 
within a social formation such as financialisation, rather than a set of freestanding 
categories of discrete social characteristics. Class is not only defined by a particular 
occupation or average income, then, but instead represents the development of a division 
of labour and the distribution of resources (Connell, 1979), where the benefits of higher 
classes are gained at the expense of the lower classes. It is therefore possible to observe 
material differences between groups of persons, where these differences are stable 
over time and reproduced within a group whose membership is also relatively stable 
[…] Material differences include measurable indices that can be summarized as life 
chances (income and wealth, job security, mortality rates etc.) (Coole, 1996: 17). 
 
Attempts to conceptualise modern class structure beyond the polarisation between 
proletariat and bourgeoisie in Althusser are admittedly vague for the purposes of thinking 
about what constitutes a financialised working class, given that Althusser was only 
beginning to grapple with white collar and clerical labour (Connell, 1979).  
But the precarious position in which Marx understands the working class to be in 
at the time of his own writing gives some insight into contemporary class relations, when 
he suggests that 
It is already contained within the concept of the free labourer that he [sic] is a pauper: 
virtual pauper. According to his economic conditions he is merely a living labour 
capacity […] If the capitalist has no use for his surplus labour then the worker may 
not perform his necessary labour (1973: 604, emphasis in original). 
 
Whilst those in typically middle-class professional-managerial occupations can also be 
considered as selling their labour for their own reproduction, it is those in precarious work 
with part-time or zero-hour contracts who often suffer in the event of unemployment, with 
no benefits and little income in reserve. The ‘fragmentation of traditional classes in terms 
of working conditions, incomes and attitudes’ (Coole, 1996: 18) toward the end of the 
twentieth century has certainly resulted in the end of a traditional working class 
characterised by its place in skilled or unskilled production relative to the managerial 
classes and owners. But income disparity and diminished life chances for many who work, 
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or struggle to find work, persists into the present. Commentators began to observe a new 
kind of polarisation dubbed the ‘two-thirds/one-third society’ (Therborn, 1989, in Coole, 
1996: 18; Office of National Statistics, 2006) which sees the traditional working class 
eclipsed by a precarious one-third of working households and those who struggle to find 
work, including indebted young workers, single parents, those with certain disabilities that 
make long-term work difficult, pensioners, and even various ethnic minorities. This, Coole 
notes, includes various lower levels of the traditional working class which ‘today shades 
into the underclass – precisely where its working becomes unreliable or yields wages below 
a certain level’. She is however quick to distinguish the differing connotations of the 
traditional and contemporary working-classes on the basis of the former’s ‘legacy of class 
struggle and organized political and economic activity’ (1996: 18). Guy Standing famously 
calls this class of precariously-waged workers the ‘precariat’ (2014), describing them as 
denizens rather than citizens owing to their economic insecurity and reduced access to 
benefits and services. The precariat, which exists partly as a consequence of the 
intensification of uneven distribution through financialisation and also struggles with the 
realities of financial involvement due to low or uncertain income as well as employment, 
is thus the focus of my interest in a contemporary working class. Their levels of debt and 
limited savings can, in general, be traced through the lowest earning quintile reported by 
the Office of National Statistics (2016), which has average annual earnings of less than 
£15,000. 
In light of systemic economic inequalities experienced by the precarious working 
class, I chronicle crucial institutional changes at the structural level that help shape the 
kinds of action available to actors in their everyday lives. Although it is theoretically 
reductionist to suggest that changes in a social structure inevitably determine changes at 
the level of subjectivity and action, this is not the same thing as arguing that structural 
changes create the conditions for new kinds of action, strategies, or reactions against 
surrounding social conditions. As regulation school political economy holds, the modes of 
social regulation, which can include norms, customs and habits, correspond to the 
institutional fixes that help stabilise and normalise crisis tendencies. I therefore chart the 
rise of financial subjectivity alongside the decline of the welfare state and the rise of what 
has been called post-Fordist growth in the financial and non-financial sectors, examining 
several important institutional shifts in corporate management, and the structure of 
banking, that enable people to adopt riskier strategies and courses of action. 
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According to Aglietta (2000) and Aglietta and Breton (2001), the rollback of the 
Keynesian welfare state and the emergence of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation also 
sees the rise of what is called the ‘ideology of shareholder value’, in which corporate 
management turns toward the maximisation of share prices over and above the security of 
employees and even the concerns of their customers (cf. Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Due to loosening restrictions on capital markets, a growing business sector emerged, 
characterised by corporate takeovers and competition, as well as an increase in the size of 
corporations. The maximisation of share prices was necessary to avoid takeovers, although 
it also created a culture that values financial objectives such as innovation and competition 
over security and consistency, for both firm managers and the workforce. This ideology of 
shareholder value therefore had two important consequences: firstly, it meant that firms 
were increasingly engaging in financial activity and trading on their own behalf rather than 
through banks, while, secondly, it introduced a new level of precariousness into lower-paid 
employees’ lives where their employment, wages, and benefits are concerned. Employees 
therefore had to embrace a certain level of risk. At the same time, banks began to 
restructure themselves to rely less on making loans to corporations, as a result of the latter’s 
increased capacity for trading, and more on providing personal financial services to 
households to draw a profit (Lapavitsas, 2011; 2013a; 2013b). The shift in retail banking 
services helps explain how individuals and households have been drawn into investment 
and borrowing in the climate of risk-taking described by commentators of shareholder 
value, in order to understand how investment and borrowing actually became regarded as 
viable strategies for managing household finances. 
However, policy and public discussion also effect changes in attitudes about what 
is important, or possible to achieve within society at a given time. The Thatcher 
government, elected in 1979 amongst the capitulation of the Keynesian national welfare 
state, encouraged independence from state provisions in its discourse about how to revive 
the economy, arguing that bureaucratic unions were stifling individual initiative needed 
for economic recovery. The need for independence, however, did not stop at the level of 
institutions, but permeated everyday life, with Thatcher advancing the notions of a 
‘shareholding’, ‘property owning democracy’, where share ownership and home 
ownership, indicating the privatisation of state assets, represented forms of independence 
from state provision. Thatcher may not have encouraged taking on debt, although her 
promotion of innovation as a solution to inequality, in the context of financial 
liberalisation, certainly made the acquisition of debt much easier for those with low wages. 
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Thus, through a shift in public discourse away from collectivist policies of the welfare state, 
toward privatisation and self-sufficiency, different possibilities for personal provision were 
made available and changed the way people made ends meet. Additionally, they also 
changed the way people thought about their circumstances, so that even those who did not 
agree with Thatcher had to contend with ideas of self-sufficiency, responsibility, and the 
need to take risks.  
Consequently, my understanding of subjectivity refers to how subjects act, which is 
to say, whether they can reasonably act in a way other than the adoption of a certain level 
of risk and responsibility within daily life. Thus, there may be great opposition to the 
acquisition of further debt or financial risks through investment, but a feeling that they are 
nonetheless the only way to make ends meet within the current configuration of structures, 
institutions, policies, and subjectivity. Once framed in a certain way there is, as Foucault 
(1994) observes, less scope for the presentation of alternative ideas and frames so that, 
although debate appears varied and diverse, it only oscillates between a particular range of 
ideas or opinions. This is also an important point worth bearing in mind when thinking 
about the future of financial subjectivity in light of defaults on financial obligations, or a 
noticeable lack of savings across British households. As I note in the fourth and fifth 
chapters of this thesis, Clark et al. (2012) question whether a form of self-governing 
financial subjectivity is in decline as a result of a lack of saving and investing for the future 
on the part of households in the United Kingdom. They illustrate the emergence of a 
‘libertarian paternalism’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2013) that assumes individuals will not 
make informed decisions in planning for retirement, and so sees employers enrolling their 
workforces with the option to opt out later, rather than employees having to make the 
choice to opt into plans earlier. Clark et al. (2012) see this as evidence that the self-sufficient 
individual who makes appropriate financial choices never completely materialised. 
However, as Feher (2009) maintains, any investment that subjects make in themselves, 
whether they prepare themselves suitably for the future or badly, still manifests as part of 
the valuation of their portfolio of human assets. I therefore suggest, in a similar vein, that 
the policies associated with a libertarian paternalism are still firmly located in the realm of 
finance in order to encourage better investments. That is to say, the remedy to a situation 
in which people do not invest enough seems to take the form of structured programmes 
aimed at encouraging responsible, focused investment, alongside financial literacy 
programmes to cultivate a better knowledge of how pensions and equity markets function. 
In short, the solutions lie squarely within a range of ideas associated with finance, rather 
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than with, for example, those associated with the welfare state. This, I argue, is indicative 
of the overall internalisation of risk-taking within contemporary capitalism, as a remedy to 
problems and as key for prosperity.  
 
Metatheory and methodology: Reasoning about the research process as a whole 
As a theoretical piece of work, my thesis aims to uncover the underlying processes that 
contribute to subjectivation and the differential experience of financial subjectivity. It 
therefore relies on a critical reading of texts and academic debates surrounding 
individualisation, self-regulation, and economic inequality, most notably in the assessment 
of Foucault’s outline of governmentality in the neoliberal condition, as well as its broader 
use in academic literature to discuss the regulation of self-conduct. This is done in relation 
to empirical conjunctures, which include statistical indicators of individual and household 
engagement with capital markets across British society comprising debt linked to credit, 
loans and other financial products as well as mortgages; rates of savings and investment in 
pensions; or even the increase in basic bank account holding over the last 40 years. The 
thesis therefore takes a critical realist approach, meaning it is concerned with the causal 
processes undergirding these empirical observations and the underlying processes that 
make them possible (cf. Bhaskar, 1989; Sayer, 2000). In addition to these indicators, I also 
take seriously the role of discourse in shaping subjective experience, as yet another causal 
mechanism with the power to give meaning to situations, persuade individuals, and to help 
them make sense of their lives on a daily basis.  
This approach therefore takes after the kind of critical political economy which 
Andrew Sayer argues must account for the effects of the ‘lifeworld’ on economic systems, 
where the former refers specifically to the realm of personal experiences, understandings, 
and subconscious biases and assumptions as a product of socialisation (2001: 689). To do 
so is to take seriously the ways in which people make sense of, and therefore interact with 
the economic structures that surround them. The cultural turn that Ngai-Ling Sum and 
Bob Jessop advocate involves an appreciation of culture as it is expressed through 
discourses that permeate social relations, including economic structures and corresponding 
political policies, rather than an isolated sphere in itself. Here political economy  
 makes a cultural turn, broadly conceived as an interest in semiosis, to interpret and,  
in part, explain events, processes, tendencies and emergent structures in the field of 
political economy. Semiosis involves the social production of inter-subjective 
meaning and, as such, is a foundational moment of all social practices and relations 
(2010: 445).   
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In other words, cultural political economy seeks to understand how people produce shared 
senses and meaning within the material relations that socialise them. Unlike the cultural 
economy of actor-network theorists, which takes discourse itself to be performative and 
thus able to produce markets and economic relations, cultural political economy holds 
discourse to be an entry point into the study of economic relations because it frames the 
way in which social actors predominantly understand a wide array of objects and 
possibilities. 
 Kutter and Jessop outline the process through which cultural political economists 
study the derivation of sense and meaning from situations, beginning from the premise that 
‘no individual or collective agent can ever comprehend the totality of all economic (and 
economically relevant) activities in all its complexity – let alone in real time’ (2014: 66). A 
period of capital accumulation under study, such as financialisation, can therefore be called 
an ‘economic imaginary’, as an ‘enforced effort to reduce that complexity as a condition 
of going on in the world’ (ibid.). In short, the economic imaginary represents a coherent 
way of thinking about myriad economic phenomena based on prevalent features like 
financial accumulation. An economic imaginary is developed in two ways. The first, 
‘complexity reduction’, renders an otherwise complex and intricate world into one that can 
be grasped, calculated, and acted upon, while ‘structuration’ refers to ‘the setting of limits 
to compossible combinations of social relations and stabilizing the expectations and 
actions of diverse individual and collective actors’ in order to reduce ‘the complexity of the 
economic world by establishing temporary fixes in time and space that allow for continued 
accumulation’ (ibid., cf. Sum and Jessop 2013). Structuration and complexity reduction 
are therefore not the same as suggesting that all social practices are socially constructed 
through language and speech acts and consequently reducible to semiosis itself. Semiosis 
is, importantly, not simply the ‘play of difference among signs’, but also involves external 
reference to ‘extra-semiotic conditions’, or, consideration of the material conditions which 
give rise to certain understandings and meanings; semiosis is inevitably embedded ‘in 
material practices and their relation to the constraints and affordances of the natural and 
social world’ (ibid.). Indeed, as I explore in this thesis, discourse may contribute to the 
understanding of a socioeconomic situation such as household responsibility in financial 
terms, but it does not altogether allow individuals to transcend material barriers of financial 
inequality and material lacking. I illustrate this with reference to Margaret Thatcher’s 
insistence on personal responsibility and innovation as key to overcoming poverty and 
financial difficulty, with reference to current levels of economic disparity. 
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 In order to examine the development of the financial economic imaginary, I use a 
form of discourse analysis known as critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992) to study 
the ways in which individuals are subjectivated through political and economic discourses 
or policy prescriptions, as I outline in Chapter Three. Subjectivation is enabled through the 
selection of certain discourses over others for interpretation and explanation of events or 
phenomena. These discourses are then retained, or reproduced. In keeping with Foucault’s 
understanding of discourses, they may be retained and reproduced through the identities 
of social agents, including the ways in which they speak and act, as well as within the built 
environment (Fairclough, Jessop, and Sayer, 2004). As such, critical discourse analysis 
requires the study of context, such as social structures, institutions, or policies of an 
economic imaginary, in order to be able to interpret how discourses work on subjects. 
 Based on previous work done within cultural political economy, I employ a study 
of what is known as the ‘periodization of capitalism’ (Jessop, 2001a), which deals with the 
strategic possibilities that a period of capitalist development, such as Fordist growth in the 
Keynesian national welfare state, or in this case, the so-called post-Fordist financial period 
of growth, provides for subjects at any given time. I provide an analysis in the first chapter 
of the institutional fixes that not only serve to stabilise finance-led growth and 
accumulation, but also subjective experience of finance as key to personal growth. In this 
way, Parisian regulation theory, with its study of different periods of capitalist growth that 
sustain accumulation, and the modes of social regulation that help maintain these periods 
(Peck and Tickell, 1992), undergird my work in general. Regulation theory, which 
ultimately seeks to understand how, in spite of numerous crises capitalism sustains itself, 
also provides an analysis of the forms of social regulation that help reduce the complexity 
of economic situations for subjects. Consequently, the thesis is ultimately concerned with 
causal mechanisms, both discursive and structural, that create and sustain financial 
subjectivity. This is achieved through the process of ‘retroduction’, which Andrew Sayer 
suggests is a  
mode of inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) 
mechanisms which are capable of producing them. […] In many cases the 
mechanism so retroduced will already be familiar from other situations and some 
will actually be observable. In others, hitherto unidentified mechanisms may be 
hypothesized (2010: 107). 
 
In the remainder of this section, I outline my metatheoretical commitments to critical 
realism, which gives theoretical coherence to my methodology as a whole.  
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 To the extent that cultural political economy draws from regulation theory and its 
focus on forms of economic and social regulation of distinct periods of capitalism, cultural 
political economy shares its similar commitment to realist social science, in an adherence 
to a materialist conception of society that is characterised by the interplay between social 
structures and socialised actors. In other words, people, who are born into social relations 
that pre-exist them, make decisions and choices, as well as take action, within a material 
context that shapes what they are able to do. As such, it is important to capture the relations 
that shape or restrain action in exploring the question of differential experiences of 
financial subjectivity, which is therefore not purely a question of interpretation of discourse 
and action, nor is it only about proving the existence of inequality through specific 
indicators. Indeed, critical realism is intended as an alternative to positivist explanation of 
empirically testable events on one hand, and hermeneutic interpretation of cultural 
uncertainty that characterises the postmodern rejection of a ‘hard’ social science, on the 
other (Benton, 2007; Sayer, 2000). While positivism engenders ‘showing that [an event] is 
an instance of a well-supported regularity’ (Keat and Urry, 1975: 9), hermeneutics, in 
contrast, entails the study and interpretations of texts and meanings common in so much 
postmodern sociology (Sayer, 2000). Each of these approaches is, I argue, inadequate for 
the study of subjectivation, which involves the examination of processes that give rise to a 
particular way of being and understanding. While this relies on the observation of 
empirical conjunctures, such as documented changes in financial accumulation and 
household access to financial products, financial subjectivity itself, as the recognition of 
oneself or one’s goals in relation to financial politics and practices, is irreducible to the 
statistical observation of more engagement with capital markets, for example. Likewise, 
while the study of financial subjectivity relies on the study of meaning-making and 
understanding of processes surrounding subjectivity, this is not the same thing as 
suggesting that the study of subjectivity is one of interpretation alone. This is why the 
critical realist approach, which grounds meaning and understanding in material practices 
and occurrences, is the best approach for this thesis. 
 Critical realism ‘distinguishes not only between the world and our experience of it, 
but between the real, the actual and the empirical’ (Sayer, 2000: 11). The real constitutes 
‘whatever exists, be it natural or social, regardless of whether it is an empirical object for 
us and whether we happen to have an adequate understanding of its nature. Secondly, the 
real is the realm of objects, their structures and powers’ (ibid.), including change through 
causal powers. The actual, then, refers to the circumstances that arise in the activation of 
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those powers, while the empirical is ‘the domain of experience, and insofar as it refers 
successfully, it can do so with respect to either the real or the actual though it is contingent 
[…] whether we know the real or actual’ (ibid., 12). Similarly, Datta defines the empirical 
as ‘what people experience of the material world through their senses’ (2012: 105), which 
has the effect of specifying the immediate relation of empirical objects of study to 
individual perception. As such, empirical perception does not tell the entire story of 
material and causal relations, even if it provides an indication. While it certainly admits 
the importance of empirical verification in some instances, then, critical realism does not 
proceed from empirical objects as the data from which to derive a theory, since it 
acknowledges that such objects of our understanding are usually the result of sets of forces 
and interactions that are not entirely observable, and must themselves be theorised. They 
are, as a result, always invested with certain conceptions and preconditions, so it is never 
possible to approach the study of an object from a totally disinterested (or theoretically 
uninformed) position (Datta, 2012). Critical realism is therefore ‘wary of simple 
correspondence concepts of truth’, since ‘the world can only be known under particular 
descriptions, in terms of available discourses’ (Sayer, 2000: 2). In contrast to 
postmodernism, however, it is not necessarily the case that all discourses are equally 
appropriate to describe or explain a circumstance, on the grounds that some descriptions 
may better account for actually-existing material phenomena. A major task of the critical 
realist project in the context of critical or cultural political economy is thus the explanation 
of the emergence of particular social relations of inequality through a demonstration of the 
way in which ‘some event or change brings about a new state of affairs’ (Keat and Urry, 
1975: 31) in the attempt to grasp more abstract concepts of power contained within the 
levels of the real and the actual. This is a key distinction relative to the nominalist 
inflections of cultural economy and actor-network theory more broadly, which sees vivid 
description of particular conjunctures as the only means of understanding broader social 
connections (Latour, 1996).  
 
Outline of the remainder 
Besides an introduction and conclusion, this thesis is comprised of five chapters, which I 
outline here. The first chapter, ‘A political economy of financial subjectivity and daily life 
in the British finance-led growth regime’, defines financial subjectivity as a process that 
transforms the way individuals and their households make ends meet in the shift from 
personal savings and thrift, to investment and borrowing. It draws on inroads made by 
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Langley (2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b) in the literature on everyday finance to understand 
how daily spending habits have changed since the 1970s. It also alludes in a deeper fashion 
to a broader structural picture of a declining welfare state, involving employers’ waning 
commitment to employee pension and their subsequent privatisation under Margaret 
Thatcher. However, economic restructuring, such as the liberalisation of capital markets, 
is also responsible for the growing number of financial products available to consumers as 
alternatives to saving, in addition to a wide scale expansion of consumer borrowing 
through credit, loans and mortgages. I chart these institutional changes in this chapter, 
beginning with the emergence of the ‘ideology of shareholder value’ (Aglietta and Breton, 
2001; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000), to understand the introduction of work-related and 
fiscal instability into everyday life, before turning to the concurrent restructuring of banks 
and financial institutions to investigate how large numbers of individuals and households 
were drawn into financial markets through a wide range of investment products as well as 
loans, mortgages, and credit. I argue that these processes contribute to the production of 
subjects of finance within the United Kingdom. However, in addition to thinking about 
subjectivation as a form of governance over self-conduct, following Foucault (1985; 1988; 
1994), I situate subjectivity back into the context of class and stratification (Althusser, 
1971) in order to understand the differential nature of subjectivation. 
 Chapter two outlines the metatheoretical approaches underpinning the key 
arguments of the thesis. The first is critical realism, with its focus on retroduction as a 
means of deriving causal mechanisms that contribute to the rise in a financialised 
subjectivity. Within political economy, I address the approach of the Parisian regulation 
school, with a crucial focus on the process of subjectivation, and the accomplishment of 
subjectivity itself, as a form of social regulation that contributes to the support of a 
financialised regime of accumulation. From the perspective of cultural political economy 
as a complement to the regulation approach, I highlight the variation, selection, and 
retention of discourses, in order to understand the inflection of meaning within the process 
of subjectivation. I introduce narrative policy analysis as a way of studying discourse as a 
form of subjective understanding, before moving into a discourse analysis in Chapter 
Three. 
 The third chapter, ‘Discourse and subjectivation: Thatcherism as a financialising 
discourse’, looks at the discursive constitution of financial subjects by tracing the rise of 
Margaret Thatcher’s discourse of personal responsibility and self-reliance in the United 
Kingdom, during the 1980s and 1990s. While the structural shifts noted in the first chapter 
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illustrate the material conditions through which subjectivity is shaped, subjects also have 
ways of making sense of their complex situations and surroundings in the course of 
internalising the need to take risks as central to their own goals and lives. This chapter 
therefore examines the cultural dimension in the process of subjectivation: following 
Kutter and Jessop (2014), I think about Thatcher’s ideology as a form of ‘complexity 
reduction’, in its promotion of self-sufficiency and personal innovation as key to 
rejuvenating the economy. I use a Foucauldian-inspired form of critical discourse analysis, 
which highlights the selection and retention of discourses as part of the creation of subjects 
in the context of a discursive formation (Foucault, 1970), which is the body of knowledge 
about an object such as the economy. I make specific reference to Thatcher’s Budget 
speeches and Party Conference speeches, as carefully curated policy proposals and 
forecasts, in order to understand how discourse itself is a causal mechanism that inspires 
legislation, which has material manifestations, but also shapes a terrain of discourse and 
public understanding of economic events. Critical discourse analysis enables us to see how 
certain discourses can be selected by those seeking to frame a situation from many potential 
explanations of events, and retained or reproduced through subjective dispositions, 
including ways of talking and acting, as well as objective dispositions in the environment, 
such as organisational practices. Selection and retention are therefore matters of the 
successful exertion of power, which is why the policies of the Thatcher government are 
such helpful illustrations of these practices.  
 The first three chapters, then, deal primarily with the constitutions of subjects 
through structural and discursive processes. However, subjectivation never proceeds in a 
completely unproblematic fashion, with Foucault suggesting that forms of resistance 
always exist. These may not necessarily be large scale acts of organised protest, but can 
take the form of a failure to comply with expectations through daily struggles against the 
restrictive nature of financial subjectivity, operating as it does through the precarious 
nature of the repayment of debts. This is particularly the case with the precariat which 
typically has fewer assets and savings to rely on, given the large amount of debt they carry 
at a time when household entrepreneurialism typically demands fiscal responsibility and 
prowess. Chapter four, ‘Daily struggles in investing and borrowing up to the financial 
crisis’, therefore details these difficulties. In the first half of the chapter, I introduce 
struggles in saving and investing brought on by pension reform and privatisation in the 
United Kingdom since 1979. Where pension provision had previously been a concern of 
the welfare state, where the responsibility for risk lay collectively with society, Thatcher’s 
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reforms in the direction of privatisation, in which employers shifted from defined benefit 
to defined contribution pensions, saw risks borne by individuals instead. The New Labour 
government furthered this trend, leading to the availability of multiple state- and employer-
sponsored schemes, although as Clark et al. (2012) note, many people were unaware of the 
differences between state and private pensions. The confusing nature of the respective 
programmes led to insufficient working individuals and households making adequate 
contributions toward retirement, so that a ‘new paternalism’ (ibid.) became necessary to 
ensure appropriate levels of saving. However, as I detail in the second half of the chapter, 
the savings of the precariat are generally undermined by high levels of debt from 
borrowing, although even this process is complicated by market restrictions on high-risk 
borrowers and their shift to subprime, high-cost markets. These kinds of issues demonstrate 
the highly unequal nature of financial subjectivity between the precariat and higher classes. 
 The fifth and final chapter seeks to answer the question as to whether precarious 
working-class subjectivity can still be considered financialised given every day struggles 
with saving and borrowing. I refer to the incompleteness of the subject, implied by 
Foucault, in relation to Althusserian overdetermination (1969), to illustrate how class, a 
concept missing from Foucault’s seemingly flat ontology, conditions subjective experience. 
Overdetermination means that multiple contradictions such as that between saving and the 
repayment of debt, are condensed and experienced ‘in a real unity’ (ibid., 100). Hence, the 
implication is that the many contradictions associated with the need for stability in 
tumultuous economic circumstances are reflected in the category of precariat: precarious 
working-class financial subjects have a different experience of what it means to be 
‘financialised’ than their higher-class counterparts. Solutions to these problems, which are 
increasingly recognised as social issues, are, however, located squarely within the realm of 
finance, insofar as they include financial literacy programmes to encourage saving and 
sustainable borrowing, or ‘choice architectures’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) which prompt 
responsible forms of decision-making. Finance is thus still used as a way of solving 
problems, contributing further to the process of subjectivation.  
 
Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has proposed the concept of financial subjectivity as a means of 
studying the increasing reliance of working individuals and households on financial 
products, such as unit trusts, insurance, and private pensions to plan for the future, as well 
as the use of loans, credit cards or mortgages to make ends meet. Consequently, as I have 
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stressed, financial subjectivity itself refers to the recognition that such products and 
practices are nearly necessary in everyday life, either for getting by fiscally, or meeting 
future financial goals. This process of subjectivation represents as much a key element of 
financialisation as the spread of finance across the globe through industries and markets, 
insofar as it illustrates the extent to which even private household finances are now 
entwined with the fluctuations of global markets. As such, it is important for political 
economy to examine how and why households become integrated, as well as the barriers 
to their success in navigating financial markets, which often include a low income or 
precarious employment, which makes it difficult to invest and repay money with any 
consistency. Indeed, perhaps the most characteristic feature of the contemporary 
precarious working class in the United Kingdom is the degree to which they are 
constrained, rather than enabled, by debt as it becomes a looming burden that is both 
difficult to repay and inhibits investment insofar as it is even possible. This means that, 
although financial subjectivity involves the individualisation of people, so that they are 
charged with a self-reliant entrepreneurialism, class still plays a major role in determining 
whether they will be successful financial subjects or not, which, in turn, implies that class 
analysis still has a vital role to play in sociological studies of contemporary capitalism. 
 Following an outline of this problem, I then explained the theoretical methodology 
I use throughout the thesis, which can be broadly summarised as a critical form of political 
economy known as cultural political economy. Cultural political economy takes not only 
material events and circumstances seriously, but also the meaning attributed to them and 
derived from them by actors socialised in a concrete context. To this end, it relies on the 
study of causal mechanisms that give rise to periods of capital accumulation, which are 
sustained and reproduced for a time through economic and social modes of regulation. It 
also requires an examination of discourse, to uncover the assumptions and preconceptions 
undergirding peoples’ understanding of their economic situation, in the form of what is 
called an ‘economic imaginary’. Underlying these approaches, then, is a commitment to 
critical realist metatheory, which seeks to study not only the material mechanisms that give 
rise to and sustain social relations, but also the necessity of meaning in social life. Finally, 
I provided five outlines of the chapters and their arguments that make up this thesis. I now 
turn to a thorough definition of financial subjectivity, which is the content of the first 
chapter of the thesis.  
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Chapter One: 	
A political economy of financial subjectivity and daily life in the British 
finance-led growth regime	
Introduction  
The financialisation of the economy over a period of 30 years in the United Kingdom from 
1980 onward is a compelling phenomenon from the perspective of the study of inequality 
and social stratification, because it introduces a level of risk into the daily financial 
decisions of British individuals and households that post-war welfare policies were 
intended to reduce. The disconnection of wages from productivity growth and their 
subsequent stagnation (Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegreto, 2007) as a consequence of the 
predominance of the financial over the productive sector (Palley, 2013) has undoubtedly 
caused problems for households in general, as the cost of living rises. But for the precariat, 
as a group which is overall underpaid due to short-term or precarious employment in 
unskilled sectors or service industries, the shortfall is often only manageable by taking on 
large levels of debt (Office of National Statistics, 2016), which can be difficult to escape 
owing to unpredictable or limited income. Thus, while there is a general shift to riskier 
practices of borrowing to finance purchases or saving through investing (Langley, 2008a), 
there is a distinct disadvantage to the contemporary British precariat.  
In this chapter, I will therefore provide an outline of the integration of precarious 
households within capital markets in the United Kingdom over a period of 30 years. I term 
the process in which individuals and households become reliant on financial markets to 
make ends meet, financial subjectivation, or the creation of financial subjects through 
institutional discourses and practices that encourage personal innovation and risk-taking 
behaviour using capital markets. Financial subjectivity is thus not about an appetite for 
risk, on the part of those involved in market or business relations, but rather the opposite, 
in which those who are otherwise financially risk-averse are incorporated into the market 
through institutional discourses and practices, requiring them to consider their goals and 
objectives through the lens of financialised policies and in relation to the market itself. For 
example, personal investment, instead of savings, has become a means of securing 
economic stability for households both in the present and future, given that it holds the 
possibility of greater returns than savings alone (Langley, 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b). 
Employers’ waning commitments to collective insurance mean that much of the workforce 
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have to consider investing in private pensions (Boyer, 2000; Langley, 2008a; Lapavitsas, 
2011) instead of relying on occupational welfare (Cutler and Waine, 2001).  
The subjectivation of individuals is, however, still a very class-based process 
(Lapavitsas, 2009a; 2011), given that the precariat are more likely to have large levels of 
debt and simultaneously less likely to have accumulated savings. As I illustrate in greater 
detail throughout the thesis, debt actually acts as a restriction on the kind of entrepreneurial 
activity that precarious working-class individuals and households can engage in, by 
limiting future possibilities for both market and self-investment with the repayment of past 
financial obligations. To this end, I sketch out the process of subjectivation as it affects the 
precariat in order to illustrate the inscription of social stratification and inequality within 
the overarching social structures of financialised capitalism. This requires a critical realist 
approach, which enables an understanding of how the interaction of subjects and structures 
produces and sustains new forms of stratification, which, in this case, require individuals 
and households to take risks in order to earn rewards. I begin, then, by tracing the origins 
of precariat financial subjectivity as it emerges alongside financialisation itself, before 
considering why, from a theoretical standpoint, critical realism is so crucial to the work of 
conceptualising the resulting forms of inequality that persist today.  
 
Approaches to financialisation, and the role of subjectivity  
According to Robert Boyer, financialised economies are generally characterised by ‘giant 
mergers, capital mobility between countries, pressures on corporate governance, [and] 
diffusion of equity among a larger fraction of the population’ (2000: 116). The academic 
study of financialisation therefore emerged in the 1990s, as a consequence of the 
deregulation of financial markets in the 1970s and the subsequent climate of ‘financial 
liberalisation’ that enabled financial accumulation (Lapavitsas, 2009b), although the 
increasing prevalence of capital markets in the generation of profit has certainly been 
acknowledged by political economists writing at the beginning of the decline of the welfare 
state (e.g., Baran and Sweezy, 1966). On one hand, financialisation is studied by political 
economists, who are predominantly interested in the global accumulation of profits in the 
financial sphere (e.g., Epstein and Jayadev, 2005), and the concurrent decline of profits in 
the productive spheres (e.g., Jessop, 2013). They investigate the macroeconomic 
development of profit rates (e.g., van Treeck, 2009), in addition to the microeconomic 
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behaviour of firms, and the managers who are devoted to maximising their firm’s 
shareholder value on the market (e.g., Aglietta, 2000; Aglietta and Breton, 2001; Crotty, 
2005; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Krippner, 2005). In short, then, political economists have 
been primarily concerned with the study of the market mechanisms that give rise to, and 
sustain financial accumulation at both national and international levels.  
On the other hand, financialisation is also studied by actor-network theorists who 
are interested in how technology, and the development of economic models (e.g., 
MacKenzie, 2006) actually contribute to the rise of financialisation. Unlike political 
economists, they consider that there ‘is no singular “global financial system”, [...] but a 
web of diverse networks of finance, each “made up of human bodies but also of prostheses, 
tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, etc.”’ (Calon, cited in Langley, 2008a: 23). 
From this perspective, it is important to examine the interaction of people and technology 
in the creation of new modes of governance (cf. Foucault, 1994) that define how 
individuals act. Actor-network theorists, advancing an approach termed ‘cultural 
economy’ (du Gay and Pryke, 2002), which acknowledges the role that discourse plays in 
performing economic relations, have therefore made important contributions to the 
emerging field of everyday finance (e.g., Langley, 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b) by thinking 
about how personal investment and borrowing form networks that develop alongside, and 
subsequently integrate with, financial networks on a global scale. Where political 
economists have studied the transformation of economies on a national and international 
scale as a consequence of new patterns of accumulation, actor-network theorists working 
within cultural economics have attempted to account for changes at the level of household 
spending and saving behaviours resulting from the spread of financialised discourses, 
models, and technologies. It is here that the question of subjectivity, or the integration of 
individuals into financial markets, becomes pertinent.  
As a contribution to a critical form of political economy, this chapter situates the 
study of financialisation within the process of subjectivation (Althusser, 1971; Foucault, 
1994) that occurs when individuals are subject to the demands of financial institutions and 
markets. Specifically, financial markets are touted as the most effective way to provide for 
households and individuals. This, of course, differs from the attitudes of successful risk-
taking entrepreneurs who control large amounts of wealth in business sectors, as it instead 
refers to the need for the adoption of risk-taking behaviours on the part of typically risk-
averse individuals in making household financial decisions. This difference, between 
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entrepreneurs in business who have been trained to manage risk, and ‘everyday’ 
entrepreneurs, who often do not understand financial risk, illustrates the persistence of 
social stratification and class divisions among households in the contemporary United 
Kingdom. Thus, while I am interested in how individuals and households incorporate the 
demands of the market in providing for themselves and planning for their futures, I 
maintain the importance of analysing and understanding the pre-existing structures and 
institutions that individuals and groups are born into, and with which they engage.  
While I acknowledge the importance of Paul Langley’s (2008a) work on the 
constitution of investor subjects and their everyday interactions with finance, I depart from 
his reliance on actor-network theory owing to his rejection of overarching social structures 
in favour of interconnected networks, which are performed by actors. In other words, his 
work eschews the duality between agency and structure (Callon, 2005; Latour, 1996) for 
actors, of both a human and non-human variety (including machines, technology, 
economic models, etc.) as they are embedded within networks of nodes which ‘plait’ ‘weak 
ties’ into strong bonds that sustain society itself (Latour, 1996). My work, in contrast, 
retains a distinctly realist understanding of the social relations and structures particular to 
a period of capitalist growth, as causal mechanisms capable of actualising certain 
conditions or strategies for some subjects, but not others. As Jessop puts it, the interaction 
of individuals and their surroundings enables an understanding of ‘the strategic possibilities 
any given period provides for different actors, different identities, different interests, 
different coalition possibilities, different horizons of action, different strategies, different 
tactics’, rather than the simple determination of agents by structures (2001a: 285 – 86). In 
this respect, my theoretical approach follows some of the developments of the regulation 
school, a form of political economy inflected with realist concerns. I think about 
financialisation in the United Kingdom as a period of capitalist development known as a 
‘regime of accumulation’ (Aglietta, 1979), or ‘growth regime’ (Jessop, 2013) that succeeds 
the industrial production and accumulation of twentieth-century Fordism, which saw 
profits derived from mass production (Aglietta, 1979). A finance-led regime of 
accumulation, in contrast, relies on ‘labour market flexibility, price stability, developing 
high tech sectors, booming stock market and credit to sustain the rapid growth of 
consumption, and permanent optimism of expectations in firms’ (Boyer, 2000: 116). The 
stability of such a regime of accumulation can be understood in terms of its ‘institutional 
fixes’ (Jessop, 2013), or configurations of structures and institutions that mediate crisis 
tendencies. In this case, market liberalisation, and the subsequent restructuring of 
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corporations around shareholder value, have led to the emergence of a competitive 
business sector, from which profits can be derived (Boyer, 2000; French et al., 2011). 
Regulation school political economy thus explains how strategies on the part of 
policymakers, and individuals within institutions combine to stabilise growth regimes 
against economic uncertainty and crisis.  
The regulation school has, however, been criticised for failing to consider the 
possibility that instability in a growth regime occurs as a consequence of ‘contradictions 
and [...] incoherence at the level of [...] households’ (Froud. Johal, and Williams, 2002: 
135). In other words, it is not entirely clear from regulation theory alone, how individuals 
and households contribute to the reproduction of a regime of accumulation, or, conversely, 
to its collapse. As Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum put it,  
regulationist work [tends] to neglect the specific subjectivities, modes of calculation 
and strategic action that help reproduce the capital relation. This is reflected in the 
tendency to describe the structural context for social forces’ actions without actually 
explaining these actions (2006: 256).  
To address this shortcoming in order to be able to grasp how certain structural 
configurations enable particular kinds of subjective experiences, it is necessary to 
supplement the regulation approach with cultural turns in political economy, namely, what 
Sum and Jessop have called ‘cultural political economy’ (2013). This approach, which is 
outlined in greater detail in Chapter Two, holds that the economy is a complex world made 
up of material relations that pre-exist individuals. It explores ‘how complexity is reduced 
(but not thereby mastered) through sense- and meaning-making (semiosis) and through 
limiting compossible social relations (structuration)’ (ibid., 3). Cultural economists 
influenced by actor-network theory examine the assemblage of firms and industries, in 
addition to individual actors themselves, through discourses that perform the functions of 
the economy. Cultural political economy, in contrast, does not see discourse as 
constituting the economy itself, but rather understands it as an entry point into the existing, 
material world, through which to make sense of complexity. In other words, it is important 
not only to describe structural relations, but also to understand how individuals make sense 
of their surroundings and consequently interact with them. To sum up, then, I proceed 
from the assumptions of regulation school political economy, which hold that capitalist 
development occurs in specific periods, in order to understand how structures and 
institutions particular to these growth regimes either limit or enable action on the part of 
subjects. Additionally, I seek to understand how individuals make sense of this 
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environment, in order to parse out the implications of financialised subjects for the growth 
and development of a finance-led growth regime in the United Kingdom.  
 
The creation of subjects and the structural contexts of inequality  
In contrast to the thick description of investor subjects provided by Langley (2008a) in his 
study of everyday finance, I outline in this section a critical realist understanding of the 
production of subjects in the context of the finance-led growth regime in the United 
Kingdom. I am therefore not only concerned with how everyday practices of finance 
interweave with global financial networks, but rather with how pre-existing structures and 
institutions help to shape how individuals interact with finance, and what they can do. 
Unlike actor-network theory, critical realism contains explanatory potential, given its 
interest in causal mechanisms that could account for the rise and normalisation of financial 
mechanisms in everyday life, which prove useful for some, and impenetrable for others. I 
address these structural mechanisms in the following section. Here, I elaborate on the 
process of subjectivation, or the creation of subjects through power relations (Foucault, 
1988; 1994; Sayer, 2012), according to Foucault, although I supplement the notion of 
governmentality with Althusserian class-based subjectivity given that the former fails to 
account for the social relations in which subjects have to govern themselves. My aim, then, 
is to make clear how a process that is seemingly individualising in its classification of 
subjects, is still inherently stratified along class lines.  
Actor-network theorists have gravitated toward Michel Foucault’s use of 
‘governmentality’ to describe an increasing tendency toward self-regulation on the part of 
individuals under contemporary capitalism. For Foucault, the government of subjects 
entails the actualisation of power within a discursive field wherein the ‘individual is led to 
constitute him or herself as a subject’ (2008: 5). Consequently, governmentality refers to  
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very 
complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major 
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument 
(2007: 108).  
Langley therefore argues that ‘the concept of governmentality suggests that all subjects’ 
perceived self-interests as investors are discursively framed and manifest in their reflective, 
intentional and aspirational practices’. Although sometimes ‘contingency, contradictions, 
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tensions and ambiguities are also likely to be present in the making of investor identities’ 
(2007: 73) as a result of struggles against constraints and power relations (Foucault, 1994).  
According to Joseph, however, Foucauldian governmentality ‘suffers from a lack 
of structure and social stratification’, which is ‘reflected in [Foucault’s] refusal to see a 
hierarchy of social institutions’ (2004: 162). After all, as Andrew Sayer notes, ‘enduring 
structures are not reducible to chance configurations of force relations coming together [...] 
important though these may be. They are in many cases intentionally constructed, on the 
basis of cultural and legal templates that successfully mobilise materials’ (2012: 186 – 87). 
In a similar vein, Paul Datta suggests that power relations always have to be situated within 
broader social relations, given that ‘the structure of the social formation [...] allows us to 
account for the place of dominance, allowing us, then, to account for how strategizing is 
possible and effective’ (2007: 293). Where Foucault considers subjectivation in terms of 
the ‘analysis of the pragmatics of self and the forms it has taken’ (2008: 5), critical realism 
enables an examination of the ‘underlying structures and generative mechanisms’ (Joseph, 
2004: 162) that actually give rise to certain forms of subjectivity. In short, while 
acknowledging, as Foucault does, that forms of subjectivity are always susceptible to 
disruption as a result of ‘contingency, difference and discontinuity’ (ibid., 164), I argue that 
the power relations that constitute subjects must be contextualised within a social 
formation, or growth regime, since this helps to explain how the actions of subjects ‘that 
are compatible with the recursive reproduction of the structure(s) in question’ are 
‘differentially reward[ed]’ (Jessop, 2001a: 285). Some individuals, after all, are better at 
acting in accordance with expectations placed on them than others, owing to ‘their 
different capacities to persuade, read particular conjunctures, displace opponents, and 
rearticulate discourses and imaginaries in a timely fashion’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 204), 
while others similarly struggle to achieve these things. This is why, whilst acknowledging 
the arbitrariness of power relations in keeping with Foucault, it is also crucial that they be 
situated within a social formation that explains hierarchies and inequalities.  
To do this, I employ Louis Althusser’s work on the role of historically constituted 
individuals in the reproduction of social formations, as a theoretical complement to 
Foucauldian subjectivation. Althusser is interested in the ways in which subjects internalise 
and act on the objectives of a social formation ‘all by [themselves]’ (1971: 169), while 
questioning, in a fashion similar to Foucault, ‘how certain concepts functioned in specific 
historical conjunctures’ (Montag, 1995: 57). Although Foucault undoubtedly rejects the 
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concept of ideology and the notion of scientific Marxism, both he and Althusser adopt a 
theoretically anti-humanist approach in the study of subjectivity by problematising the 
notion of the individual, providing a certain level of theoretical continuity (Montag, 1995; 
Youdell, 2006). Foucault’s outline of the process of subjectivation turns on the ways in 
which individuals are ‘tied to [their] own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’ (1994: 
130), and one of these forms of knowledge includes ‘the objectivizing of the productive 
subject [...] in the analysis of wealth and economics’ (ibid., 126). For Althusser, the 
economic realm is not simply one of many modes of subjectivation, but the one that 
explains how subjects produce and consume their means of subsistence, thereby grounding 
the distribution of resources within the social formation, and the subsequent stratification 
of subjects. In the capitalist social formation, the working class are thus hailed, or 
‘interpellated’ as individuals with specific roles to play in the accumulation of capital, 
working entirely of their own accord (1971: 182). Called up as free and autonomous 
individuals by apparatuses like the family, religious or educational systems, legal and 
political institutions, or within culture (ibid., 143), subjects regard themselves as freely 
engaged in their activities, despite constraints that maintain class divisions.1 Hence, then, 
in keeping with Foucault, subjects are formed within particular conjunctures through 
discursive practices about the self that, as Althusser has it, stem from material apparatuses 
of a specific social formation.  
 
Financial subjectivity and its structural preconditions  
It is necessary, then, to think through the particular structural and institutional 
configurations that give rise to financial subjectivity. Financial subjectivity itself refers to 
the growing need of individuals and households to rely on financial markets and 
institutions to make ends meet and plan for their futures, engaging in progressively riskier 
behaviour as they do this. The sort of entrepreneurialism promoted by government policy 
and industry advertisements see successful individuals as ‘responsible and self-reliant 
figures who embrace risk and reward’, as financial markets ‘appear to present opportunities 
for individuals who want to progress’ (Langley, 2007: 83). The conditions of possibility of 
social reproduction and everyday life are thus much more closely aligned with the 
                                                        
1 For a critique of Althusser’s so-called structural functionalism, see Appendix One.  
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performance of financial markets, given that income and job security are no longer 
sufficient to guarantee stability from the present into the future. Consequently, individuals 
are now ‘called up’ (Langley, 2007) or ‘interpellated’ (Althusser, 1971) as investors and 
borrowers who are responsible for providing for themselves instead of relying on collective 
provision and risk reduction for protection. This is a particular form of subjectivity, that 
permeates management and employment, as well as the government of working-class 
subjects (Amoore, 2004; Sayer, 2001). As I elaborate in greater detail in the first appendix, 
individuals are expected to be responsible financial citizens in the face of economic 
uncertainty, meaning that they have obligations to others in their actions as well as to their 
own futures, in contrast to earlier promises of financial security and consumer comfort 
promoted in the post-war Keynesian welfare state. Indeed, Langley charts the evolution in 
practices of saving and borrowing in Anglo-America, arguing that they ‘have 
fundamentally changed in the past three decades or so’ (2008a: vii), as ‘thrifty savings 
practices of making deposits in commercial bank accounts and purchasing government 
bonds’ (2007: 69) gives way to investment in pension plans and mutual funds (2008a), 
increased investment in mortgages and homeownership (Cook, Smith, and Searle, 2009; 
Smith, 2015), and ‘day trading’ (Langley, 2007). Thus, traditional forms of saving have 
been displaced by forms of investment, not for reckless speculation, but because they 
generate greater returns that saving alone. Additionally, individuals and households now 
acquire debt due to a growing ‘acceptance that credit facilitates consumption and is part of 
modern society’ (Szmigin and O’Loughlin, 2010: 599), with Lapavitsas arguing that they 
‘have been increasingly drawn into the realm of private finance to meet basic needs, 
including housing, consumption, education, health, and the provision for old age’ (2009a: 
146).  
Although the incorporation of previously excluded households within financial 
markets is often called the ‘democratisation of finance’ (Noccera, 1994), the process itself 
requires the active stratification of such groups to distinguish a low risk from a high risk, 
ostensibly in order for markets to continue to function. Thus, financial subjects are studied 
and stratified, and, in keeping with both Althusserian (1971) and Foucauldian (1994) 
understandings of subjectivity, classified according to individual characteristics. 
Employment, income levels, and assets all play a role in differentiating subjective 
experience of financialisation, as well as the classification of subjects which enables 
specialised forms of government over large populations. For precarious working-class 
subjects, who make less than £15,000 annually, the experience of the spread of financial 
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logic is likely to be oriented around the acquisition of debt and means of repayment, rather 
than effective personal investment that secures future subsistence. After all, the decline of 
real wages in the United Kingdom since the 1980s (Office of National Statistics, 2014a) is 
compounded by an increased ‘proportion of household income accounted for by 
expenditure on “essential” household goods’ including utilities and electricity (Office of 
National Statistics, 2013a), meaning that precarious working-class households are 
acquiring ever higher levels of debt simply to make ends meet. Consequently, those with 
lower weekly earnings and few or no educational qualifications are ‘the most likely not to 
have any form of private pension saving’ (Office of National Statistics, 2014b). Limited 
savings and assets as well as low wages thus mean that the precarious, low-waged sections 
of the working class may default on loans or mortgages lent to them, meaning that the 
market requires a way of classifying such borrowers according to the risk they pose for 
default.  
The study of financial risk, or the prediction of the likelihood of default or 
repayment posed by particular households and individuals, is thus necessary as increasing 
numbers of people are reliant on capital markets (cf. Langley, 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b). 
The creation of new hierarchies, in the classification of borrowers and investors as either 
high- or low-risk, is evident insofar as they are accommodated by different sections of the 
market itself. While low-risk households with stable employment prospects and sizeable 
assets have access to mainstream sources of finance, riskier borrowers have typically been 
allocated to second-tier, subprime markets, which charge higher rates and fees to account 
for possible defaults. After all, as Langley has it, second-tier lenders must consider future 
repayment obligations by attempting to ‘pre-emptively fold those future uncertainties into 
the present’ (2007: 177). Consequently, anyone classified as ‘high-risk’ has to bear the 
burden of uncertainty almost immediately in the form of high interest rates, which can 
make borrowing sufficiently more difficult, and with it, the possibility of successfully 
managing finances and navigating financial markets.  
Langley contends that financial risk does not represent a ‘set of real dangers, [...] 
multiplied through market innovation and increased speculative trading’ (2008a: 26), in a 
manner advocated by Watson (2007), but holds instead that it is a set of technologies and 
calculations for making future events and possibilities predictable (cf. Caouette, Altman, 
and Narayana, 1998). However, critical realists Rigakos and Law (2009) find that risk does 
not simply exist as a consequence of the ordering of categories, but also produces tangible, 
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material, and therefore actually-existing consequences. Thus, while the idea of dangers or 
future events to be accounted for may not be inherently real in the present, the prediction 
and calculation for the purposes of ordering the future in certain ways has real 
consequences, making the study and prediction of risk a causal mechanism in itself. 
Particularly notable in this regard is ‘the manner in which the category of “risk” itself 
makes possible market innovation and trading’, such as ‘the charging of interest in 
everyday saving and borrowing’ (Langley, 2008a: 26), which stratifies individuals in 
certain ways according to their employment histories, levels of income, marital status, and 
homeownership (Caouette et al., 1998). People are therefore classified in a hierarchy and 
subjectivated according to their real attributes, characteristics, and histories, which are 
mobilised around the prediction of financial events such as their likelihood of repayment 
or defaulting on loans, credit or mortgages. At the same time, ‘investment technologies of 
risk actually license the calculative taking of chance by the individual’ (Langley, 2008a: 
53) in planning for their futures, as taking risks is touted as a rational way to make ends 
meet.  
What, then, are the structural and institutional configurations that enable such a 
form of subjectivity? I first discuss the effects of the ideology of shareholder value, as 
outlined by prominent members of the Parisian regulation school, in addition to the work 
of Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) on the transformation of the economy as a whole. This 
describes the emerging climate of insecurity and the promotion of personal responsibility 
among firms and their employees. However, in order to understand precisely how the 
precariat is integrated within financial markets through their daily actions, habits, and 
routines, it is also necessary to explore the reorganisation and shift in banking practices 
that drew precarious individuals and households into capital markets in a climate of 
uncertainty. I thus draw on Lapavitsas’ work (2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2013a; 2013b) to 
illustrate how financial liberalisation and banking practices enabled changes in spending 
habits. These distinctions help indicate the class-based stratification that emerges out of 
financialisation, by showing the pressures faced by firm managers and the middle class 
during financial liberalisation, as distinct from those plaguing the working class. A more 
detailed exposition of these developments is available in the second appendix.  
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Financial liberalisation, shareholder value, and the finance-led growth regime  
Finance-led growth regimes are characterised by the global flow and disembedding of 
‘money as the most abstract expression of capital’ (Jessop, 2013: 19) and overall financial 
liberalisation. This is in contrast to earlier Anglo-American Fordist growth, where wages 
paid to workers contributed to domestic demand, continued mass production, and 
economic growth (ibid., 14). In other words, the social redistribution of the twentieth-
century welfare state was made possible in part by a regulated wage which, in contributing 
to mass consumption, spurred further reproduction and economic growth necessary for 
welfare policies and infrastructure provision. Finance-led growth regimes, by comparison, 
move away from state regulation by removing ‘controls on interest rates and quantities of 
credit advanced by financial institutions’ (Lapavitsas, 2009b, 13), changing the supply of 
financial services. The concurrent development of a competitive business sector, in which 
firm managers aim to maximise shareholder value and take over smaller, inefficient firms, 
is part and parcel of ‘the new growth regime and hence of the new economy’ (Aglietta and 
Breton, 2001: 435). As profits are increasingly derived from asset price inflation instead of 
inflation in goods markets, the finance-led growth regime is more susceptible to the booms 
and busts of the business cycle than Fordism.  
Financial liberalisation is premised on the global flow of money and competition 
between firms, which will ostensibly generate innovation. It comes as little surprise, then, 
that firms operating in finance-led growth regimes encourage competition among both 
managers and employees for wages, benefits, and jobs. It is indeed possible to see how, as 
a consequence of financial liberalisation, both work and lifestyles became more precarious 
and individual innovation was, more than ever, required in demonstrating one’s relevance 
in a firm. Lazonick and O’Sullivan chronicle the emergence of the competitive firm, noting 
how those prior to the 1970s aimed to retain ‘both the money that they earned and the 
people whom they employed’, while investing in ‘physical capital and complementary 
human resources’ (2000: 14). A firm’s earnings naturally contributed to its growth, ‘while 
the building of managerial organizations to develop and utilize productive resources 
enabled investments in plant, equipment and personnel to succeed’ (ibid., 15). However, 
as Anglo-American corporations grew in size, it became difficult for a centralised 
management body to make effective decisions about the investment of corporate resources, 
leading to poor performance. This was compounded by economic uncertainty, at the time 
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of the collapse of Fordism, and new competition from international firms, which were 
proving at least as innovative as their Anglo-American counterparts.  
According to Aglietta (2000), in the 1970s principal-agent theory, which holds that 
the market is more effective than managers in allocating resources, thus contested the 
efficacy of a managerial class that focuses on retaining employees and reinvesting profits. 
Principal-agent theory, in contrast, focuses on the interests of shareholders rather than 
managers, where the former are principals and the latter their agents (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 2000). Indeed, principal-agent theorists argue that the poor performance of 
companies in the 1970s under the leadership of entrenched corporate managers 
necessitates a takeover market that uses a firm’s market performance to discipline its 
managers. Consequently, the ‘rate of return on corporate stock was their measure for 
superior performance, and the maximization of shareholder value became their creed’ 
(ibid., 16; cf. Aglietta, 2000). The advent of a takeover market itself required institutional 
investors, who benefited from the ‘transfer of stockholding from individual households to 
institutions such as mutual funds, pension funds and life insurance agencies’ as regulators 
lifted ‘legal restrictions on the extent to which life insurance companies and pension funds 
could include corporate equities in their investment portfolios’ (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
2000: 16). However, institutional investors are particularly important in their ability to 
influence corporate behaviour through ‘the collective power of opinion wielded by capital 
markets in the new era of information technology’:  
The process of evaluation takes place under the permanent scrutiny of investors, 
because rules and standards have made it possible to abstract from specificities of 
the firm’s organization. Charters of corporate governance embody the principal-
agent relationship in a set of formal procedures, require transparent information 
reporting, certified accounts and quantified prospects for future profit, so that 
performance of the firms can (without difficulty) be measured against objectives 
and benchmarks (Aglietta, 2000: 149).  
The liberalisation of finance therefore provides a framework for understanding the 
emergence of financial subjectivity in the United Kingdom. The deregulation of financial 
markets facilitates the provision of financial services, as well as the growth of the business 
sector itself, and it is possible to see how, even though the managerial classes potentially 
stand to gain from increases in shareholder value due to their own stock options and 
incomes, their employment prospects are nonetheless tied to some level of uncertainty.  
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This uncertainty places pressures on all classes within British society, with even the 
managers of the upper middle classes at risk for job loss as a consequence of financial 
restructuring. Perhaps what is most noticeable is the downward trend in living conditions 
and life chances faced by the newly ‘squeezed middle’ class, comprised of skilled jobs in 
manufacturing and white collar clerical workers (Carré and Heinze, 2013; Mishel and 
Shierholz, 2013; Parker, 2013; Smith-Ramani and Mehta, 2013), who face stagnating 
wages, escalating housing prices, and limited savings to cover them in the event of financial 
shortfall (Parker, 2013). With debt in the United Kingdom currently sitting at roughly 
160% of all household income (Smith-Ramani and Mehta, 2013: 118), dwindling savings 
undoubtedly place individuals and households at risk of financial shortfall, with limited 
means for protecting themselves in the event of unforeseen or changed fiscal 
circumstances. Indeed, over half, or 56 %, of UK adults have cash savings of only £5 000 
or less, including 13 % who have no savings at all to speak of, leaving many at risk of 
having no savings for retirement or for financial contingency (Financial Conduct 
Authority, 2017).  
However, the pressure of fluctuating in capital markets and labour markets is 
greatly magnified by low income, with individuals and households averaging only £15,000 
of yearly income saving less; it is hardly surprising that 57 % of precarious working-class 
adults, having a household income of £15,000 or less, do not have any form of private 
pension for future provision, a number that decreases to 30 % among those with incomes 
of £15,000 to £30,000 (ibid.). In this regard, the Financial Conduct Authority suggests that 
saving is related to income, insofar as individuals and households with little to put away 
are less likely to contribute to a scheme; this is amplified among the younger working 
population both because they have not been working as long, and because their job 
prospects may be limited relative to older workers. It is also the case that individuals and 
households earning £15,000 or less on average borrow nearly 85 % of their yearly income 
(Office of National Statistics, 2016), so that most of their earnings are already earmarked 
for repayment of outstanding obligations. With regard to the stratification of financial 
subjects, indebtedness is key: although individuals are expected to take on an 
entrepreneurial role as investors and managers of household portfolios, much of what they 
are able to accomplish is limited by their reliance on debt to make ends meet, such that 
those with high levels of debt in the underclass are inevitably disadvantaged relative to 
those in the higher classes with more savings and assets to rely on in the case of 
contingency. Financial subjectivity thus manifests differently across classes, in spite of a 
CHAPTER ONE  Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 37 
common concern with job precariousness. For the precariat, the question is less about how 
to adapt to restructuring markets and more their incorporation into a system from which 
they have traditionally been excluded as a result of the wider embrace of risk, and with it, 
high-risk borrowers. It is therefore important not only to grasp the conditions under which 
wages and benefits became precarious, since it is generally understood that the recovery of 
profitability in the 1980s came at the expense of the workforce (Bakir and Campbell, 2006), 
but to also consider the mechanisms through which the precariat has been integrated 
within financial markets. This, after all, helps explain the subjectivation of the precariat as 
indebted subjects.  
 
Hilferding’s approach to finance: The restructuring of banks and the inclusion of the 
precarious working class within financial markets 	
I therefore turn to the work of Costas Lapavitsas, who draws on earlier inroads made by 
Rudolf Hilferding, in thinking about financialisation as a ‘structural transformation of 
advanced capitalist economies’ (2013a: 798) rather than considering it, as many political 
economists have previously done (e.g., Baran and Sweezy, 1966), as ‘the escape of capital 
to the realm of finance’ and away from production (Lapavitsas, 2013a: 798). Indeed, as the 
previous explanation of the ideology of shareholder value should illustrate, finance ‘is a 
well-defined field of economic activity’ in itself, rather than ‘surface phenomena sitting 
atop the “real” economic activities of production and exchange’ (ibid., 799 – 800). 
Lapavitsas is particularly interested in the ‘molecular relations between contemporary 
industrial and financial capitals’ (2009b: 17) that give rise to financialisation, following 
classical Marxist economics, rather than the development of social forms of regulation that 
sustain accumulation. Yet his account illuminates how financial and non-financial activity 
gives rise to new modes of accumulation sustained by household activity, as a way into 
thinking about modes of social regulation under financialisation.  
While Hilferding argues that corporations become financialised as they increasingly 
rely on banks for investment (1981), Lapavitsas reiterates that the modern firm has ‘been 
able to finance investment without relying heavily on banks. The primary mechanism has 
been retention of own profits’, with external finance derived from trading in markets at a 
lower cost (2011: 620). As firms develop their own financial capacities, banks subsequently 
restructure themselves to account for the drop in revenue from trading on behalf of 
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corporations. Banks, according to Lapavitsas, began ‘mediating in open markets to earn 
fees, commissions and profits from trading’, as well as expanding into household finance 
by lending to individuals and ‘handling savings and financial assets’ (2013a: 800). The 
upshot, I argue, is the integration of incomes into financial markets, as households begin 
to invest their savings in insurance, pensions, or unit trusts, while obtaining credit, loans 
and mortgages. This approach enables the illustration of how precarious working-class 
households contribute to the reproduction, or the possible disruption, of a finance-led 
regime of accumulation, rather than considering precarious working-class subjectivity as a 
mere offshoot of the introduction of risk and instability into the workplace.  
 
The spread of finance across non-financial institutions  
The account provided by Lapavitsas (2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2013a; 2013b) turns on the 
financialisation of otherwise non-financial spaces. Thus, general tendencies that might be 
shared among economies at an international level are characterised as ‘financialised’ to the 
extent that the logic of finance has permeated non-financial institutions, rather than to the 
rates at which profits have declined in productive spheres across individual national 
economies. What is crucial, for Lapavitsas, is the investment of retained profits by non-
financial corporations in markets, as they draw even external finance from open financial 
markets. Consequently, ‘[e]ven the wage bill of large non-financial corporations is 
frequently financed through the issuing of commercial paper in open markets’ (2013a: 799 
– 800). This introduces the logic of finance into operations of the workforce that were 
previously non-financial, and with it a certain level of instability associated with the 
fluctuations of financial markets.  
Tony Cutler and Barbara Waine call this process the ‘transfer of risk to the 
workforce’ in the ‘pursuit of shareholder value’ (2001: 105). Finance, as Duménil and Lévy 
(2011) note, is indifferent to stagnating or declining wages, and employees’ reduced 
purchasing power, as its primary goal is the maximisation of shareholder value. This, 
however, enables the introduction of insecurity among the rest of the workforce in the form 
of a reduction of benefits provided both by employers, such as collective insurance and 
occupational welfare, which encompasses pensions and insurance, but also the provision 
of state benefits like healthcare, childcare, housing or education (Cutler and Waine, 2001; 
Langley, 2008a; Shalev, 1996). Thus, while savings and financial well-being were 
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previously predicated on one’s ability to find and maintain employment in volatile labour 
markets, workers are now also subject to the uncertainty of financial markets in making 
ends meet (Cutler and Waine, 2001; Langley, 2008a; Pfaller, 1991). While occupational 
welfare is derived from the ‘social right to retirement income’, in which ‘society as a whole 
has a liability towards the holder of such a claim’ (Aglietta, 2000: 157), private pension 
plans underscore the ‘ageing society’ and the pensions crisis facing the United Kingdom 
(Langley, 2008a) as a consequence of the slowdown in growth relative to escalating wages 
and the concurrent increase in state scheme liabilities during the 1970s (Cutler and Waine, 
2001).2 For Langley, the encouragement of private pension investment, where pensions are 
dependent on the performance of a pension fund rather than contributions from the state 
and employers, is a ‘disciplinary disincentive’ in the Foucauldian sense, insofar as it 
discourages the use of state insurance (2008a). This is exemplified in the Thatcher 
government’s indexation of basic state pension benefits to prices rather than earnings, 
leaving pensioners with minimal income (Blackburn, 2002).  
There is thus a noticeable shift in attitudes about provision for the future. Where 
the welfare state considered provision for retirement an obligation borne by society for 
staving off potential risks in the future, the current financialised state treats it as an 
individualised concern at least since the Conservative Party reformed British pension 
policy in 1985 (Waine, 1995). Class-based stratification becomes evident here, with Randy 
Martin noting that ‘the link between wages and pensions’ is now what ‘labor unions 
negotiate or strike over’ (2002: 133) in order to ensure future security for employees. In the 
Fordist growth regime, wages were a frequent source of concern for the traditional working 
class, ‘as the means through which the market might be reshaped’ to meet the needs of the 
workforce through consumption’ (ibid.) and thus provide a certain level of security and 
comfort. Now, labour relations also include the future financial prospects of employees, 
due to fears about the devaluation of pension plan contributions. Meanwhile, the growth 
of pension funds has resulted in the concentration of wealth among their managers and 
corporate CEOs, rather than working individuals and households who make investments. 
For those at the lowest ends of the spectrum, characterised by the Office of National 
                                                        
2 Appendix Two provides a further distinction between occupational welfare, and private 
occupational pensions.  
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Statistics (2014b) as having low weekly earnings and few or no qualifications and yearly 
earnings of £15,000 or less, 24 % of households hold no wealth in private pensions at all 
(Office of National Statistics, 2014c). Even when they are enrolled in a pension, stagnating 
wages and the rising cost of bills and utility fees, as well as childcare and housing costs, 
make it hard for low income households to actively contribute to their pensions and save 
for retirement from a young age (Cumbo, 2015). Additionally, few low income households 
have investment products or savings accounts, possibly as a consequence of ‘financial 
disengagement’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2015a). The benefits of personal 
investment are therefore primarily enjoyed by the higher classes, although there can be 
little doubt that the logic of finance has spread not only to non-financial sectors, but to 
household decision making as well.  
Indeed, concern with financial illiteracy as a social problem, and its association 
with minimal or no investments on the part of precarious working-class households 
indicates the extent to which the welfare state has ceded to financialisation, as it illustrates 
the kinds of options and choices subjects have in planning and structuring their livelihoods. 
As private pensions eclipse occupational welfare, personal investment in unit trusts and 
portfolios becomes an important fixture in planning for retirement. This is primarily 
because, as Langley points out, personal investment on the market has the potential to 
generate greater returns than saving in an account alone, so that investment is actually 
touted as more rational that saving. It is thus not a form of ‘irrational exuberance’ in 
speculation, driven by ‘herd-like’ market behaviour (2008a: 34 – 44). This is part of what 
is entailed in the ‘financialization of [...] income [and] savings’ (Lapavitsas, 2011: 620), or 
the spread of the logic of finance to household decisions, as wages and savings are 
channeled through pension funds and unit trusts into the stock market.  
Consequently, it is important to emphasise that the connection of household 
finances with capital markets does not mean that British households, especially where the 
precariat is concerned, are purchasing more stocks or holding greater amounts of social 
wealth. Individual or household direct ownership of shares has actually dropped 
substantially, reflected in the fact that only 10.7 % of wealth on the stock market is currently 
owned by individuals, down from nearly 50 % in 1969 (Office of National Statistics, 
2013b). The Thatcher government certainly promoted individual share ownership 
throughout the 1980s, beginning with ‘the British Telecom privatisation in 1984 in which 
2 million people bought shares’, and followed by the ‘TSB and British Gas flotation, in 
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September and November 1986 [which] attracted 3 million and 4.5 million shareholders 
respectively’ (Donabie, Hughes and Randall, 2010: xxxiii). To the extent that only 13 % of 
workers engaged in semi- or unskilled labour purchased shares, this primarily affected the 
middle classes, with 46 % of individuals in professional occupations buying shares (Norris, 
1990: 69). However, individual share ownership in itself has not been the major force 
behind the integration of households within financial markets, as it is estimated that ‘some 
new shareholders with an eye for the quick profit sold in the first few months to 
institutional investors’, so that ‘nearly 40 % of shares bought in privatisation schemes [had] 
been resold’ (ibid., 67).  
What is important to grasp instead is that financial markets have become a means 
of preparing for the future, in terms of being able to draw an income in retirement from a 
portfolio of investments managed by mutual fund managers. The increase in personal 
investment, and with it the spread of the logic of finance to personal savings, can instead 
be traced to the indirect ownership of equities, with individuals investing in portfolios and 
institutionalised funds in order to draw returns from their savings (Langley, 2008a: 49 – 
50). Investment in unit trusts and private pensions form some of the major individual 
interactions with capital markets. Unit trusts are open-ended investment companies which 
pool the savings of their investors in a portfolio of securities. Individuals and households 
thus ‘own a share or “unit” [...] in the fund, but have no ownership claims on its assets’ 
(ibid., 57). Unit trusts have grown on the stock market since the 1970s in the United 
Kingdom, given that as of 2012 they comprised 9.6 % of holdings on the stock market, 
relative to only 4 % in 1975, and less than 3 % in 1969 (Office of National Statistics, 2013b).  
Froud, Johal, Haslam and Williams assert that the United Kingdom has ‘created a 
massive savings flow from households onto the stock market’ (2001: 78), as households 
rely increasingly less on the welfare state for services. As Langley notes,  
‘Ownership’ of pension provision now lies with the individual worker who no 
longer relies upon the collective insurance of occupational welfare and Social 
Security, but instead creates and carefully manages an ‘asset base’—largely through 
equity-based mutual fund investment—that is to be drawn upon in retirement 
(2008a: 67).  
Pension fund holdings currently sit at 4.7 % of wealth on the stock market, although this 
likely reflects ‘fund managers broadening their portfolios to seek higher returns and spread 
risk’ (Office of National Statistics, 2013b). Holdings by insurance companies now sit at 6.2 
% (ibid.), so that individuals have some stake in 20.5 % of the stock market in the United 
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Kingdom, in addition to the 10.7 % directly owned by British households. This makes up 
a sizeable portion of stock market holdings, given that 53.2 % of shares in the United 
Kingdom are actually owned by world investors, so that many other British shareholders, 
such as banks (2.5 %), the public sector (3.1 %) non-financial corporations (2.3 %) and 
charities or churches (0.8 %) own fewer shares than investment and pension funds (ibid.).  
However, aside from equities, households also invest in assets, most notably in the 
form of property investment, so that homes are not only a consumerist expression of place 
and security, and but also something to be maintained and improved for the purpose of 
‘trading up’ (Langley, 2006; 2007; although see also Smith 2015). As a result of the 
expanding securities market, which has led to the origination of so many cheap mortgages 
associated with the housing boom, household security and prosperity is increasingly tied 
to the value of the home as a property that can be ‘flipped’ through renovations aimed at 
raising the price on the market, or let out as a means of generating rent to cover the cost of 
the mortgage (Langley, 2006). As a consequence, many British households are now 
imbricated within capital markets in the ownership of shares and assets, thereby linking 
the performance of markets with household savings and income. Appendix One notes 
similar trends in the United States.  
 
The restructuring of retail banking, and the spread of household borrowing  
As I illustrated in the previous sections, the restructuring of non-financial firms and the 
incorporation of the logic of finance within not only investment decisions, but also 
managerial tactics, has created a climate of risk and uncertainty among the workforce. This 
has, crucially, created a need for new personal financial services among individuals and 
households. As a consequence, it is also necessary to take account of Lapavitsas’ concern 
with the reorganisation of financial institutions like banks, in addition to the previously 
discussed expansion of investment services. Undoubtedly, the restructuring of banks is, in 
part, related to ‘the enormous growth of open financial markets in recent decades’, so that 
in response to ‘the altered conduct of non-financial enterprises’ banks have ‘moved toward 
mediating in open markets to earn fees, commissions, and profits from trading’ 
(Lapavitsas, 2013a: 800). However, banks have also ‘turned toward individuals (and 
households in general) to obtain profits from lending but also handling savings and 
financial assets’ (ibid.) meaning that household income acts as a new source of profit for 
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banks (ibid., 2011). This point is crucial in the development of financial subjectivity, as it 
indicates how workers, facing uncertainty at work from receding welfare schemes and 
stagnating wages, found financialised solutions to some of their problems in the banks’ 
provision of loans or credit. There is, then, a shift both in the kinds of services provided by 
retail banks, and the way in which they are handled, stemming largely from the re-
regulation of the financial system in the United Kingdom during 1986, where the Financial 
Services Act and the Building Societies Act dissolved institutional divides and encouraged 
competition among financial enterprises (Leyshon and Pollard, 2000; Wainright, 2012).  
Andrew Leyshon and Jane Pollard argue that there has been a regulatory 
convergence in the provision of financial services between American and British banks, as 
a ‘traditional and largely informal system of regulation was swept away [in Britain] and 
replaced with a more codified US-style system of statutory regulation’ (2000: 208). In order 
to access larger populations, retail banking has been centralised so as to concentrate 
operations and provide services more efficiently through the use of customer databases and 
credit rating systems that enable the impersonal analysis of customers. According to 
Leyshon and Pollard, banks have also benefited from ‘automated loan application 
processing systems, typically operated outside the branch at specialized loan centres. These 
centres enable banks to reap scale economies in processing while simultaneously removing 
loan processing work (and lending authority) from branches’ (2000: 205). In other words, 
while local branches used to serve as sources of information about their local populations, 
in terms of the suitability of a loan or mortgage, restructuring has enabled banks to process 
large populations as part of their business models. The upshot is that branches now focus 
primarily on the generation of income through fees, as customers deposit and withdraw 
money from their accounts. There has, then, been a decline in bank branches, as customers 
move to direct or online banking (Coppock, 2013; Leyshon and Pollard, 2000).  
The Financial Services and Building Societies Acts have also enabled increased 
levels of borrowing, given a certain amount of restructuring by investment banks that also 
took place in 1986. Most prominent in this respect was the arrival of the process of 
securitisation to the United Kingdom, which was re-engineered from its American origins 
to channel international capital into the United Kingdom (Wainwright, 2009). 
Securitisation is ‘the process of “bundling” together a stream of future obligations arising 
from mortgages repayments to provide the basis for the issue of, and payment of principal 
[obligations] and interest on securities’ (Langley, 2006: 283). This might include asset-
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backed securities, or the ‘repayments arising from everyday borrowing’ (Langley, 2008b: 
136) for ‘credit cards, consumer loans, car finance and infrastructure’ (Wainwright, 2009: 
374), in addition to mortgage-backed securities where residential mortgages are bundled 
together (Wainwright, 2009).  
The introduction of securitisation within the United Kingdom was an important 
step in the changing social structure that gave rise to financial subjectivity, inasmuch as it 
is here that large scale lending in loans and mortgages was made possible. Thomas 
Wainwright argues that the Financial Services Act ‘opened markets to a myriad of new 
financial institutions such as banks and centralized lenders, while the Building Societies 
Act (1986) allowed building societies to demutualize and become banks’ (2009: 377; cf. 
Wainwright, 2012). This enabled American banks to establish lending subsidiaries in the 
United Kingdom, from which retail banks could then originate loans and mortgages (ibid.) 
as new financial products available to the British workforce. Securitisation worked so well 
for banks and lenders, because it was ‘a cheap way of borrowing’, where ‘a company or 
lender can realize its income streams early’ while some ‘lenders also benefit from the off-
balance sheet nature of securitization, which has led some banks to originate profitable, 
high-risk mortgages as credit risk has shifted from their balance sheets to investors’ 
(Wainwright, 2009: 374; cf. Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; Dymski, 2007). By providing 
structured financial services, then, investment banks could concentrate the risk of default 
into tranches or fractions of capital in order to isolate credit risk as a smaller proportion of 
securitised notes available to investors looking for higher returns by taking on more risk 
(Wainwright, 2009).  
The upshot of the process of securitisation was the so-called democratisation of 
finance and credit, whereby financial markets become accessible even to those who had 
previously been excluded as high-risks. However, this integration within market structures 
was by no means unproblematic. Ann Pettifor contends that the liberalisation of finance 
that has been responsible for opening financial markets, the removal of caps on interest, 
and the amount of credit advanced by financial institutions, were the roots of the easy 
availability of money that led to middle-class indebtedness and working-class households 
borrowing beyond their means. While those who own assets benefit from credit, ‘which 
enables them to leverage their assets to obtain more’, those ‘who do not already own assets 
have had to borrow well beyond their means’ (2006: 10), which subsequently leads to 
higher rates of insolvency. By rendering credit so easy to obtain for high-risk households, 
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but also almost necessary for making ends meet, a longstanding history of poverty and 
indebtedness was exacerbated, given the ‘strong relationship between indebtedness and 
low relative income’ (Parker, 1990: 201). The process of securitisation, creating many 
indebted households who were reliant on some form of borrowing to finance basic needs 
or previously unattainable luxuries, certainly cultivated a period of volatility leading up to 
the 2008 financial crisis. 
How, then, does the concept of risk stratify working individuals as subjects of 
finance? The management of risk undoubtedly creates a hierarchy of borrowers, by 
highlighting distinctions between those who invest for their futures and borrow to tide 
themselves over in the present, and those who merely borrow and acquire debt that is 
difficult to pay off. Previously, lending to customers relied on trust between customers and 
merchants established in face-to-face contact through patronising local shops and local 
banks (Caouette et al., 1998). This, however, made lending on a global scale nearly 
impossible, and it was only with the development of credit scoring techniques in the 1960s 
that people could begin to borrow en masse. Credit scoring techniques, after all, 
standardised borrowing according to ‘details on occupation, [as well as] length of time in 
current residence’, in order to calculate the probability that a credit cardholder will default, 
given their employment, financial, and residential/family histories’ (Langley, 2008a: 149; 
cf. Ritzer, 2001). As a consequence, credit scoring has  
constituted the boom in consumer borrowing as rational, scientific, and controlled. 
This is especially the case as lenders have come to embrace would- be borrowers 
that were previously excluded and deemed too ‘risky’, as credit scoring provides the 
foundations for so-called ‘risk-based pricing’ (Langley, 2008b: 136).  
Credit cardholders therefore pay higher or lower interest rates, depending on their credit 
scores and risk for default. Borrowers are divided between low- and high-risk categories, 
where the latter pay higher interest rates, regardless of whether they have actually defaulted 
on payments in the past. This hierarchy is considered necessary to the functioning of the 
market, given that lenders take a higher risk in extending loans, credit, and mortgages to 
borrowers who are more likely to default based on their income levels and financial 
histories.  
This division, however, is the basis of new forms of material inequality for low-
income, working households which have been classified as ‘high-risk’ owing to their 
structural constraints. Chinloy and MacDonald have previously argued that ‘market 
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completion’, or ‘the completion of the credit supply schedule with the market pricing for 
poorer quality credit’ is actually a ‘social welfare gain’, because it allows subprime lenders 
to ‘reduce borrowing constraints’ on high-risk borrowers and grant them access to financial 
markets (2005: 153). Yet, high-risk borrowers have undoubtedly been the targets of 
exploitative lenders, looking to take advantage of the high interest rates and repayment 
cycles applied to their borrowers. Because of the high interest rates and fees applied to them 
to account for already precarious conditions like low income or unpredictable 
employment, many subprime borrowers have struggled to perform as successful financial 
subjects, which opens up the possibility of instability in their own households. The more 
households this affects, the more the regime of accumulation is also affected. The United 
Kingdom witnessed this on a large scale when, in 2007, the American subprime mortgage 
crisis began to spread, causing a ‘global evaporation of liquidity’ and a credit crunch in 
which high-risk loans and mortgages were withdrawn from the British market 
(Wainwright, 2009: 382).  
This is the outcome, for Langley, of integrating household finances with the 
fluctuations of capital markets. Insofar as investment can be disrupted and even damaged 
by market uncertainties, ‘so the meeting, management, and manipulation of on-going 
borrowing obligations are reliant upon relatively predictable wages’ (2008a: 204). While 
high-risk borrowers on the subprime market are particularly likely to struggle with meeting 
the conditions of repayment, even low-risk borrowers borrowing through conventional 
means may be subject to uncertainty in employment. Financial subjectivity after all takes 
a level of stability in an individual’s life chances that assumes no change in the wage 
relation as a precondition in the calculation of risk. In addition, it ignores the extra-
economic concerns that precarious households also factor into their daily lives. However, 
because ‘the borrower that is summoned up [...] appears as a disconnected and unitary 
subject, a figure that is disembedded from all but his/her financial relations’ (ibid., 203), 
the discipline of financial subjects operates through the imposition of high rates and fees 
to discourage delinquency, and financial literacy to encourage personal responsibility. As 
a consequence, although subjectivation necessarily entails individualisation, and financial 
subjectivity encourages a kind of household entrepreneurialism, the process of producing 
financial subjects creates contingencies by virtue of the struggle against the individualising 
nature of the knowledge about individuals and groups (Foucault, 1994) as borrowers and 
investors working with the framework of overarching power structures.  
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Financial subjectivity is therefore all but solidified through the very practices of 
investment and borrowing that ground it, insofar as they carry the risk of default or 
insolvency, leading to a disruption in ways of life centred on financial responsibility. In 
Foucauldian terms, the process of subjectivation is never fully complete, owing to struggles 
with self-discipline that occur as a result of structural constraints such as job loss or market 
downturn, in addition to political struggles stemming from a conscious rejection of self-
reliance in the absence of state welfare and social assistance. The Althusserian concern 
with the differential interpellation of subjects on the basis of class especially highlights how 
the immediate expectation of default among lower income households reinforces the 
potential for insolvency in the charging of higher rates and fees; these in turn exacerbate 
structural constraints on such families, in contrast to more successful everyday 
entrepreneurs who may be able to channel income into investments and assets while 
managing debt. Even where investment is possible among precarious working-class 
households, it is still no guarantee of stability and long-term prosperity, as the value of 
investments fluctuates with the markets.  
 
Subjectivation and the individualisation of risk in a class-based society  
To sum up then, everyday investing and borrowing are made possible by the transfer of 
risk from employers to the workforce, as a result of corporate restructuring in a financial 
liberal climate, in addition to the concurrent restructuring of retail and investment banking 
which has provided more scope for household investment and borrowing. In general, these 
changes indicate a larger shift from the provision for individuals and households as were 
made possible by the Keynesian national welfare state, to financialised economies that are 
entwined with each other on a global scale, each with particular localised structures and 
institutions (Wainwright, 2012). Precarious working-class households, in addition to the 
managerial classes who are forced to adapt to market competition, are increasingly subject 
to the fluctuations of financial markets in the course of making household decisions. What 
has become evident in this chapter is what Lapavitsas characterises as the increasing 
privatisation of consumption, not simply as a function of mass consumption, but in its very 
mediation by the financial system:  
the most striking aspect of the recent period has been the financialization of the 
personal revenue of workers and households across social classes. This 
phenomenon refers both to increasing debt (for mortgages, general consumption, 
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education, health) and to the expanded holdings of financial assets (for pensions, 
insurance, money market funds) (2013a: 800).  
The way in which subjects are constituted as individuals through financial systems is 
important, albeit less widely discussed. It is undoubtedly common to argue groups, 
households, and people are increasingly individualised within contemporary capitalism, 
as even the traditional structures of class give way under the decline of the welfare state 
and economic deregulation. However, the process of subjectivation and the creation of 
subjects are, by definition, one of creating individuals (Althusser, 1971; Foucault, 1994), 
and it is important to specify the nature in which groups are individualised. Consequently, 
what requires emphasis, I argue, is the particular way in which the financialisation of 
economies is responsible for individualisation, for creating entrepreneurial risk-takers who 
learn to view financial markets as a means of subsistence or possible success, or who, at 
the very least, consider risk and contingency an inevitability. This stands in contrast with 
the subject which had earlier been individualised and constituted as a subject through the 
use of affluence, or a stable wage, to express hard work and success, in an era of mass 
production and mass consumption.  
Individualisation, after all, does not necessarily mean that a person or household 
can only rely on itself for success, but can also refer to the extent to which subjects see 
themselves as distinct from others. Individualisation as understood in the Fordism of the 
post-war era turned on the regulation of wages and benefits through the institutionalisation 
of collective bargaining, which created a certain level of stability among the traditional 
working class. This enabled them to become consumers and, importantly, homeowners, 
who could live further away from work and cultivate comfortable lifestyles suited to their 
unique tastes, outside their roles as wage-earning producers (cf. Aglietta, 1979; Jessop, 
2013; Wolff, 2005). That is to say, individualisation previously concerned the expression 
of meritocratic success as evidenced by consumption perpetuated in the present, while 
financial subjects are individualised in the amount of responsibility they are expected to 
take for their future success. This is exemplified in the realisation that, although mass 
consumption is still a major driver of the economy, it is now linked with indebtedness and 
the need for future repayment, rather than current household prosperity. This shift can be 
observed, Langley notes, in the ways in which homeownership can now symbolise an asset 
for the future, in addition to a status symbol reflecting current earnings: ‘future autonomy 
and welfare for owner- occupiers and would-be owner-occupiers increasingly appears to 
turn less on the home as an individual space of shelter and refuge, and more on the 
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financial returns achieved from house price rises. In short, liberal suburban subjects are 
now explicitly neo-liberal property investors (2006: 290; Lowe, Searle and Smith, 2012). 
Randy Martin has even gone so far as to argue that securitisation performs the function of 
earlier forms of the dispossession of the precarious working class, to the extent that 
‘[p]ossession has been rendered liquid so that it can be revalued daily’, when those who 
own homes are prepared to divest themselves of their asset in order to move elsewhere for 
a better job prospect or greater economic return (2002: 141 – 42). Consequently, it is 
insufficient to emphasise individualisation as a contemporary process, without appropriate 
attention given to particular experiences associated with structural changes. The presence 
of certain structures and institutions in any given regime of accumulation helps explain 
subjectivity itself, owing to the range of knowledge they generate about groups and 
individuals, but their ability to shape the actions that subjects can also reasonably take 
within their surroundings. In the case of the accumulation of capital and emerging finance-
led growth, the class-based wage relation is sustained and recombined to form financialised 
subjects.  
 
The endurance of class in an individualised growth regime  
Indeed, in spite of claims concerning the diminishing structure of class in contemporary 
capitalism, there are still good reasons for taking class-based socioeconomic inequality very 
seriously. Indebtedness is highly stratified according to earnings and savings, as this 
chapter has shown, so that many households are beholden to financial institutions: the 
spread and ‘democratisation’ of finance does not ameliorate the condition of the precariat, 
so much as it makes it easier to enter financial markets. In addition, the emergence of 
personal investment as a rational technology of the self has not shifted the overall 
ownership of wealth to diverse groups of individuals, but has rather cemented the control 
of social wealth in the hands of financial institutions and fund managers (Martin, 2002). 
In short, the promotion of individual or household independence still happens within the 
constraints of the wage relation, with the entrance of numerous households and individuals 
into capital markets largely reflecting a shift in ‘patterns in the ownership of financial market 
instruments (especially equities), with an increasing proportion of the total by value held 
by pension and mutual funds’ (Langley, 2008a: 49; emphasis added). However, ‘everyday 
investment has done little to challenge the privileged place of the wealthy in the direct 
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ownership of equities’ (ibid.), even if more households are involved in the market by virtue 
of owning shares in investment trusts and pension plans.  
Consequently, Lapavitsas contends that the involvement of precarious working-
class households in capital markets is still inherently stratified according to exploitative 
class relations, given how ‘[b]anks and other financial institutions have been able to extract 
profits directly out of wages and salaries rather than surplus value’; in addition, they ‘have 
also been able to make profits out of [personal] assets, particularly as public provision of 
pensions has retreated, encouraging the channeling of [household savings to pension 
funds, insurance companies, money funds and thus the stock market’ (2011: 620). The 
examination of relations of distribution, such as wages and profits (Skotness, 1979), is 
crucial to understanding contemporary class inequality, although much of the focus has, 
to date, been on declining job security and career prospects as a result of the financialisation 
of the workplace (Thompson, 2003; 2013) and the enterprising attitudes working 
individuals are forced to adopt while at work in order to further their careers (Amoore, 
2004) if they are to be successful in a labour market which is not rapidly expanding 
(Lapavitsas, 2011). Indeed, it is precisely because of the stagnation or decline of wages, 
partially as a result of outsourcing (Boyer, 2000; Leamer, 1996) that finance begins to take 
an important role in everyday lives of workers. Yet, insofar as finance requires one to 
account for future risks in the present, it does not always alleviate problems associated with 
declining wages or job loss. Thus, as I’ve noted, providing for oneself or a household has 
not necessarily been made easier by finance, so much as it is the case that the logic of 
finance appears to be the most viable or rational way of making ends meet.  
Financial subjectivity, as the intersection of risk and financial markets with daily 
decisions involving household reproduction, is thus intricately related to the social 
relations of contemporary capitalism, rather than a contingency produced by the 
interaction of conflicting sources of power. On one hand, as Sum and Jessop note following 
Foucault, ‘[s]ubjectivation involves not only the creation of subject positions but also of 
“willing” subjects, that is, subjects who are willing and able to play their allotted roles’, 
alongside the ‘objectivation’ of the natural and social world through ‘different technologies 
of power/knowledge’ (2013: 112). As a consequence, courses of action that correspond 
with discourses about the world and help to reproduce it are ‘differentially reward[ed]’ 
(Jessop, 2001a: 285). Subjectivation in and through financialisation thus undoubtedly 
produces contingencies that cannot necessarily be accounted for in a regime of 
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accumulation, since ‘[i]nvestment as a technology of the self is contradictory. It rests on 
calculating market risk/reward, but necessarily cannot bring order to its own future 
uncertainty’ (Langley, 2008a: 111 – 12), which is coupled with similar issues in borrowing.  
On the other hand, however, is the importance of situating these processes within 
existing social relations which are through the causal powers or underlying structures and 
generative mechanisms, transformed and recreated. The call, or interpellation, to 
entrepreneurialism and self-sufficiency is inherently related to broader social and economic 
changes that render reliance on welfare state provisions problematic, or even the cause of 
crisis, while financial markets themselves emerge as a source of opportunity. The precariat, 
in turn, respond by reorganising and adapting their lifestyles to fit this requirement. Yet, 
financial subjectivity is still situated within the wage relation, which is itself a source of 
hierarchy, inequality, and thus, a potential source of contingency in the process of creating 
successful entrepreneurial subjects who can reproduce their households and contribute to 
the economy. Contingency, while indicating that causal relationships are never inherently 
deterministic or structurally functionalist in producing subjects to prop up capitalist 
growth, still has antecedents in existing material, social and power relations.  
Critical realism and the study of inequality  
In this chapter, I have sought to indicate how a particular form of subjectivity, namely, 
financial subjectivity, is inherently bound up with the structural relations of the financial 
growth regime, in spite of the fact that subjects themselves often act in contingent, or 
unpredictable ways. That is to say that, although the exercise of power on groups and 
individuals may produce unintended consequences, the kind of power exercised by a ruling 
class is nonetheless related to existing socioeconomic structures, which goes some way to 
explaining the kind of stratification groups and individuals might face under a regime of 
accumulation. For these reasons, I have departed from Langley’s actor-network theory 
research programme (2008a), and adopted instead a critical realist outlook by relating the 
progression of self-reliant subjectivity, expressed in investing and borrowing, to changes 
and developments at the level of markets and government in the United Kingdom since 
the 1980s.  
Critical realism, as a philosophy of social science with metatheoretical assumptions 
about the ontology of social relations and their epistemological study, is elaborated upon 
in greater detail in the second chapter. Here, I note that retaining the structure/agency 
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duality, which distinguishes between overarching social structures and individuals who are 
influenced by these pre-existing conditions, is necessary to studying the persistence of 
economic inequality in the contemporary regime of accumulation. To be sure, Langley’s 
actor-network theory finds the structure/agency duality constraining (ibid.) in his attempts 
to figure out how capital markets have connected and been infused with everyday practices 
of saving and borrowing in the process of studying the increasing need for self-reliance. 
But a critical realist focus on agency as operating within the constraints of a social structure 
is necessary to understand how expectations of self-reliance affect groups, or classes of 
individuals, differently. Although responsibility for present and future success has 
undoubtedly become individualised, as I have illustrated in laying out the tenets of 
financial subjectivity, an aptitude for carrying this out successfully still persists among the 
middle and higher classes, to the exclusion of the British precariat. Hence, it is not enough 
to say that social problems have become individualised the further the logic of financial 
markets permeates everyday life because some individuals experience failure more often 
than others, which, in the case of financial subjectivity, is closely related to levels of income 
and qualifications, type of employment, as well as amount of savings and number of assets.  
 
Conclusion  
Although academic interest in financialisation and the emergence of finance-led growth 
regimes as a distinctive feature of contemporary capitalism has surged since the financial 
crisis of 2007 – 2009, the connection between financial markets as a major source of 
accumulation and the appearance of financial logic in everyday decision-making remains 
under-theorised by critical theorists who want to understand current forms of inequality 
and stratification. Where cultural accounts of a neoliberal kind of subjectivity stress 
personal experience as individualised and divorced from ostensibly earlier class 
distinctions, they rarely make links with broader social forces that give context to the 
actions of subjects. In this chapter, then, my aim was an examination of financial 
subjectivity as a process that constitutes individuals as entrepreneurial subjects who, 
through the development of technologies associated with the calculation of risk, manage 
their affairs and financial futures as a series of investments and returns. Specifically, from 
the end of the 1970s onward in the United Kingdom, individuals have become ‘everyday 
investors’, relying on returns from pension plans to supplement income and prepare for 
retirement, in contrast to earlier use of regulated wages, collective insurance, cash savings 
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and provisions set out in workplace collective agreements from 1945 through to the 1970s. 
Additionally, as part of their ‘everyday entrepreneurship’, they also become borrowers and 
make use of credit, loans and mortgages to make ends meet. Consequently, household 
finances are, in a finance-led regime of accumulation, intricately bound up with global 
capital markets.  
It is therefore necessary to consider and understand the structural mechanisms that 
contextualise this sort of action on the part of financial subjects. I have thus stressed that 
financialisation, as a period of accumulation with institutional fixes such as the financial 
liberalisation dating back to the 1970s, represents a sequence in the periodisation of 
capitalism and, consequently, has its own particular configuration of interactions between 
structures and subjects. This includes the increasing prominence of financial logic in the 
management of even non-financial enterprises, brought on by the restructuring of markets 
and the drive for shareholder value. While Regulation school accounts have focused on 
the ideology of shareholder value and its effects on the managerial classes in thinking about 
the emergence of financialisation, I expanded this to account for the effects of contingency 
and financial precariousness on the working class in the United Kingdom. I subsequently 
followed Lapavitsas in considering the effects that market liberalisation has had on the 
restructuring of investment and retail banks, in order to understand how the reorganisation 
of firms and banks has given rise to the financialisation of household income, in the 
prevalence of personal investment and borrowing as welfare state provision declines. I 
contend that, although this process has undoubtedly produced individualised subjects, they 
are still oriented by their relation to employment and wages, inasmuch as those who are 
less successful in investing, saving, and repaying are also usually those with unstable 
employment and wages. This is very disadvantageous for the precarious working class, 
given that risk-taking has become a means of providing for oneself or a family: the need to 
take risks is structurally inscribed within the arrangement of financial institutions as a result 
of declining welfare provisions and market liberalisation, so that risk as a precursor to 
reward seems, in itself, a rational formula to making ends meet.  
My metatheoretical understanding of this process therefore diverges from the actor-
network theory approaches to Foucauldian governmentality taken up by some scholars of 
‘everyday finance’, which stresses contingent power relations in the creation of 
entrepreneurial subjects who learn to govern themselves in neoliberal fashion. My own 
approach is underpinned by critical realism, which stresses underlying causal mechanisms 
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found in the structural transformation of post-war capitalism and the emergence of finance-
led growth, to understand the configuration of relations and interests in the subjectivation 
of the precariat as financial subjects. In order to address the persistence of class relations 
in the stratification of society, it is possible to invoke Althusser’s understanding of 
subjectivity as constituting a class of individuals, historically specific to capitalism, 
alongside Foucault’s outline of the study of the separation of individuals from each other 
in the process of subjectivation. Stressing pre-existing social conditions gives a context, I 
argue, to the subjectivation of individuals in a particular time and place.  
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Chapter Two: 
Metatheoretical underpinnings and methodological approaches: Critical 
realism, regulation theory, and cultural political economy 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter defined financial subjectivity as the individualisation of financial 
risk at the level of household spending and saving, in the acts of investing and borrowing. 
Understood in this way, I argued that the contemporary, precarious working class in the 
United Kingdom is at a noticeable disadvantage to the higher classes with more stable 
employment and income, owing to precarious work or low incomes averaging less than 
£15,000 per annum, both of which restrict the ability to save, exaggerate potential financial 
loss from investment, and magnify problems of debt and repayment. Consequently, I 
maintained that the process of subjectivation, or the governance of individuals’ self-
conduct, always happens within the context of the structures and material relations of a 
social formation, which implies class-based stratification related to the distribution of 
resources. I therefore situated the process of subjectivation within the climate of financial 
liberalisation that led to the expansion of credit and investment alongside the decline of 
lower-risk options for provision and saving, to illustrate how subjective experience is 
nonetheless conditioned by structural forms of inequality. The theoretical development of 
this position is guided by three related approaches which I’ve briefly alluded to so far, 
namely critical realism, regulation school political economy and its discursive variant, 
cultural political economy.  
 This chapter elaborates the metatheoretical assumptions the thesis makes in its 
adherence to a critical realist philosophy of social science, owing to the role of critical 
realism as ‘philosophical underlabourer’ that produces knowledge about the social sciences 
(Joseph, 1998). This includes ontological assumptions about what constitutes the social 
world, which can be found in the work of Parisian regulation theorists who conceive of 
social production and reproduction through the accumulation of capital and regulation of 
crisis tendencies within any given mode of social regulation. For regulation theorists, the 
social world is comprised of material structures and economic, political and social relations 
that pre-exist individuals and consequently influence the kind of action they can take. This 
is evidenced in the concepts of the growth regime and the mode of social regulation, which 
explain production, consumption and reproduction, as well as the mediation of crisis 
tendencies through institutions, networks and conduct, respectively (Jessop, 2001b). The 
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social world is therefore one that exists independently of socialised actors, although it is 
nonetheless influenced and shaped by them. The other important metatheoretical concern 
encompasses epistemological assumptions made about how social scientists know about 
their objects of study, through a critical form of political economy called cultural political 
economy that understands the discourses produced about economic and political relations 
as an entry point into the apprehension and study of the social world. Crucial here is the 
fact that the social world exists independently of our thinking about it, as a set of material 
structures and institutions and embodied relations, and is understood first and foremost 
through the kinds of discourses produced about it. Discourses thus do not construct the 
social world in a performative way, bringing concrete relations and structures into actuality 
simply through discussion and statements of existence. The ideas and concepts discourses 
contain can, however, occasionally act as causal mechanisms that create macro-level 
change by motivating new kinds of thought about how things should be, inspiring new 
kinds of behaviour and action, or indeed a commitment to current standards. 
 Here, I outline how critical realism, regulation theory, and cultural political 
economy combine to give new insight into the stratified nature of subjectivity and, 
consequently, contemporary forms of inequality faced by the working class relative to the 
middle and upper classes in the context of the spread of financial risk. Beginning with 
critical realism, I demonstrate how retroduction, as the derivation of causal mechanisms 
giving rise to an object or event of study, illuminates how causal mechanisms in structures 
reshape both the kind of financial practices available to subjects in the direction of higher-
risk strategies, as well as the gradual normalisation of risk as a component of everyday life. 
This is done with reference to the changing economic and political landscape that 
characterises the United Kingdom from 1980 onward, defined in the terms of the 
Regulation School as an examination of the regime of financial accumulation (including 
the production and consumption that sustain a particular social formation) and the mode 
of social regulation (including the forms of state regulation, policies, norms and habits that 
inform subjective experience). Finally, from the perspective of cultural political economy, 
I illustrate how subjectivity is constituted further through the variation, selection and 
retention of particular discourses about the economy in order to highlight the infusion of a 
new economic landscape with particular meaning and importance for subjects. Each of 
these three approaches shares ontological and epistemological commitments which differ 
from other approaches taken in the study of everyday finance, namely those influenced by 
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actor-network theory, and I argue that these commitments enable a particular focus on 
stratification and inequality that is often missing from actor-network theory accounts. 
 
Metatheory and the sociology of everyday finance: How ontological and 
epistemological assumptions ground our understanding of the social world 
Metatheory, or ‘theory about theory’ as Anthony Woodiwiss (2005: 14) succinctly defines 
it, concerns the kinds of assumptions that social theorists and sociologists more broadly 
have to make about the world they are studying, whether or not they are acknowledged or 
even firmly understood. For Woodiwiss, metatheory functions as a visual field, 
highlighting or obscuring various features of the social world depending on the chosen 
approach: metatheoretical assumptions ‘specify what one is looking for or how one thinks 
one should go about looking for it, rather than [specifying] what it actually is or how 
exactly it should be looked for’ (ibid.). This does not mean making unfounded suppositions 
about objects of study themselves, but instead delimiting the number of ways to describe 
the social world in research. Assumptions are made ‘where one has to take a decision about 
an issue that is inherently undecidable and that therefore cannot be made into a 
researchable topic’ within sociology (ibid.), such as, for example, an ontological claim 
about whether the social world exists as a set of structures, independently of social actors, 
or whether it is primarily constructed through language and performance. Hence, all 
sociological work relies on such assumptions either implicitly or explicitly, from empirical 
sociologists collecting data with the aim of verifying a set of hypotheses, to qualitative 
researchers who consider their findings to have been constructed within the interview space 
itself. Methodological choices are thus necessarily related to metatheoretical assumptions. 
The study and emphasis on these assumptions is not purely academic, as metatheoretical 
orientation has much to do with how social scientists frame their objects of study and, 
consequently, the light they shed on their findings. Indeed, whether consciously or not, 
metatheory underpins an important debate within the sociology of finance concerning the 
conceptualisation of finance as, on one hand, a new form of global accumulation 
overtaking productive industries, or, on the other, a system of diverse but interconnected 
networks of human and non-human actors made possible through technological 
advancement.  
Responding to political economists holding the former position, actor-network 
theorists have increasingly focused on the inseparability of ‘nature, politics, discourse’ 
(Latour, 1993: 4) in the study of financial markets. For actor-network theorists, advancing 
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a project of the social and technological understanding of the rise of finance is politically 
important, as a way of illustrating the contingent and unnecessary nature of the new 
prominence of finance and financial institutions. Consequently, the metatheoretical 
assumptions actor-network theorists have advanced against political economists has an 
important normative component in destabilising notions of a monolithic concept of 
finance, which is part of the reason actor-network theory has been of interest to sociologists 
of finance. According to Bruno Latour, the social realm, or society, has been separated 
from the collective of objects and actors: the ‘collective’ denotes ‘the association of humans 
and nonhumans’, while ‘society’ refers to ‘one part only of our collectives, the divide 
invented by the social sciences’ (ibid.). In short, everything that exists and interacts with 
each other is part of the collective, while the social realm, comprised only of human actors, 
is a construct that neglects human interaction with nonhuman actors such as machines and 
technology. The interconnected nature of collectives is forged in expanding, and yet unseen 
networks. These networks ‘”self-construct” and take on agency-like powers’ to the extent 
that they ‘grow and feed themselves on the action of others, who help bring them into 
existence’ (Munro, 2009: 127).  
 According to Langley (2008a), the shift in focus on finance from impersonal 
systems of global accumulation to fibrous networks of politically-oriented, technology-
driven speculation, trading, investment and borrowing gives actor-network theory insight 
into the financialisation of daily life. Joe Deville puts this succinctly when he argues, ‘[i]t 
goes without saying that markets are constantly being remade. What is less obvious is that 
through the circulation of its devices and practices of attempted capture, the worlds of 
market participants are also being remade’ (2015). According to Deville, the mere 
inception of credit immediately introduces a shift in method of payment, for although the 
resulting transfer of goods between buyer and seller remains the same, the ‘use of consumer 
credit involves a commitment to living alongside and with a particular financial product’ 
(ibid.). Credit introduces consumers to the world of repayment, with its attendant 
bureaucracy and money management, but it also implies the possibility of default, which 
disrupts the very routines of daily life. Thus for Liz McFall, the definition of a product as 
a useful thing through consumption is only one component of consumption: ‘How it 
physically moves, from “field to fork” as it’s phrased in the recent discovery of 
controversies in the supply chain, or from mortality table to life policy [in the case of 
insurance], is another’ (2014). For McFall, these technical aspects have been conspicuously 
absent in the accounts of political economists, business analysts and economic historians 
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(ibid.). The use of actor-network theory to study finance therefore opens up the possibility 
of examining the function of finance in everyday life by charting the connection of financial 
networks. 
 This new insight, highlighting as it does the lack of consideration given to supply 
chains and the interaction of households with finance, is achieved through a rejection of 
earlier variants of realist ontology and epistemology espoused by political economists. In 
the first instance, actor-network theory is a flat, or unstratified ontology, challenging the 
traditional duality of structure and agency as a stratified ontology (Law, 2005; Latour, 
1996). Actor-network theorists are not interested in abstract socioeconomic structures, but 
instead, the interconnected, nearly ‘thread-like, wiry’ nature of society that ‘is never 
captured by the notions of levels, layers […] structures, systems’ (Latour, 1996: 370; 
Latour, 2005). The endurance of society is best understood as the ‘careful plaiting of weak 
ties’, with ‘sturdiness achieved through netting, lacing, weaving, twisting of ties that are 
weak by themselves, and that each tie, no matter how strong, is itself woven out of still 
weaker ties’ (1996: 370). It necessarily follows, for Latour, that any universal laws deduced 
by political economy are the exception rather than the rule, as actor-network theory begins 
from ‘irreducible, incommensurable, unconnected localities’ (ibid.). Actor-network theory 
can therefore be called, in contrast to realism, a form of nominalism since it focuses on 
particularities and eschews the existence of abstract universals. Epistemologically, actor-
network theory is also very different from political economy which usually takes some 
form of realist approach to the study of its objects, either empirically or theoretically. For 
actor-network theorists, the act of studying an object such as financial markets is one and 
the same with its creation, as formal academic examination names markets and institutions 
as objects of study and enables economists to approach them with a particular 
methodology and terminology. Michel Callon argues for the performative nature of 
economics with regard to the economy, or, ‘the role of economics as a discipline, in the 
broad sense of the term, in formatting calculative agencies’ (1998: 23). As Paul du Gay 
puts it, ‘economics should be considered less a form of knowledge that describes and 
analyses the economy as a pre-existing entity, but rather as one, very important element in 
the practical making up of the economy’ (2010: 171). Such an epistemology is therefore 
broadly constructionist.  
 Yet, each of these assumptions, in opening up a new way of thinking about how 
people interact with finance, also has implications for the kind of economy that is 
envisioned, and the kind of subjects that manage their finances and futures. Michel 
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Foucault’s ‘historical nominalism’ (1991: 86) emphasises ‘rediscovering the connections, 
encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which at any given 
moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary’ 
(ibid., 76). Research into everyday finance is therefore characterised by the assemblage of 
a historically specific agency in subprime lending: for Langley, what matters is not the 
potentially unscrupulous nature of lenders in a stratified society of low-earners, but ‘the 
ways in which the assembly of the socio-technical agency of sub-prime lending ensured 
that it came to appear as a legitimate part of the contemporary financial markets, that is, 
as calculative and scientific’ (2008c: 472), or, as Foucault would have it, necessary. Like 
other cultural economists and actor-network theorists (Thrift, 2002; Law, 2005), Langley 
employs Foucauldian governmentality ‘in order to make explicit the power relations and 
politics at work in the constitution of calculative market networks of saving and borrowing’ 
(2008a: 15). He does this by showing how the rationalisation of calculative techniques as 
scientific de-politicises and therefore legitimates the so-called necessity of everyday 
finance, as a contrast with other approaches to power and finance that focus on the 
embedded nature of power instead of suggesting ‘that power as a material resource is 
wielded in a constraining fashion by finance capital as an economic group and class 
interest’ (ibid., 16). The subject so envisaged, however, is a self-sufficient individual which 
engages through a ‘calculative agency’ (Callon, 1998; Abolafia, 1996; 1998) with markets.  
In this flat ontology, class and class interests are conspicuously absent, and, 
although this avoids suggesting a determination of subjects by larger market forces and 
dominant interests, it also ignores the very real struggle many currently face in a system 
which is unsympathetic to precarious employment and income. The process of 
subjectivation therefore risks appearing as a neutral process that affects everyone evenly, 
as new forms of rationality and action are informed by ever expanding networks of 
individual conduct, choice, and technological development in the creation of self-
governing subjects. Yet, subjectivation is undoubtedly inflected with positive normative 
associations for successful subjects, and negative associations as well as social 
ramifications for so-called unsuccessful subjects. Technological and scientific 
advancements, as they contribute to the development of markets and financial instruments 
that can be used to assess individual risk, are never free from motivations, and their 
implementation carries both positive and negative consequences for various parts of the 
population. Langdon Winner worries about ‘an almost total disregard for the social 
consequences of technological choice’ (1993: 368) in actor-network theory, as well as any 
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engagement with moral and political questions underpinning the necessity and greater 
good that technology presents. Instead, ‘one usually finds a field of what are called relevant 
social actors who are engaged in defining technological problems, seeking solutions, and 
having their solutions adopted as authoritative within prevailing patterns of social use’ 
(ibid., 369; emphasis in original). This leaves unanswered questions concerning ‘[w]ho 
says what are relevant social groups and interests? What about groups that have no voice 
but that, nevertheless, will be affected by the results of technological change?’ (ibid.). 
Critical theorists and heterodox economists thus see in actor-network theory a parallel with 
orthodox economics and its focus on rational individuals (Fine, 2005; Mirowski and Nik-
Khah, 2007), particularly where Michel Callon has emphasised calculative rationality in 
market engagement and argued that capitalism itself is a construction of economists, 
political economists and sociologists (Fine, 2005). The study of markets, for Ben Fine, 
undoubtedly involves some study of exchange and thus calculation, but it also ‘embodies 
a set of qualitative relations—not least those between capital and labor and labor and 
nature’ (ibid., 100), which is to say, of stratification. In sum, then, work from an actor-
network theory perspective that explores the question of financial subjectivity, by virtue of 
its metatheoretical assumptions, largely overlooks the very issue of inequality in favour of 
the concept of a rationalised individual. Insofar as the study of the subjective experience of 
finance is largely missing from political economy (Jessop and Sum, 2006; Lapavitsas, 
2011), I show in the following sections of this chapter how a critical realist engagement 
with subjectivity using regulation theory and cultural political economy can rectify this in 
the context of understanding contemporary forms of financial inequality.  
 
 
Critical realism and retroduction 
In the absence of a detailed assessment of the social reproduction of individuals and 
households, in terms of their ability or inability to sustain themselves and forge a living, it 
is possible to find in political economy a kind of structural determinism (Langley, 2008a) 
which sees individuals carried along by economic developments without much agency 
themselves. However, within the actor-network theory understanding of financialisation, 
it is not altogether clear how to conceptualise the precariously positioned working class as 
anything other than passive in the face of the technological advancement, guided by 
political interests, that ultimately shapes and reconfigures capital markets and networks of 
individual borrowing and saving. I therefore suggest that critical political economy can 
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account for the interaction of individuals with structural elements like capital markets, in 
a way that both emphasises the constraints of unequal class relations while highlighting 
the contingency of these sets of power relations. In other words, their origins are the 
product of singular rather than necessary or teleological occurrences, so that their 
endurance must be actively mediated and regulated against other potential configurations. 
An understanding of how individuals are successfully or unsuccessfully subjectivated is 
thus crucial to thinking about the perpetuation of inequality, or, conversely, its 
transformation. 
 In this section I therefore outline and define my own metatheoretical commitments, 
drawn from critical realism. Critical realism is a philosophy of social science that stands in 
contrast with the empirical realism of positivist social science and its concentration on 
empirically observable features, since it posits the existence of real entities and causal 
mechanisms which are not necessarily directly observable, as conditions of possibility of 
empirically verifiable objects (Sayer, 2000; Bhaskar and Lawson, 1998). For Andrew 
Sayer, observability of phenomena is not the only means of proving the existence of 
something, given that the underlying mechanism which makes it possible is usually a 
causal process. As a consequence, through the use of retroduction, ‘a plausible case for the 
existence of unobservable entities can be made by reference to observable effects which can 
only be explained as products of such entities’ (2000: 12; cf. Collier, 1994). Contra actor-
network theorists, then, overarching structures, like capital markets and the financial and 
political institutions which facilitate their functioning, need not be treated as reified or 
abstract objects in political economy. Instead they can serve as dynamic entities, in that 
they have the potential to change, that shape a situation and whose structural effects can 
be measured in the social stratification of classes relative to debt and savings. Critical 
realism is thus still grounded in a materialism that understands the social world to exist 
externally of the social actors it encompasses, viewing social structures and the people who 
interact with them as having the ability to effect causal change. Change, or even social 
structures themselves, are not merely the products of discourse or performance either, so 
that critical realism also stands in contrast with post-structuralism, in its assertion that the 
material world pre-exists and therefore conditions our understandings and, to a certain 
extent, what is and is not possible.  
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‘Emergentist ontology’ 
Given the stratification between the real, the actual, and the empirical as the basis for 
understanding the causal mechanisms that give rise to a configuration of social relations 
within any particular period of growth and development, Dave Elder-Vass has distilled an 
‘emergentist ontology’ for use in critical realist social science (Elder-Vass, 2007a). In its 
most basic form, this entails that ‘realists in the social sciences proceed on the assumption 
that social theories must identify causal powers or emergent properties in the social world’ 
(ibid., 229). In this thesis so far, I begin from the premise that the constitution of subjects 
of finance is an inherently stratified process given that it expects the same level of self-
sufficiency and innovation from all individuals regardless of their employment prospects 
and stability, in addition to wealth, income, assets and savings. Rather than tracing the 
way in which interweaving networks of finance, predictive models, and household 
accounting regulate an increasingly individualised mode of self-conduct, I ask how risky, 
entrepreneurial behaviour in everyday decisions is conditioned by the expansion of capital 
markets as a kind of social structure, and the way in which this process activates successful 
engagement with finance for some groups, whilst hindering it for many others. This 
hindrance lies predominantly in characteristics related to class such as low income and 
precarious employment.  
 Elder-Vass outlines the structural components of the material world with which we 
engage, including ‘entities’, which are wholes made up of particular ‘parts’ that are 
configured in a specific way that endows them with causal powers. Within society, an 
entity could be an organisation, such as a firm or a bank; or a social institution, which is a 
‘normatively endorsed social practice’ like the exchange of money rather than bartering for 
goods (Elder-Vass, 2007a; 2007b). Parts include the components that make up an entity, 
like management and employee hierarchies or transaction technologies, the arrangement 
of which creates particular kinds of relations in the way they function. Finally, a causal 
power, according to Elder-Vass, is ‘the capability of an entity to have a certain sort of causal 
effect on the world in its own right: an effect that is something more than the effects that 
would be produced by the entity’s parts if they were not organised into this sort of whole. 
Real causal powers are synonymous with emergent properties’ (2015: 229; emphasis in 
original). Emergent properties are endowed with causal mechanisms, as ‘processes that 
depend on interactions between the parts, interactions that only occur when those parts 
are organised in the particular relations that constitute them into wholes that possess this 
emergent property’ (ibid., 230, emphasis in original). In short, entities, or organisations 
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and social institutions and their constituent parts including the people, norms and material 
objects that make up organisations and institutions, have the potential to exert social 
change because of the emergent properties that exist through the relational arrangement of 
parts making up the entity. The actualisation of this change comes from the interaction of 
parts in a particular way to form a causal mechanism that can carry out change. For 
example, the viability of credit as a new source of payment for low-income households has 
to be traced to the interaction of multiple parts in specific ways, including the development 
of technologies of securitisation and the ability to price risk as part of the expansion of 
financial markets. Further, a political climate in government entities that favoured 
financial expansion was required, so that even if Prime Minister Thatcher did not believe 
in the accrual of personal debt, her support for financial innovation and the liberalisation 
of markets nonetheless created conditions that made household borrowing on a larger scale 
possible in the context of developing financial technologies. The confluence of these 
conditions produces an event, which, as Elder-Vass has it, is ‘”multiply determined” or co-
determined by a variety of interacting mechanisms, which may be attributable to entities 
at various levels in the hierarchy of composition’ (ibid., 231). In this case, it can be said 
that the creation of a kind of conduct requiring the management of risk in everyday life, as 
an event worthy of study, is attributable to changes in social structures, because they 
introduce new elements into the lives of social actors. It is not possible to make use of credit 
without also responding to payment obligations, whether through successful repayment or 
through processes of default. 
 It should therefore be possible to see that recourse to social structures in political 
economy does not need to be in an abstract or reified way, treating them as static or 
monolithic entities. Further, they are not deterministic in any necessary or unavoidable 
way, since the actualisation of emergent properties is contingent on particular 
configurations between components, which include both groups and individuals, subjects 
themselves and their interactions. This is not to say that the activation of all causal 
mechanisms is down to chance, however, since some mechanisms are more easily 
activated under certain conditions. Here I return to the issue of nominalism and the lack 
of a notion of stratification in Foucauldian governmentality, as outlined in the first chapter 
(Joseph, 2004): while it is true to say that the relations of power at work on subjects are 
chance configurations rather than inevitable or unchanging relations, the only way to 
understand their efficacy and endurance is to situate them within the context of a social 
structure (cf. Datta, 2007; Sayer, 2012). In this case, Althusser’s original concern with 
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subjectivation relative to class (1971) need not be read as deterministic, but as grounding 
self-conduct within the division of labour that explains how individuals and households 
are able to reproduce themselves. A critical realist ontology, in short, provides suitable 
means for thinking about subjectivity within political economy more broadly. 
 
Retroduction as method 
The use of critical realism in this thesis can be characterised as a means for seeking the 
conditions of possibility of financial subjectivity in the financialised growth regime of the 
United Kingdom, in order to understand the limits of the everyday entrepreneur in unequal 
and unstable relations. Financial subjectivity is therefore a sustained event which emerges 
from a particular configuration of entities, and the particular kind of individual subject 
produced must be understood relative to the relations between entities and parts found in 
contemporary Britain. The identification of the specific entities that make up a 
financialised structure as it relates to the production of subjectivity is the topic of the next 
section, which looks at the economic and social regulation of financial accumulation. The 
means of identifying such causal mechanisms, as things that give rise to the events in 
question, is called ‘retroduction’, which is complemented in turn by ‘retrodiction’, or an 
explanation of the interaction of emergent properties to generate events (Elder-Vass, 
2007a). The effects of these mechanisms in producing working-class subjects who are 
nonetheless financialised is measured throughout the thesis by empirical indicators relating 
to levels of debt and savings, stratified by average annual individual or household income. 
It is, consequently, possible to see a contrast between those with incomes of less than 
£15,000 per annum as representatives of precarious or unstable sectors, in the 
accumulation of personal debt and depletion of savings, in comparison with higher classes. 
Such characteristics are inherently related to the configuration of entities that produces the 
financialised subject in the context of a stratified, class-based society. 
 
 
The regulation approach and the search for causal mechanisms in social structures 
As a critical, or in some cases explicitly radical, form of political economy (Jessop, 2001b), 
the Parisian Régulation school, exemplified by thinkers such as Michel Aglietta (1979), 
Robert Boyer (2000), or Alain Lipietz (1987), is well-known for its studies of the 
transformation of economic relations in modern industrial societies (Grahl and Teague, 
2000). In particular, Aglietta’s landmark study of the long boom in the post-war United 
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States during an economic period known as Fordism (1979) highlights both the social and 
economic conditions of possibility of capital accumulation, in addition to moments of 
crisis that destabilise and threaten production and reproduction. These prompt the 
emergence of new forms of regulation for a new growth period following what is known 
as the ‘crisis of Atlantic Fordism’ during the 1970s. For many regulation theorists, the 
contemporary period characterised by the accumulation of profits in financial spheres now 
represents the post-Fordist financialised regime of accumulation (e.g., Boyer, 2000; Jessop, 
2013; Stockhammer, 2008). The foundational theorists of the Parisian school shared a 
basic interest in understanding how, in spite of recurring economic crises in a nature 
suggested by Marx (1973) as detrimental to the survival of capitalism, economic, social, 
and political institutions could be mobilised and reconfigured to foster new kinds of growth 
over successive periods. It is true to say, however, that a lot of contemporary work 
undertaken within the regulation approach focuses on more ‘middle-range issues in 
comparative institutionalism’ (Jessop, 2001b: 89) rather than seeking to understand 
broader ontological issues concerning accumulation and the centrality of the commodity 
form. For example, in contrast to earlier theoretical work, Aglietta has more recently 
focused fairly specifically on the structure of corporate governance and the role of 
institutional investors, in thinking about how firms are controlled and what external 
obligations they have (2008). Additionally, as Grahl and Teague (2000) point out, 
contemporary studies using the regulation approach may, in spite of the clear Marxist 
inflection of the original theory, include other points of view such as New Keynesianism, 
institutionalism, or game theory.  
  Although the original theoretical underpinnings of the Regulation school have 
been obscured in more recent middle-range explorations, its investigative method, which 
seeks to uncover causal mechanisms that give rise to and help sustain accumulation 
regimes, is certainly inspired by critical realism (Jessop, 2001b). As such, a major facet of 
the regulation approach is a ‘retroductive account of the changing combinations of 
economic and extra-economic institutions, norms, and practices that help to secure, if only 
temporarily and always in specific economic spaces, a certain stability and predictability 
in economic conduct and accumulation’ (ibid., 90). This process was initially derived, in 
part, from an Althusserian concern with the relation of surface appearances ‘to the 
underlying realities of capital as a social relation’ (ibid., 92; cf. Althusser, 2009), otherwise 
understood as the way in which the inner structure of capitalism produces the particular 
phenomena we experience. For regulation theorists, this can be accomplished with 
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reference to forms of social regulation that aid reproduction, achieved by conceptualising 
the ‘industrial paradigm’, ‘accumulation regime’, ‘mode of regulation’, and ‘model of 
development’ as part of the identification of any given period of capitalist development 
(Jessop, 2001b: 93). These concepts enable theorists to understand how particular periods 
of development function in terms of the technical and social division of labour they require 
for production, accumulation and reproduction. But they also point to methods of 
regulation, beyond the narrow sense of state regulation of markets or industry, that 
facilitate and stabilise otherwise unpredictable or tumultuous cycles, including ‘norms, 
institutions, organisational forms, social networks, and patterns of conduct’ (ibid.). Thus, 
while the purpose of my own work is not to identify the forms of regulation of financialised 
growth itself (cf. Boyer, 2000), the social regulation of production and consumption in the 
context of the financial period of development is the context for understanding how social 
subjects, who are constrained or enabled by their material conditions, interact with 
financial risk and capital markets. To this end, my approach to subjectivation involves the 
identification of key entities from the financialised mode of social regulation supporting 
the regime of accumulation that condition subjective experience as risk-based and unstable. 
 According to Jessop, the regime of accumulation, referred to in other cases as a 
growth regime, is a ‘pattern of production and consumption that is reproducible over a 
long period. Accumulation regimes are sometimes analysed abstractly in terms of their 
typical reproduction requirements; but, specified as national modes of growth, they can be 
related to the international division of labour’ (2001b: 94). In other words, a regime of 
accumulation describes how a particular form of capitalism is reproducible as it accrues 
profits, representing the structural form, or entity that, comprised of many parts, conditions 
subjectivity itself. In the case of post-war variants of Fordism in the United Kingdom or 
United States, the accumulation regime could be described in terms of the ‘unprecedented 
synchronization of mass production and consumption’ (Boyer, 2000: 112), bolstered by 
modernisation and technological advancements leading to high productivity, but also a 
compromise between capital and labour for stable wages which enabled consistent 
consumption and high profit rates (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 2000). Richard Wolff (2005) 
contends that the regulation of wages, won through the institutionalisation of earlier 
struggles in the process of collective bargaining, enabled the individualisation of even the 
traditional working class under Fordism. As workers began to earn enough to purchase 
now cheaply-produced commodities that enabled them to live a more comfortable lifestyle, 
defining as they did a range of hobbies and interests constituting individual tastes and 
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preferences in contrast to the poorer ‘proletarian’ workers of the nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-centuries, they were increasingly called up, or interpellated (Althusser, 1971; 
Wolff, 2005) as consumers with personal choice rather than as struggling labourers. The 
crisis of Fordism – the increasing internationalisation of economies and the subsequent 
disruption of the wage relation as production moved abroad in search of cheaper 
conditions and new markets (Jessop, 2013) – and the emergence of financialisation 
necessitates a retroduction of the mechanisms which give rise to the entrepreneurial 
individual. To do this, I explain how the mode of regulation, or the ‘ensemble of norms, 
institutions, organisational forms, social networks, and patterns of conduct that can 
stabilise an accumulation regime’ (Jessop, 2001b: 94), as the parts of the regime of 
accumulation, contain causal mechanisms that shape subjective understanding and action. 
 
The regime of accumulation 
The development and mediation of the financialised regime of accumulation as a successor 
to Fordist accumulation are discussed in greater detail elsewhere (e.g., Boyer, 2000; 
Stockhammer, 2008; cf. Jessop, 2013). Here it suffices to outline the main features of 
production and consumption relative to the developments I identified in the preceding 
chapter as conditioning financial subjectivity. Simply put, the movement of production 
abroad amid the deterioration of labour relations during the 1980s left room for the 
transformation and expansion of capital markets so that, as I have noted with reference to 
Lapavitsas (2011), even non-financial firms have acquired trading capacities, and thus a 
formal involvement in financial markets. The upshot for Boyer (2000) is that wages are no 
longer regulated through collective bargaining and compromise, but are subject, through 
their disconnection from formal productivity, to the fluctuations of the markets, so that 
they must react ‘to any discrepancy between actual and expected returns. Depending on 
the precise content of the capital-labour compromise, the related flexibility may affect 
either the direct wage or working hours and employment’ (ibid., 120). However, as 
employees also increasingly have access to some of their employers’ means for financial 
gains in the form of equity ownership or pension holdings, ‘the prospect of gains on the 
financial markets has a direct influence on the decision to save or spend’ simply because 
‘wealth, as measured by financial markets, tends to become an important influence on the 
consumption of durable goods and also in house purchase and indebtedness to banks. If 
they are sufficiently developed, these new behavioural elements can inject an 
unprecedented dynamic into consumption’ (ibid.). To put it succinctly, the effects of 
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investment replace the wage compromise of the Fordist period, so that mass consumption 
is enabled, in the wake of the decline of productive industries in the United Kingdom, by 
access to financial gains that expand or shrink depending on the performance of the 
market. The reproduction of the financialised regime of accumulation is thus mediated by 
the performance of markets, which in turn makes credit easier to access (ibid., 117) and 
facilitates household consumption. In a climate of expected returns contrasted with risk 
and uncertainty, it is possible to see how the process of subjectivation cultivates an 
individual concerned, not simply with individual choice and freedom as in the Fordist case 
of mass consumption, but with their own navigation of personal risk and reward relative 
to debt and investment (cf. Lazzarato, 2012; Feher, 2009). In the case of contemporary 
working-class subjects, however, encumbered as they are by low wages or unstable 
employment, their structural surroundings serve as potential barriers to successful 
engagement with financial risk, creating certain amounts of instability where issues of 
default or limited savings are concerned. Thus, it is important to discern, through 
retroduction, the mechanisms that actualise this kind of inequality. 
 
 
Modes of social regulation 
Modes of social regulation, as a group of ‘economic and extra-economic factors’ (Jessop, 
2001b: 97) that mediate crisis tendencies and stabilise accumulation, constitute so many 
parts, in the terms laid out by Elder-Vass (2007a), of an overarching system of production, 
consumption, and reproduction. In this sense, a regime of accumulation contains emergent 
properties that can be actualised through the activation of causal powers inherent in the 
particular configuration of the modes of social regulation. In order to understand how 
economic inequality, expressed through class relations, conditions subjective experience 
and potential (or lack thereof), the causal mechanisms that give rise to the stratification 
and success of some individuals over others can be grasped through retroduction.  
 The modes of social regulation that facilitate financialised accumulation are 
comprised of parts such as the wage relation (including the flexibility of employment and 
working hours, the distribution of profits through equity returns and pension funds, as well 
as the lifestyles employees have as a result); forms of competition (which can be seen by 
firms within capital markets themselves); the monetary regime (which, under 
financialisation, aims to prevent financial bubbles); and the relation of the national 
economy with the global economy (through the trend to global finance) (cf. Boyer, 2000: 
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115). What is crucial for my work on the kinds of individuals this configuration of parts  
produces is the way in which socioeconomic inequalities are magnified through the 
increasing volatility of the accumulation regime, given the connection of production and 
labour markets with fluctuating capital markets and the process of speculation. As such, 
the first chapter of this thesis traced the emergence and stratification of financial 
subjectivity relative to some key modes of social regulation. In the first instance, the wage 
relation is massively changed through the rise of the ideology of shareholder value and the 
introduction of financial risk and volatility into even non-financial firms, leading to job 
and wage instability. The wage relation is supplemented by greater access to returns 
through pensions and equities. Speculation and competition in capital markets have the 
potential to create larger returns, but also lead to volatile consumption patterns and, 
subsequently, uncertainty in household incomes. Meanwhile, the refinement and 
expansion of financial instruments, services, and providers enabled by the restructuring of 
both retail banks seeking new customers through the provision of loans and credit, as well 
as investment banks trading securitised assets has led to the incorporation of even 
previously excluded individuals and households within capital markets. This happens as a 
consequence of the introduction of the pricing of risk for those whose uncertain financial 
histories make them a higher risk. The retroduction of modes of regulation that exacerbate 
earlier inequalities related to employment and income illustrates how the relations between 
such parts trigger particular mechanisms that give rise to a highly indebted form of 
subjectivity, because, as I illustrate in later chapters of this thesis, they actualise the 
possibility of future financial risk related to income and employment in the present, in the 
form of high rates and fees that often see many working-class households burdened by high 
levels of debt that is difficult or impossible to repay, while also reducing the ability to save 
and invest. Consequently, the configuration of structural relations is necessary to 
understand the way in which subjects, as individuals, are differentiated from each other. 
This is not because their activities and perspectives are determined by institutions and 
organisations so that they cannot act in any other way, but because their abilities are either 
enabled or constrained by stratifying relations that cannot simply be overcome through 
conscious action, such as low-waged work or poverty due to factors including upbringing 
and education, as well as available opportunities, but also gender and ethnicity.  
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Cultural political economy and the discursive constitution of subjects 
In addition to structures such as financial institutions or non-financial firms that give 
context to subjective action, it is also important to consider the lenses that financial subjects 
have to make sense of their situation. This is done through the examination of discourse, 
as the entry-point into understanding the complex nature of the social world. The 
subjectivation of financialised individuals does not occur purely through structural 
enabling or limiting of action, after all, inasmuch as it has been clear in both the 
Althusserian and Foucauldian conceptions of subjectivity that subjectivation is productive 
rather than purely repressive, creating self-assured individuals who are able to carry out 
necessary work through their own will. In a rejection of philosophical humanism, both 
Althusser and Foucault sought to locate the notion of a free and autonomous individual, 
emerging predominantly in Enlightenment thought, within the social relations that 
produce this kind of subjectivity. Althusser famously traces the production of autonomous 
individuals who ‘work all by themselves’ through Ideological State Apparatuses which 
inculcate subjects by calling upon or ‘interpellating’ them specifically as individuals with 
particular abilities and identities (1971). They are, in short, not purely dominated by class 
interests through more classically Repressive State Apparatuses which exert physical 
control or violence, but cultivated and encouraged as individuals in daily life through 
family relations, at school, church, work, and so on, where particular kinds of behaviour 
and conduct are promoted and regularised. Foucault’s later distance from the terms of 
scientific Marxism advocated by Althusser undoubtedly contributed to his notorious 
conceptualisation of the process of subjectivation, but at its heart, it retains a distinctly 
theoretically anti-humanist trajectory. As Datta notes, the idea of ‘Man’ is for Foucault a 
notion to be explained, rather than the basis of social life, so that he sought to understand 
‘how this invention – Man – emerged, and how various institutional conditions support its 
becoming the dominant reference point for making judgments about truth and about the 
basis for policy development in Western societies since the nineteenth century’ (2008: 289). 
Consequently, Foucault deploys the notion of the dispositif, or social apparatus (ibid., 284) 
that configures ‘elements and forces, practices and discourses, power and knowledge, that 
is both strategic and technical’ (Burchell, cited in Bussolini, 2010: 86, emphasis in original), 
to study the relationship between politics and social life (Datta, 2008; cf. Foucault, 1990).  
 Foucault approaches the study of the dispositif through ‘problematisation’ (1984), in 
order to ask how discourses and their associated practices and conduct evolved as ‘true or 
legitimate and became objects for thought, to reconceptualize power as a productive force 
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and to interrogate the normalizing institutional and societal practices associated with 
subjectivity and the development of an ethic of the self’ (Motion and Leitch, 2007: 264). 
The study of discourse, as well as social structures, is therefore inescapable in 
conceptualising the production of subjects, given that discourse, in the Foucauldian sense, 
is not only the act of speaking itself within a social context, but includes  
the widely held and oft-repeated interpretations of social conduct that produce and 
affirm behaviours. Over time these interpretations become unreflexively taken for 
granted; they are scarcely noted by the actors who employ them. As generally 
accepted presuppositions, they become embedded in the institutional deliberations 
and practices that produce and govern basic societal relations (Fischer, 2003: 73 – 
74).    
 
Insofar as discourse is actually produced, reproduced, and sometimes transformed within 
the dispositif in a way that inflects practices and material structures with meaning (Hajer, 
1995), discourse imparts to subjective experience a kind of meaning and understanding of 
social relations that enables a particular form of engagement. For critical realists working 
within critical variants of political economy, discourse is a large part of culture itself, which 
serves an ontological purpose (Jessop and Scherrer, 2014) as an ‘ensemble of social 
processes by which meanings are produced, circulated, and exchanged’ (Thwaites, Davis, 
and Mules, 1994: 1). Discourse and culture, then, are not separate spheres in contrast to 
an impersonal economic structure, but rather permeate everything from daily activities to 
political proceedings and economic relations with some form of meaning to those who 
engage with them, interpret them, or at very least are affected by them. Understood in this 
way, discourse is not held to be performative, in the way that actor-network theorists 
understand it when they argue that capital markets are performed, or brought into 
existence by academic and economic commentators (Callon, 1998). Instead, in critical 
realist fashion, discourse is also produced in a structural context, acting as a potential 
causal mechanism that can induce action or inaction on the part of subjects (Fairclough, 
1992). In this way, the connection between the process of subjectivation understood by 
Althusser as rooted in ideology, and the Foucauldian project as it is inflected with 
discourse, becomes clear, for, as Frank Fischer points out, discourses may have their bases 
in language, but are nonetheless ‘uttered in the social sphere, which is constituted 
ideologically. They always find their social meanings by reference to an ideological 
position’ (2003: 77), which is, through discourse, potentially rendered as legitimate, 
scientific, and apolitical.  
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 The third facet of my approach, deployed further in Chapter Three, is known as 
cultural political economy (Sum and Jessop, 2013), as a form of critical political economy 
that seeks explicitly to understand the stratification and privileging of particular discourses 
above others, within the context of unequal social relations. Cultural political economy 
begins from the premise that the ‘actually existing economy’, as the ‘chaotic sum of all 
economic activities’ (Jessop, 2004: 162) cannot be grasped in its totality as an object of 
calculation and study, or governance and management. Instead, ‘such practices are always 
oriented to subsets of economic relations […] that have been discursively and, perhaps, 
organisationally and institutionally fixed as objects of intervention’ (ibid.). That is to say, 
management of economic matters often focuses on the particular narration of economic 
activities as more (or less) important to the stability of growth and reproduction, so that 
what individuals think of as ‘the economy’ is an ‘economic imaginary’ (Jessop, 2004) 
composed of relevant features which helps constitute a stable growth regime (Jessop and 
Sum, 2006). Economic imaginaries are composed through the ‘selection of discursive and 
material mechanisms and translated into strategies and policies’ from a variety of possible 
discourses; the selected discourses then ‘shape the process of retention when these policies 
prove more or less effective and become sedimented into taken-for-granted imaginaries and 
relatively coherent sets of social relations’ (Kutter and Jessop, 2014: 67). Thus, from among 
the variation of possible descriptive discourses about the economy, certain ideas and 
concepts are selected for their perceived efficacy in addressing material conditions and 
retained to the extent that they become established facts within economically stable social 
relations. They do not bring the things they describe into existence, as in Callon (1998), 
but provide a lens with which to make sense of the existing world.  
 In this thesis in particular, I conceptualise the financialised economic imaginary 
through the explicit selection of now common and oft-repeated Thatcherite discourses of 
self-sufficiency, innovation, and responsibility, notoriously framed as the only solution to 
economic instability in the United Kingdom throughout the 1970s. I focus on Prime 
Minister Thatcher’s Party Conference speeches and Budget speeches, which are carefully 
crafted explanations of policy, as powerful discursive devices setting the tone for policy 
and legislation through the use of what is now understood as a neoliberal language of self-
sufficiency in order to understand the infusion of subjective experience with the importance 
of entrepreneurial innovation and personal responsibility. It is certainly the case, after all, 
that the notion of governmentality of subjects and their conduct as elaborated by Foucault 
is inherently bound up in the explicit formulations of political economy from the sixteenth 
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century to the eighteenth century, which maintains a concern with the management of 
resources within the state. For Foucault, this initially means that to 
govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the 
level of the entire state, which means exercising control towards its inhabitants, and 
the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as 
attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods (1990: 
92). 
 
Governance is thus not solely concerned with individuals themselves, but with the 
‘imbrication of men and things’ including resources, territory, climate, wealth, but also 
habits and ways of thinking (ibid., 93). In other words, subjects do not exist in a vacuum, 
but are shaped and conditioned by the things with which they interact. However, where 
the government of subjects might have earlier referred to the disciplinary practices which 
sought, through surveillance and the organisation of institutions such as prisons, schools, 
hospitals, and factories to normalise desirable forms of conduct among subjects (Datta, 
2008), Foucault’s landmark contribution to the study of neoliberal individualisation has 
undoubtedly been the application of government in the broader sense to the understanding 
of self-responsibilisation, or the monitoring of one’s own conduct. Here, the exercise of 
power centres on ‘knowledge production through the ensemble of rationalities, strategies, 
technologies, and techniques […] that allow for the de-centering of government through 
the active role of auto-regulated or auto-correcting selves who facilitate “governance at a 
distance”’ (Springer, 2012: 137). The mobilisation of knowledge on a population’s 
characteristics, such as its distribution of wealth, life expectations and health concerns, 
levels of education, employment prospects and histories, or ethnic backgrounds, can be 
used to develop individualised and targeted approaches to particular groups which appeal 
to their subjective rationality, rather than imposing harsh and ineffective rule in order to 
facilitate efficient and effective self-conduct. However, the normative grounds for 
becoming self-reliant, as a function of the moral health of society, are formulated explicitly 
in the policy of the British Conservative government inspired by Thatcher, making such 
discourses crucial for studying the spread and normalisation of such ideas.  
 The third chapter therefore uses a specific form of critical discourse analysis (e.g., 
Fairclough, 1992) known as narrative policy analysis (Roe, 1994; Van Eeten, 2007) to 
understand the stabilising effects of narratives underlying policy prescriptions in the face 
of uncertainty (Van Eeten, 2007: 251). Neither cultural political economy nor narrative 
policy analysis prescribe any single method of discourse analysis, and so for the purposes 
of this thesis, which seeks a critique of dominant narratives in terms of the implicit interests 
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they serve, a close textual reading of the transcripts of speeches using critical discourse 
analysis is appropriate (ibid., 255). This involves a consideration of the types of discourse 
used in particular texts, the inclusion and exclusion of various discourses in policy making, 
and the question of the construction of authority and legitimacy in the discourse (Fischer, 
2003). The upshot is a distillation of the normative expectations of financial subjects as 
they were initially articulated in a period of instability, through to their crystallisation and 
acceptance as commonsensical.     
 Two sets of transcripts of speeches are chosen for analysis, including the annual 
Party Conference speeches delivered by Thatcher throughout her tenure as Prime Minister, 
and the Budget Speech as given yearly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (including 
Geoffrey Howe, Nigel Lawson, and John Major). 23 speeches were examined in total, 
including 12 Conference speeches, five Budgets delivered by Howe, and six delivered by 
Lawson. The Party Conference speeches are thorough summaries of the achievements and 
aspirations of the Conservatives in government under Thatcher, representing a carefully 
and deliberately crafted outlook that is presented both to conference delegates and news 
outlets. They are thus important for understanding the Conservatives’ framing of the 
problems they perceive as the most pressing, and the solutions needed. The yearly Budget 
Speech is similarly thorough in its summary of the financial year and proposals for the 
forthcoming one, in addition to providing insight into the material consequences of the 
enactment of financial legislation. The Budget Speech is therefore illustrative of the way in 
which discourse is also a casual mechanism, as ideological assumptions and utterances 
become formal legislation which affects the kind of resources available to individuals and 
households. 
 Each set of speeches was analysed systematically in order to understand the 
material contexts of the discursive content of the speeches. The Party Conference speeches 
illustrate the framing of economic crisis in the United Kingdom as attributable to union 
bureaucracy and excessive government spending and interference as stifling to individual 
innovation needed for economic recovery. The economic crisis, embodied in the 
stagnation of productivity and wages, and subsequent strikes, is narrated specifically as a 
crisis caused by union and government regulation, at the expense of individual flourishing 
needed for creative solutions in industry. The Budget Speeches are analysed for their 
narration of the effects of reducing government spending and encouraging financial 
deregulation, in order to trace the role of discourse as a causal mechanism that can alter 
material contexts. 
CHAPTER TWO  Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 76 
 Additionally, I analysed both sets of transcripts thematically, drawing out latent 
themes from the carefully and deliberately chosen recurring words to consider the 
ideological motivations underlying the Thatcher Conservatives’ narration of the economic 
imaginary. Individuality, economic freedom, risk and reward, and personal responsibility 
are positively-presented thematic ideas, strongly contrasted with bureaucracy and 
regulation, government impingement and collectivism as a limit on personal flourishing. 
What is crucial here is the seemingly impartial way in which they are presented, to suggest 
the objectivity of market-based solutions and the subsequent inevitability of economic 
recovery. A latent analysis which searches for the underlying assumptions and ideology of 
semantic content (Braun and Clark, 2006) provides a way of examining the power relations 
implicit in discourse that is presented as objective or apolitical. This enables an 
understanding of subjugation as a set of practices reproduced in institutions and 
organisations that is achieved, in part, through the seemingly straight-forward nature of 
the ideas that inform it (Althusser, 1971; Foucault, 1984). A summary of the types of 
documents and analyses used is provided in the table below. 
Type of source: Party Conference Speeches Budget Speeches 
Number of 
documents: 
12 speech transcripts 11 speech transcripts 
Description of 
sources, and the 
reasons for their 
selection: 
Delivered annually at the 
Conservative Party Conference 
by the Leader, Margaret 
Thatcher presented a speech 
every year of her premiership 
between 1979 – 1991. These 
speeches provide an overview of 
the Party’s accomplishments and 
setbacks over the past year, as 
well as ambitions for the coming 
year. They are suitable for 
analysis because they provide a 
yearly documentation of Party 
policy, and can be used to trace 
ideological and political 
developments. 
Delivered annually by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to the 
House of Commons, the Budget 
Speech contains a list of events 
from the previous financial year, 
ahead of proposals for the budget 
in the current year. They are 
important for analysis as a 
distillation of government 
financial policy, providing a yearly 
comparison of developments in 
taxation, benefits, savings 
initiatives, and the expansion of 
credit. They illustrate both the 
trajectories of these policies, and 
their ideological underpinnings in 
the Thatcher government.  
Use of systematic 
analysis: 
To determine the kinds of 
discourses selected and retained 
by the Thatcher Conservatives in 
the construction of an economic 
imaginary characterised by 
To examine discursive concepts as 
causal mechanisms, through the 
enactment of legislation that 
affects the kinds of financial 
resources available to individuals 
and households. 
CHAPTER TWO  Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 77 
entrepreneurialism and financial 
freedom. 
Use of thematic 
analysis: 
Latent thematic analysis: Party 
Conference speeches are 
inherently loaded with prevalent 
key words; a latent analysis of 
themes emerging from recurring 
words and concepts enables an 
understanding of the underlying 
assumptions about the role of the 
individual in economic prosperity 
underlying Thatcher’s narration 
of economic crisis, and her 
subsequent solutions.   
Latent thematic analysis: this 
form of thematic analysis enables 
themes concerning economic 
insecurity, personal responsibility, 
innovation and entrepreneurship, 
and financial risk to be read in 
terms of their ideological 
underpinnings, in spite of their 
presentation as objectively 
determined and unavoidable 
courses of action proposed in the 
Budget Speech.  
Table 2.1: Speeches and types of analysis used in the narrative policy analysis 
 
Conclusion 
The metatheoretical assumptions of any theoretical piece of work, whether implicit or 
explicit, undoubtedly shape the conceptualisation of both the object of study and the way 
in which this is approached. Inroads in the study of a neoliberal, self-responsible 
subjectivity have certainly been made by actor-network theorists expressly concerned with 
the notion of daily life as a part of the larger understanding of the interweaving of cultural 
and economic matters, in an attempt to depart from the structural focus of political 
economy. However, as I have argued, the issue of structural inequality which stratifies 
financial subjects is absent in actor-network theory accounts of the individualised subject, 
predominantly owing to the flattened ontology which denies the duality between structure 
and agency presupposed by political economists. In order to situate the process of 
subjectivation within economic and political social relations without suggesting that 
subjects are wholly determined by their external conditions, I elaborated my critically 
inflected metatheoretical commitments in critical realism, and my connected deployment 
of elements of the Parisian Regulation school, in addition to the discursively focused 
cultural political economy.  
 Critical realism entails an understanding of the social world as something that exists 
externally and materially to subjects, even if their apprehension of it is mediated through 
discourse and cultural conceptions. Consequently, I defined social structures in critical 
realist terms, as entities composed of interrelated parts, containing between them potential 
in the form of emergent properties that can be actualised in the activation of causal 
mechanisms. The process of retroduction is methodologically useful for distilling the 
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causal mechanisms contained within structures that give rise to a stratified, class-based 
subjectivity that nonetheless calls for individual responsibility and innovation. To further 
flesh out this process, I continued into an exposition of the Parisian Regulation school and 
its elaboration of the reproduction of a financialised regime of accumulation through 
production and consumption, and the mediation of crisis tendencies and instability by 
modes of social regulation including the conduct of subjects themselves. Finally, I turned 
to a specific critical form of political economy called cultural political economy, taking its 
inspiration both from the periods of capitalist growth theorised by the Regulation school, 
and the discourses that shape conduct and social understandings constituting subjects in 
the Foucauldian dispositif. To this end, I began to think about the variation, selection, and 
retention of discourses that form a financialised economic imaginary. In the next chapter, 
I put this approach to work in the study of Thatcherite discourses on finance and self-
sufficiency, to fully lay out the constitution of subjects within the dynamic relations of the 
material social world.   
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Chapter Three:  
Discourse and the narrative of self-reliance under Margaret Thatcher 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter made explicit my commitment to a critical realist metatheory, 
elaborating how the thesis is underpinned by the search, in the process of retroduction, for 
causal mechanisms that produce financially stratified subjects. I highlighted in particular 
the multifaceted nature of structures, which are far from reified or monolithic, but instead 
composed of many social institutions and organisations that exist in relation to each other 
and thus, as a result, contain the possibility of shifts, largescale changes, and instability or 
crisis leading to a reordering of social relations. This emergentist ontology (Elder-Vass, 
2007a), so-called because of its focus on underlying emergent properties and their ability 
to cause change, is also consistent with the political economy of the Parisian Regulation 
school, concerned as it is with disruption caused by accumulation crises and the mediating 
economic, political and social mechanisms that help stabilise growth regimes. From the 
second chapter, it was possible to see how multiple factors identified in Chapter One 
coalesce in the formation of subjects engaged in risky financial decisions, such as 
investment for future provision or, as is more likely the case for the precariat, the 
accumulation of debt to provide for the present. The upshot is an understanding of 
subjective disposition, including habits, beliefs, cultural norms, strategies and coping 
mechanisms, as part of the mode of social regulation in a growth regime. However, as I 
noted with reference to the third approach taken in this thesis, cultural political economy, 
financialised subjects do not understand their situation within the context of broader social 
structures purely by engaging with them, but in the narratives that are produced about 
socioeconomic relations. These create what cultural political economists call the 'economic 
imaginary' (Kutter and Jessop, 2014), a parsimonious selection of particular elements that 
coherently explain a specific perspective of the socioeconomic terrain with which subjects 
engage.  
 Indeed, it is true to say that while the expansion of markets and the emergence of 
new financial products undoubtedly helps shape how individuals and households budget 
and manage finances, their understanding of their situation likely comes more from the 
discourse that surrounds them through product advertisements and investment advice, 
financial education and literacy programmes and, above all, political rhetoric about the 
economy. While the thesis has, up to this point, suggested a climate of uncertainty from 
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falling production, labour market fluctuation, and reductions in the welfare state, I now 
have to discuss the political developments of the Thatcher Government, beginning in 1979, 
which paralleled and fostered the rise of financial liberalisation. This turn, after all, 
represents a very particular take on the economic slowdown facing the United Kingdom 
at the time, plagued as it was by declining productivity and profits, inflation, and industrial 
action. Yet the language of the policies, concerning financial discipline and austerity 
needed to cultivate future profit, innovation, self-reliance, and the promotion of economic 
literacy and citizenship, including an understanding of risk, was touted as the only solution 
and indeed remains pervasive in British policy today. In short, the certainty of Thatcher’s 
pronouncements, expressed through budgets, policy, and eventually legislation, set the 
tone for the assessment and understanding of personal progress and quality of life, as 
individuals and households framed their needs and plans relative to the resources that 
were, or some cases ceased to be, available to them. While Thatcher herself did not address 
the idea of the individual as an entrepreneur in everyday life, she undoubtedly laid the 
groundwork for the idea of an individual as the centre of personal advancement and 
wellbeing, made possible by the expansion of financial risk among households in the 
owning of property and holding of shares, which was meant to encourage greater 
productivity and a stake in the firms people were employed with. The deregulation and 
liberalisation of markets promoted by Thatcher as part of economic reform further helped 
with the ability of individuals and households to behave as risk-takers or entrepreneurs, as 
I elaborate further in the fourth chapter.  
 In this way, it is possible to treat discourse as a mediating part of the political 
organisation of the social structure, containing its own causal mechanisms that, in keeping 
with critical realism, can initiate a change in behaviour as part of subjectivation itself. 
Having charted changes in structural terms, concerning market liberalisation and the 
expansion of credit, my focus in this chapter is specifically on accompanying political 
discourse that takes up the call to a ‘property owning democracy’, later transformed under 
New Labour to ‘stakeholder society’. Thatcher’s discourse, and underlying free-market 
ideology, serves as a concrete beginning for tracing political and economic developments 
in British society that culminate in a risk-oriented individualism. The take-up of many 
earlier Conservative policies by Tony Blair in the reshaping of Labour policy during the 
1990s is indicative of Thatcherism as a broader causal mechanism in the creation of 
contemporary financial subjectivity. Through this, it is possible to think about the ways in 
which discourse frames subjective experience and effects a change in behaviour as the 
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expression of particular interests in speeches and policy is channelled into parliamentary 
budgets and legislation. This affects what individuals can and cannot do, at least where 
saving and spending are concerned. To illustrate this process, I have analysed each of the 
11 Budget Speeches given by Chancellors of the Exchequer during Thatcher’s three terms 
as Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990, in addition to 11 of her annual Speeches to the 
Conservative Party Conference, as well as other television and radio interviews. I focus on 
the Budget Speeches as the highly refined annual iterations of economic policy, which 
indicate concrete changes being made by the government, while Party Conference 
Speeches provide a concise narrative of Thatcher’s achievements in government each year. 
A narrative policy analysis, as I noted in the previous chapter, provides insight into the 
production of a narrative that helps stabilise the assumptions of policymakers in the face 
of political and economic uncertainty (Van Eeten, 2007), much in the same way 
organisations and social institutions help stabilise crisis tendencies in accumulation. The 
result, I argue, is that regardless of the efficacy of Thatcherite prescriptions for the success 
of the economy and indeed Conservative Government, the notion of prosperity through 
innovation, self-reliance and the embracement of risk is nonetheless a prevalent narrative 
that continues to frame and inform the subjective experience of finance in contemporary 
Britain.  
 
 
Homo economicus and the neoliberal entrepreneurial subject: Foucault’s take on 
individualism as a theoretical underpinning to economic austerity 
‘Neoliberalism seems to be everywhere’, write Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002: 380), 
thinking about the largescale restructuring of economies in the former Soviet Union, Asia, 
Africa and Latin America, but also in the increasingly supply-oriented approaches taken 
by governments in Europe and North America after the dissolution of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971 and the subsequent reduction in post-war Keynesian policies. 
Consequently, the logic of neoliberalism ‘has become a commonplace of the times’, both 
‘compelling’ and ‘intangible’ as a source of power (ibid., 381). Despite the variety of 
different definitions and applications found in academic literature, the interpretation of 
events that Foucault himself supplies concerns the encroachment of economic rationality 
in the conduct of the self. In thinking about subjectivation specifically, the meaning and 
importance of a neoliberal shift in governance, for Foucault, is clear. The rational 
individual, Homo economicus, is no longer purely a maximiser of utility, engaging in 
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exchange as in the case of the classical liberalism of the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-
centuries, but is instead an ‘entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being 
for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings’ (Foucault, 
2008: 226, parentheses in original). Foucault’s (2007; 2008) prescient assessment of 
governance and forms of conduct at the end of the 1970s remains a definitive analysis of 
contemporary policy programmes and political governance, even if he could not foresee in 
his own career the development of a financial infrastructure, with its capacity to classify, 
stratify, and regularise the conduct of subjects through risk-based pricing and repayment 
schedules, or personalised investment advice and products. He understood, however, 
Homo economicus as a ‘free and autonomous “atom” of self-interest who is fully responsible 
for navigating the social realm using rational choice and cost-benefit calculation to the 
express exclusion of all other values and interests’ (Hamann, 2009: 38, emphasis in original), 
so that individuals became responsible for their success and accountable for their failure.  
    Trent Hamann traces the link between Foucault’s broader study of the 
government of populations and the government of one’s self through the ‘conduct of 
conduct’: a population can be governed as a group of individuals with distinct 
characteristics, but the process of subjectivation crucially entails ‘the work that individuals 
perform on themselves in order to become certain kinds of subjects’ (ibid.), as a 
consequence of ‘growing government and corporate surveillance’ as well as ‘more subtly 
and significantly, the extent to which activities of production and consumption typically 
practiced in public spaces are increasingly taking place in the home, a space once 
exclusively reserved for leisure time and housework’ (ibid., 39). Meanwhile, mobile 
phones, computers and other technology render ‘private space and personal time accessible 
to the demands of business and, increasingly, the interests of government’ (ibid.). The 
upshot is a worrying blend of economic rationality with everyday decisions, so that even 
those individuals who do not explicitly agree with the tenets of something as abstract as 
neoliberal ideology are nonetheless likely to find themselves carrying out the tasks and 
conduct of self-sufficient subjects, as a matter of necessity or expediency, in Foucauldian 
terms. Yet, the neoliberal dispositif touting innovation, risk-taking, and responsibility has 
not always been so ubiquitous. Indeed, the narration of economic crises as requiring 
supply-side innovation seemed a throwback to the nineteenth century in the United 
Kingdom prior to the election of Margaret Thatcher, whose name is now practically 
synonymous alongside that of Ronald Reagan with neoliberalism. Furthermore, in the case 
of the United Kingdom, the appeal to individualism and self-sufficiency was certainly no 
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indicator of the declining significance of class, but in fact took place against intense 
industrial unrest, serving as a highly politicised corrective to ‘collectivist’ labour action. 
The discursive promotion of self-sufficiency through politics, in a period of growing 
economic and social inequality, is therefore compelling to the study of the stratification of 
subjects.  
 
An economy ‘in crisis’: Margaret Thatcher and the spread of individualism in the 
United Kingdom 
The ‘Winter of Discontent’ and the crisis of productivity 
During the 19070s, the United Kingdom suffered from economic crises related to reduced 
output and profitability. British industry was beginning to fall behind its international 
competitors in both Western Europe and abroad, so that household commodities cost 
more and the standard of living to which many working families had become accustomed 
was more expensive. Wages had not kept up with inflation, resulting in workers’ strikes. 
Infamously, between 1978 – 1979, industrial action was so widespread in its effects that it 
was termed the ‘Winter of Discontent’. This proved to be a strategic moment of political 
transformation, with the Conservatives successfully contending that the economic crisis 
was indicative of a more fundamental crisis of the British state (Hay, 1996): industry, profit, 
and progress were, for Thatcher, being stifled by union demands, which had become so 
strong through the institutionalisation of collective bargaining so as to be able to hold the 
nation hostage to pressure from union bosses. Meanwhile, nationalised industries were 
performing poorly due to lack of competition and significant injections of funds from the 
state in spite of their inefficiency, contributing to higher costs of production with low 
output. The only possible solution, in Thatcher’s mind, was the complete minimisation of 
state involvement in industry, in order to enable competition, which was meant to 
encourage efficiency, increase output and profitability, leading to job creation and lower 
prices. Controlling public spending was thus crucial for Thatcher, in that inflation, 
including the cost of household commodities, could only be controlled and reduced 
through financially austere measures meant to curtail undue government influence whilst 
stimulating the economy through a course of privatisation and deregulation. 
Overspending, particularly on lagging nationalised industries with no competition, was 
leading to increased costs of production, leading to higher costs in the absence of lower 
output. Increasing wages in line with costs only put further pressure on industry, and 
Thatcher was adamant that they should be set by the market rather than collective 
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bargaining, while government spending on industry should be reduced through the 
privatisation of national firms. Vivien Schmidt therefore suggests that the rhetoric of 
Thatcher’s campaign and subsequent political mandates can be seen as ‘neoliberal 
discourse promoting laissez-faire capitalism, monetarist macroeconomic policies, and the 
rollback of the state’ (2001: 257). Perhaps unsurprisingly, financial austerity, or discipline, 
for Thatcher, proved contentious and unpopular because public spending could not be used 
to ameliorate periods of low productivity and pay. This proved trying for some individuals 
and households, who had to make significant cutbacks.  
 Later popularity during Thatcher’s second mandate was primarily related to an 
appeal to middle-class self-interest through the introduction of tax cuts, as well as the 
infamous sale of council houses under the Right to Buy Act which promoted working-class 
homeownership and family security. Thatcher considered local council control over much 
of the housing supply to be unnecessarily bureaucratic. Council houses and estates had 
originally been developed out of a need for housing due to shortages in the private sector 
following both World Wars, touted as a new kind of security for working-class households 
struggling to find adequate and well-priced accommodation. According to Jones and 
Murie, however, in the 1970s the ‘private rented sector had diminished in size’, making it 
‘harder to be in favour of the growth of both council housing and homeownership’ (2005: 
6, emphasis in original). In short, council housing and its control by the state was now 
considered to be a damper on the aspirations of working-class households for 
homeownership, even if previously it had been a means to affordable housing for many 
who would not otherwise have managed. Discourse thus focused on state provisions as 
‘restrictions’, not simply on economic growth, but also on the choices of tenants and 
families in council houses to own homes independently of the state (Conservative Party 
Manifesto, 1979). As a result of the popularity of these appeals, ‘Thatcher’s discourse could 
be seen as transformative with regard to public attitudes to the structure of the economy 
and work’, with opinion polls in the 1980s indicating that ‘Thatcher did manage to move 
the British toward more “capitalist” values, by accepting greater inequalities, individual 
responsibility, materialism, and entrepreneurialism’ in the cultivation of new small 
businesses (Schmidt, 2001: 258). However, while maintaining a certain amount of support 
on some economic issues, others such as welfare reform proved less marketable, as 
resistance to cuts to social welfare grew, meaning, as Schmidt argues, that Thatcher ‘did 
not by any means eradicate “socialist” values, especially with regard to health and welfare’ 
(ibid.).  
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 It is thus not the case that Margaret Thatcher enjoyed complete political support in 
order to exercise an unquestioned ideological hegemony, without vigorous opposition 
(Jessop, Bonnet, Bromley, and Ling, 1987). This was especially evident in ‘the lowest 
opinion poll ratings ever recorded by a British Prime Minister’ in her first term (Jessop, 
Bonnet, and Bromley, 1990: 84). Her ideological interests and the discourse of her 
campaign and government, however, represented a fundamental shift in perspective within 
Britain, to which all opponents now had to respond. By advocating traditionally liberal 
principles of limited state intervention, she broke ‘both with Labor’s “socialism” and 
“corporatism” and the Tories’ “paternalism”, neither of which were seen as suitable for 
rejuvenating what she considered to be fundamental flaws in the operation of the economy 
itself. The only remedy was  
a return to traditional ‘Victorian’ values of hard work and self-reliance; the rollback 
of the welfare state in order to ‘change Britain from a dependent to self-reliant 
society. From a give-it-to-me to a do-it-yourself nation; to a get-up-and-go instead 
of a sit-back-and-wait-for-it Britain’; and the recognition that inequalities were 
necessary to encourage the ‘spirit of entrepreneurship’ (Schmidt, 2001: 257).    
 
Socioeconomic inequality had become, then, morally acceptable as a way of incentivising 
a strong work ethic, as a means of promoting industry among employees and the 
unemployed themselves. However, high unemployment rates and declining prospects in 
productive industries employing traditionally working-class individuals notoriously left 
many on uneven ground when it came to opportunities for personal and industrial 
advancement. The promotion of an accumulation strategy involving the ‘deregulation of 
private capital, the privatization of significant parts of the public sector, the introduction 
of commercial criteria into residual state sectors, and the promotion of an open economy’ 
(Jessop et al., 1987: 106) is, by Thatcher’s own admission, a supply-side solution, in which 
the profit of industry eventually benefits working households. The upshot, however, has 
been the introduction, and subsequent persistence, of a discourse of individualism that sees 
success as purely the result of personal dedication and hard work. This has sinister 
implications for failure, for Walker, who notes that ‘one should be wary of underestimating 
the importance of discourses of choice, agency and personal empowerment’: 
A fundamental commitment to the notion of the rational and knowing financial 
subject has become dominant in the way we understand people in problem debt as 
personally responsible for their circumstances rather than as subject to increasingly 
immiserating economic regimes of practice (2012: 54). 
 
Indeed, a myopia that focuses only on the individual, rather than also accounting for the 
structural constraints such as precarious employment and income that create difficulties 
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for them, continues into the present, in a way which suggests that the fundamental shift 
brought on by Thatcher’s individualistic discourse has not disappeared. After all, as Jessop 
points out, the New Labour Government actually continued and deepened six tenets of 
neoliberal strategy, including ‘liberalization, deregulation, privatization, re-
commodification, internationalization, and reduced direct taxes’ (2007: 283) during its 
mandate. Thatcherism was thus not simply one of many perspectives on economic crises 
to be countered by others, but a carefully selected and retained discourse that reconstituted 
the conduct of subjects through its wide reach and application. 
 
Cultural political economy and narrative policy analysis 
The endurance of discourses and their legitimacy as part of a neoliberal dispositif of risk and 
self-reliance cannot be understood as only a question of the performance of such a position 
by relevant politicians, policymakers, and interested parties. Discourse, as I noted in the 
previous chapter, is uttered relative to an ideological position, which is bolstered by 
material support in the form of organisations such as political offices or firms which stand 
to benefit from certain kinds of legislation, as well as the repressive state apparatuses 
identified by Althusser (1971) such as the police, which can be used to quell social or 
industrial unrest. Discourse is thus not purely reducible to its material preconditions, but 
it is necessarily situated within them, and this context must be considered when seeking to 
understand why certain discourses acquire an authoritative, or at least prevalent status at 
the expense of other possible explanations of the workings of the social world and the place 
of individuals within it. This, effectively, is what cultural political economists mean when 
discussing the ‘economic imaginary’, as a series of discursive relations deliberately selected 
from among the myriad of activities and interactions that make up the ‘actually existing 
economy’ for the purpose of making targeted interventions through policy and legislation 
(Jessop, 2004). In short, the economic imaginary serves as a frame with which to view the 
most pressing economic problems, and subsequently, the best solutions to them. Further 
sections of this chapter will explore how the Thatcher Government successfully narrated 
the crisis of the British economy during the 1970s as a function of undemocratic union 
leadership and ineffective nationalised industries or assets as stifling the innovation and 
enterprise in industry needed to rejuvenate output, profitability and employment. First, I 
discuss the discourse analysis used to assess the selection and retention of discourses. 
 The study of how certain discourses are selected and retained requires taking 
linguistic and discursive turns within the social sciences and humanities seriously, in order 
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to understand the ‘discursive construction of ideas, agents, and structures, and the socio-
political implications of such construction’ (Kutter and Jessop, 2014: 69). The linguistic 
turn has helped in ‘de-naturalizing assumptions about social reality, culture, and scientific 
truth’ (ibid.) by locating communication and dialogue within power relations and social 
structures. A cultural political economy that takes the role of discourse seriously in the 
creation of intelligible economic imaginaries thus does not privilege sense- and meaning-
making above all else as the main focus of study within sociology and political economy, 
so much as it suggests that the analysis of discourse must eventually be included in 
explanations because the meaning that people derive from their surroundings and 
interactions with others frames how subjects make sense of their environment and the 
actions they take or feel forced to take (cf. Sum and Jessop, 2014).  
 As a metatheoretical outlook, cultural political economy does not require the use 
of any particular method of discourse analysis, given that many have emerged out of the 
linguistic turn (van Dijk, 1997; Joseph and Roberts, 2004). However, the study must make 
‘explicit [from] which epistemological universe (or combination of theories) it is 
borrowing’ to ensure a specific understanding of the meaning and role of discourse (Kutter 
and Jessop, 2014: 71). Following on from the previous chapter, my understanding of 
discourse itself emphasises a Foucauldian concern with discourses as ‘knowledge systems 
of the human sciences (medicine, economics, linguistics, etc.) that inform the social and 
governmental “technologies” which constitute power in modern society’ (Fairclough and 
Wodak, 1997: 261; Foucault, 1995). According to Nick Hostettler, ‘Foucault’s work on 
modern disciplines contributes to the non-discursive aspect of [disciplinary] relations, 
sharing a concern with the sphere of modern life Althusser designated “Ideological State 
Apparatuses”, those primarily modern relations of subjectification and agentification’ 
(2004: 181). In this sense, discourse, or systems of knowledge, helps explain how subjects 
are constituted (Sum, 2009), both in the way that language is used, but also in the design 
of systems of discipline and education (Foucault, 1995; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). 
Foucault does not himself provide a specific methodology for the analysis of discourse, but 
his primary interest in the creation of subjects through the self-regulation and monitoring 
of conduct implies a critical approach grounded in the study of explicit and implicit 
interests and uneven relations of power (Chilton and Schäffner, 1997).  
 Narrative policy analysis provides a useful tool for examining the development of 
ideas within the speeches and budgets tabled over the course of the Conservative 
Government under Margaret Thatcher. As a form of discourse analysis, it was developed 
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in order to understand how the narration of particular events in broader contexts help 
stabilise assumptions made by policymakers in times of uncertainty. In this regard, it is an 
approach that is consistent with the Parisian Regulation School’s understanding of the 
mediating effects of a mode of social regulation. Narrative policy analysis serves a number 
of purposes, including the study of current and past policy in order to assess potential policy 
options (Roe, 1994). However, it can also take a more critical approach geared toward the 
analysis and critique of dominant narratives through close textual readings in a content 
analysis (Van Eeton, 2007), an approach which is well-suited to the aims of this thesis. 
Close readings of texts involve a comprehensive reading of documents in order to parse 
out the carefully selected storyline that guides the creation of meaning attributed to social 
phenomena in flux (Fisher, 2003). Roe suggests, for example, that ‘[n]ational budgets are 
notorious for trying, by way of figures and statistics, to simplify, quantify, and commodify 
into commensurable units a reality that revolts against such reductionism’ (1994: 23). It is 
thus important to trace the narrative that is developed over the course of three Conservative 
terms through Budget and Party Conference Speeches, by searching for recurring words 
and phrases that are loaded with specific connotations, such as ‘responsibility’, 
‘innovation’, and ‘creativity’; as well as particular framing devices, such as a market that 
is stifled in productivity and output by bureaucratic government ministries or corrupt 
unions. Framing devices help to show which ‘seemingly technical issues’, such as a budget, 
can nonetheless ‘conceal normative commitments’ (Fischer, 2003: 85) in order to parse out 
the expectations of the behaviour of subjects.  
Here, the most straightforward texts for analysis are usually papers and speeches 
that can be attributed to a specific actor or group of actors who play an important part in 
the construction of a narrative. The selection of a particular set of discourses for narrating 
and constructing an economic imaginary can be observed in an examination of the 
question as to which discursive interpretations are allowed to dominate public discussion, 
and why. Put another way, it involves thinking about the stratification of discourses and 
the lending of authority to a particular outlook (Fischer, 2003). How, for example, do 
concepts such as innovation, self-reliance, or risk emerge, over ‘collectivist’ discourses of 
social risk reduction and welfare support? Concerning the retention of discourses about the 
economic imaginary, it is pertinent to ask what ‘kinds of forces—both political and 
rhetorical—are brought to bear to establish such discursive formations, and how do they 
affect the behaviour of individuals and social groups? Once established, how can such 
constructions establish discursive hegemony over a particular policy domain?’ (ibid., 85). 
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In Foucauldian fashion, the discourses that are consciously selected might be retained and 
reproduced in their incorporation into ‘the ways of being/identities of social agents both 
semiotically (e.g., ways of talking) and somatically (bodily dispositions)’; but they are also 
retained in their ‘objectification’ within ‘the built environment, technology, etc., [or] in 
organisational practice’ (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer, 2004: 31).  
 A critical approach to discourse analysis is thus consistent with the critical realism 
adopted in this thesis, because it contextualises discourse not simply as an object of 
hermeneutical study in the search of meaning, but as a causal mechanism in its own right, 
situated within a social structure, that affects the personal conduct of subjects as well as 
policies and legislation that maintain or transform organisations and institutions. As 
Fairclough et al. note, a ‘speech made during an election campaign may offer people strong 
reasons for voting in a certain way. The fact that the speech might be construed differently 
by different individuals (even leading them to vote contrary to the reasons adduced’ (ibid., 
26) indicates that discourses serve as the basis, or cause, of beliefs, decision, and action. 
The approach I take to cultural political economy in this chapter therefore draws on a 
Foucauldian-inspired narrative policy analysis to interpret Thatcher’s discourses of 
entrepreneurialism and self-sufficiency in the context of the crisis-ridden British welfare 
state. Policy analysis can be used to explain how the selection of discourses promoted the 
rise of a particular, economically liberal economic imaginary, while their retention later 
contributed to the subjectivation of individuals and the notion of the entrepreneur even at 
the household level. Importantly, the question is not of the popularity of Thatcher’s 
policies, but of the way in which they set the terms of debate at a political level, while also 
reconfiguring daily life by publicising a discourse about private property, security, 
innovation and personal freedom that signalled a shift in the management of household 
activities. 
 
‘There is no alternative’: The individualistic discourses of the Thatcher Government, 
1979 – 1990 
Margaret Thatcher is perhaps infamous for her selection of market-oriented discourses 
focusing on ideas of deregulation and privatisation as crucial to promoting prosperity at all 
levels from industry to individual households. Indeed, early in her first term as Prime 
Minister she had already proclaimed in speeches (e.g. 21 May, 1980) that ‘there is no 
alternative’ to her proposed programme of laissez-faire economic rejuvenation. Here, 
reductions in government controls and spending are touted as necessary for promoting 
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productivity and wealth, which will lead to job creation, stable wages combined with lower 
prices on household goods, and, consequently, a better quality of life for citizens. Her 
straightforward condemnation of the ‘collectivist’ policies of previous Labour 
Governments clearly paints the welfare state and nationalised industry both as responsible 
for the decline of the economy and an impediment to its recovery, as she laments how they 
‘exalted the role of Government and humbled the role of the individual’ in ‘social 
regeneration’ (6 July, 1979). For Thatcher, the source of innovation needed for recovery is 
the individual itself, as the locus of creativity and responsibility necessary to direct and 
effect change, from the utility-maximising household that makes parsimonious purchasing 
decisions all the way up to firm directors who seek pioneering ways of meeting consumer 
demand in order to expand production and cut costs. Thus, 
We need, for example, to create a mood where it is everywhere thought morally 
right for as many people as possible to acquire capital; not only because of the 
beneficial economic consequences, but because the possession of even a little capital 
encourages the virtues of self-reliance and responsibility, as well as assisting a spirit 
of freedom and independence (ibid.). 
 
Consequently, Thatcher insisted that ‘human fulfilment is not the monopoly of any one 
party’ (ibid.), as it can only flourish through individual freedom of choice and responsibility 
to others, which can be expressed in the freedom of enterprise. As she further argued, ‘I 
am sure there is a wide acceptance in Britain, going far beyond the supporters of our Party, 
that production and distribution in our economy is best operated through free competition’ 
rather than government intervention (ibid.).  Individual freedom as the source of wellbeing 
in any given society is therefore rendered as a universal approach to improvement rather 
than a mere possibility among options on a political spectrum ranging from the 
collectivism of the left to the individualism of the right. In this way, although the results 
were highly contentious, Thatcher attempted to posit the ability of the individual to 
flourish, alongside fiscal restraint at the only option, validated by experience and common 
sense, rather than politically charged ideology. 
 Indeed the ostensible common sense involved in Thatcher’s plan for economic 
recovery probably contributed to its selection as a discourse to describe the crisis-ridden 
economic imaginary. For Thatcher, economic relations were reducible to individual 
behaviour, so that state spending became as relatable as household management: 
The task of Government is to provide the right framework in which industry and 
commerce can operate. Then and only then will enterprise be able to flourish. I have 
been criticised for talking about the principles of financial management of a nation 
as if they were like those of a family budget. Some say I preach merely the homilies 
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of housekeeping or the parables of the parlour. But I do not repent: those parables 
would have saved many a financier from failure and many a country from crisis (15 
November, 1982). 
 
By rendering the structural organisation of government as akin to a household that cuts 
back on consumption in difficult times, fiscal decisions could be made relatable even for 
those who had no grasp of or interest in monetarist policy and inflation. One of Thatcher’s 
great insistences was that the four central economic issues of the Conservative campaign, 
‘inflation, public spending, income tax and industrial relations’, were not ‘separate and 
distinct issues’ but actually connected in such a way as to mean macroeconomic policy 
concerning inflation or industrial relations are intricately related to the wellbeing of private 
citizens (Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 12 October, 1979). A vote for the 
Conservatives’ desire to improve individual lives through tax cuts and the promise of 
reduced costs was therefore necessarily a vote for monetarism and privatisation, not a 
choice between ‘a capitalist wealth-creating society on the one hand and a caring 
compassionate society on the other’; if voters desired better welfare, they needed to 
embrace policies that would facilitate better output and the subsequent creation of wealth, 
which, Thatcher maintained, could be accomplished through monetarism. Thus, 
‘industrial countries that out-produce and outsell us [Britain] are precisely those countries 
with better social services and better pensions than we have. It is because they have strong 
wealth-creating industries that they have better benefits than we have’, Thatcher 
proclaimed at her first Conservative Party Conference as Prime Minister in 1979 (ibid.). 
The use of common sense rhetoric about the relation of the everyday and the economy by 
the Conservatives prior to their 1979 win was thus geared, as James Thomas points out, 
‘to win popular support by presenting themselves as a centrist party rather than one seeking 
to fundamentally shift the political consensus to the right’ (2004: 273). The discourse was 
all the more successful owing to shaky narratives being produced by Labour about the 
crisis, and James Callaghan in particular: in many cases, the party failed to counter a 
distinctly Conservative history about the issues of state intervention, occasionally even 
apologising for what they grew to think of as their own mistakes (ibid., 277).  
 
 
The retention of Thatcherite discourses 
Thatcher’s upper hand is attributable, then, to her successful reduction of the complexity 
of economic relations to produce an economic imaginary that allowed individuals to derive 
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sense and meaning from the chaotic reality of economic crises, rampant unemployment, 
and reduced life chances. For Thatcher, the solution was necessarily supply-sided, which 
meant stimulating private industry while reducing government spending in order to 
encourage high productivity and output, lower prices, and the expansion of industry in 
order to create more jobs. For voters, whether supportive or not, it meant a period of 
financial discipline at home by cutting back to necessities, in aid of assisting the 
strengthening of an economy overrun by inflation. It is possible to trace the development 
of Conservative economic policy under Thatcher as it affected everyday spending over 11 
years through the annual Budget Speech presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and the Speech to the Conservative Party Conference delivered by Thatcher each October. 
These yearly speeches are parsimoniously condensed summaries of Conservative policies, 
achievements, and future goals, which are important for understanding the discursive 
shaping of the economic imaginary due to their rhetoric and the coverage of their content 
in the media: they would have been easily digestible and widely available. While Budget 
Speeches are more technical in discourse and less relevant in the cognitive shaping of daily 
life as a result, they are nonetheless important from a discursive perspective because they 
signal the activation of policy and the interests that underpin it in a way that directly affects 
the amount and kind of resources that will be available to households in making ends meet.   
An analysis of these documents demonstrates how the Conservatives, emphasising 
as they did the universality of the individual and its capabilities, nonetheless found a 
particular foothold in a set of complex relations of economic crisis and industrial unrest on 
the part of workers. Rhetoric had little, if anything, to do with the expansion of capital 
markets and the democratisation of finance, but instead focused on a crisis in more 
traditionally working-class industries induced by undemocratic trade unions demanding 
higher wages against a backdrop of low productivity, and facilitated by government 
spending requiring higher taxes. In her first Speech to the Conservative Party Conference 
as Prime Minister in 1979 Thatcher therefore appealed to a common identity that could 
unite people as individuals, rather than workers or employers, under a banner of British 
nationalism:  
It is said that Britain’s time is up, that we have had our finest hour and the best we 
can look forward to is a future fit for Mr Benn [Tony Benn, Labour MP] to live in. 
I do not accept these alibis. Of course we face great problems, problems that have 
fed on each other year after year, becoming harder and harder to solve. We all know 
them. They go to the root of the hopes and fears of ordinary people—high inflation, 
high unemployment, high taxation, appalling industrial relations, the lowest 
productivity in the Western world. […] Our people seem to have lost belief in the 
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balance between production and welfare. This is the balance that we have got to 
find. To persuade our people that it is possible, through their own efforts, not only 
to halt our national decline, but to reverse it, and that requires new thinking, 
tenacity, and a willingness to look at things in a completely different way. Is the 
nation ready to face reality? I believe that it is. People are tired of false dawns and 
facile promises. If this country’s story is to change we the Conservatives must 
rekindle the spirit which the socialist years have all but exhausted (12 October, 
1979). 
 
The ostensibly class-divided society represents, in such a narrative, a diversion from the 
community of British individuals who could come together for the sake of national 
prosperity far more easily if not for the interests and influence of trade union bureaucracy. 
Indeed for Thatcher, the victory of the Conservatives in the spring election was one ‘for 
realism and responsibility’, as the Conservatives garnered support even from unionised 
workers: ‘I was particularly pleased by the support we attracted: the largest trade union 
vote in our history; the young people; so many of whom saw no future under Labour and 
who turned to us; and all those who voted Labour before and who, this time, voted 
Conservative’ (ibid.). Already, then, the notion of a society stratified by class is relegated 
to the left, as both a preoccupation of Labour and a consequence of policy. The vision 
posited by the Conservatives, in contrast, is presented as one in which everyone can unite 
as individuals for the sake of prosperity. 
 Unsurprisingly many initial policy programmes were aimed at supporting the 
‘hopes’ of broadly-defined ‘ordinary people’ (ibid.) in ways which would enable them to 
engage in what Anthony Eden had earlier called ‘property owning democracy’ (Thatcher: 
Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 10 October, 1980), including the infamous 
sale of council houses at reduced rates and tax cuts (Budget Speech, Howe: 12 June, 1979). 
However, as Chancellor Sir Geoffrey Howe argued in his first Budget Speech, prosperity 
in everyday life has to be predicated on industrial prosperity, noting that consumer 
spending had outpaced manufacturing output by seven times. The idea that what 
households and individuals did mattered to the wellbeing of the national economy, even 
at the everyday level of household finance, became an important aspect of policy. Thus, 
‘[p]eople must understand and accept that the only basis for real increases in wages and 
salaries is an increase in national production. Higher pay without higher productivity can 
only lead to higher inflation and unemployment’ (ibid.); likewise, increases in pensions for 
the retired was also dependent on boosting productivity, while reductions in social security 
would both reduce government spending and incentivise seeking employment. It would 
thus be necessary to shrink the public sector and expand the private sector: ‘In order to 
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reduce the borrowing requirement and the burden of direct taxation, we must make savings 
in public spending and roll back the boundaries of the public sector. We are totally 
committed to improving standards in the public services. But that can only be achieved if 
the economy is strong in the first place’ (ibid.). This fiscal austerity was couched in 
apolitical terms as nearly scientific, with Howe proclaiming in 1980 that ‘it began to be 
recognised […] that we could no longer spend our way out of recession. But although that 
break-through of realism has begun, the change in attitude has not got far enough. Not 
everybody has yet accepted that public expenditure cannot go on growing while the 
economy stagnates’ (Budget Speech, 26 March, 1980). Monetarism, or the control of the 
money supply, was the only ‘practical, commonsense’ approach to inflation which was 
responsible for setting ‘worker against worker, employer against employee, and sometimes 
even Government against their own employees’ (ibid.). So, with a commitment to reduce 
government expenditure to boost the economy in order to produce harmonious living 
conditions from production increases and prosperity, the notion of the household as 
responsible for its own wellbeing and, consequently, the wellbeing of the national 
community, was discursively enshrined in policy and the national budget for the duration 
of Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister.  
 To be sure, the Conservative commitment to rigid targets of monetary growth 
established in the 1980 Budget had waned by 1985 in favour of ‘ad hoc considerations’ and 
measures to monetary policy (Hall, 1993: 282 – 283), but the drive to reduce inflation and 
cultivate a strong industry through individual financial discipline and societal engagement 
remained. The Government thus pursued a programme of ‘privatization, deregulation, and 
commercialization of the state sector’ (Jessop et al., 1990: 89) with Howe advocating the 
efficiency of private industry for wage moderation, rather than collective bargaining and 
union action:  
Management and workforces are at last joining together to tackle the problem of 
overmanning, restrictive practices, and out-of-date working methods. They 
understand that cutting labour unit costs is the way to become competitive again 
and price themselves back into the market. But nationalised industries, many of 
them monopolies, are not subject to the same market disciplines as the private 
sector. They have often been slow to adapt (10 March, 1981). 
 
Couched in the rhetoric of defeating the socialism of bureaucratic trade unions and local 
authorities alike as part of a crucial ‘freedom from intimidation’ (Thatcher, Speech to the 
Conservative Party Conference, 16 October, 1981), the Government began to dismantle 
the traditional sources of working-class appeals to power by weakening the 
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institutionalisation of unions and collective bargaining at the same time as privatisation 
and the introduction of greater competition within industry, as well as encouraging 
technological advancement for better production, rendered employment primarily 
dependent on output and performance (Thatcher, Speeches to the Conservative Party 
Conference, 8 October, 1982; 14 October, 1983). The weakening of collective class identity 
related to work was thus an important part of Conservative policy, helping as it did to 
encourage the idea of the individual as truly important and valuable.  
Furthermore, and contrary to previous Labour governments, new rhetoric of the 
importance of the household unit as the real basis of society emerged early on in Thatcher’s 
first term, as she claimed ‘the family is the basic unit of our society and it is in the family 
that the next generation is nurtured. Our concern is to create a property owning democracy 
and it is therefore a very human concern. It is a natural desire of Conservatives that every 
family should have a stake in society’ (Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 16 
October, 1981). Individuals making up households and as members of families therefore 
had an obligation to contribute as best they could to restoring the natural order of society, 
but also a right, in moral terms, to some stake in it. Nowhere is the backlash against the 
ostensibly unnatural and restrictive society of the welfare state and ‘socialist’ values more 
clear than in the discourse on council housing and the right of tenants to buy their homes, 
directing homeownership toward everyone and away from a ‘privilege’ that is ‘restricted 
to the few’: ‘It is now our turn to take a major step towards extending homeownership to 
many who, until now, have been deliberately excluded. Councils, particularly Socialist 
councils, have clung to the role of the landlord. They love it, because it gives them so much 
power. […] It is the arrogance of the Socialist creed to insist that they know best’ (ibid.). 
What was crucial, in other words, was the introduction of choice as a barometer of 
individual freedom for those who sought more for themselves, rather than equality of 
opportunity for housing. Indeed, as Jones and Murie point out, the introduction of the 
Right to Buy legislation in 1980 had nothing to do with reducing homelessness or 
improving the availability of properties, but was designed with the sole purpose of creating 
satisfied homeowners with a perceived stake in engaging with the preservation of British 
society (2005). Choice and upward mobility, as individual virtues, were therefore 
paramount above collectivist concerns with equity. 
 The second Budget Speech contains the earliest reference to the adoption of 
financial risk among individuals and households as a moral virtue. Thatcher envisaged a 
direct link between productivity and household earnings when she extended the notion of 
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stakeholders and property owners to profit sharing and personal investment. Thus 
Geoffrey Howe summed up in his second Budget an early formulation of what it means to 
be an entrepreneurial individual, brought into the public consciousness through tax 
benefits and cuts for employees who wished to purchase company shares: ‘It is generally 
agreed that share ownership and profit sharing can help in developing employees’ 
understanding of, and commitment to, business and industry. I believe that share 
ownership can also spread a wider understanding of the role for risk-taking and initiative 
in the economic system’ (Budget Speech, 26 March, 1980). At the Party Conference in 
October of that year, Thatcher would later extoll the virtues of this individual engagement 
above broader economic trends when she insisted that ‘[p]rosperity comes not from grand 
conferences of economists but by countless acts of personal self-confidence and self-
reliance’ (Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 10 October, 1980). The notion of 
‘popular capitalism’ (Thatcher, Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 10 October, 
1986) was indeed a cornerstone of policy, persisting through Thatcher’s 11-year tenure as 
Prime Minister as the basis for proper economic engagement through the ownership of 
property. The lives of workers were not to be improved through union bargains and 
agreements, likening their leaders as she did to ‘tyrannical’ thugs, but instead through the 
privatisation of national industries and selling shares which, in addition to ‘improv[ing] 
efficiency’, would ‘spread the nation’s wealth among as many people as possible’ (ibid.). 
But encouraging workers to purchase shares in the companies they worked for would also 
link, Thatcher believed, employees’ notions of personal welfare with productivity, so that 
they would appeal less to unions for concessions and more to their personal productivity 
for a better life. Privatisation certainly did create a surge of new investors, as they increased 
threefold from 3 million in 1979 to 9 million by 1988 (Clemons and Weber, 1990). So too 
could individuals and households control the wealth they acquired in reforms to the 
taxation of shares and private pensions, including the introduction of the personal pension 
itself by Nigel Lawson in his fourth Budget. As ‘an important new dimension of 
ownership’, they would ‘enable employees—if they so wish—to opt out of their employers’ 
schemes and make their own arrangements, tailored to fit their circumstances’ (Budget 
Speech, 17 March, 1987). These developments were facilitated in bolstering the financial 
City in order to retain its ‘world pre-eminence’ as a financial centre, by cultivating the 
global securities market with tax benefits (Lawson, Budget Speech, 18 March, 1986; cf. 
Myles and Pierson, 2001). Additionally, reforms in the banking sector aimed at setting 
interest rates through market mechanisms also enabled the proliferation of consumer credit 
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by 1982 (Burton, 2008; Sparkes, 2015). The upshot, for the Conservatives, was a true 
‘returning power to the people’ through a ‘crusade’ to ‘enfranchise the many in the 
economic life of the nation’, in addition to their basic democratic rights and duties to vote 
(Thatcher, Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 10 October, 1986).  
The language of policy and its political underpinnings is incredibly clear: words 
such as ‘innovation’, ‘self-reliance’, and ‘prosperity’ are inextricably linked in Conservative 
discourse under Thatcher, all in the context of a renewed valorisation of the free market. 
Thatcher’s epitaph of ‘Marxist Socialism’ during the collapse of the Soviet Union linked 
the ideas underpinning Labour policy with the promotion of ‘lies and mediocrity’ and the 
persecution of ‘faith and talent’ in the USSR in the context of Britain’s return to ‘those 
basic truths and principles which made her great—personal liberty, private property and 
the rule of law, on which democratic freedoms everywhere are based’ (Speech to the 
Conservative Party Conference, 12 October, 1990). These notions acquire a primordial 
significance in this discourse, as ‘truths’ that are ‘written in the human heart’ (ibid.). 
Indeed, the application of an individualistic lens to the analysis of all social problems 
means that people are viewed primarily as independent actors possessing some personal 
creativity which flourishes as innovation for economic benefit when it is unrestricted in its 
ability to advance individual interests. People are thus individuals in the first instance, and 
members of a larger collective (which, for Thatcher, has a distinctly national character) 
second, when they bring together their individual talents. Individual drive and ambition 
are therefore crucial to the wellbeing of society as a whole which can, for Thatcher, be 
achieved through the direct introduction of an appreciation of the stakes of economic 
success into daily life. Dealing with risk in household decisions is not, then, to be thought 
of as unmanageable so much as an incentive to make the household itself efficient. 
 However, it is certainly not the case that a crucial component of financial 
subjectivity, namely the acquisition of personal or household debt as a stopgap in times of 
financial difficulty or unemployment, was ever advocated by Margaret Thatcher herself. 
In actuality, Thatcher abhorred the idea of personal credit as a conduit to indebtedness, 
and, as her Chancellors of the Exchequer made clear in Budget speeches, higher spending 
in the public sector and households alike could only be properly justified in the context of 
low inflation. After all, ‘lower inflation contributes to lower interest rates, so improving 
cash flow; and lower inflation helps keep down other costs. […] With lower inflation the 
cash programmes of the public sector go further: they buy more goods and services’ (Howe, 
Budget Speech, 15 March, 1983). As such, only lower inflation could guarantee that 
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spending properly reflected the benefits of economic growth and improvement as a 
function of productivity and output. Thatcher herself extolled the moral virtue of saving as 
a laudable individual characteristic that benefits the community as a whole. Government 
policy could therefore necessarily be used to ‘encourage people to spend less and save 
more’, and indeed as Chancellor, Nigel Lawson ‘had to raise interest rates [in 1988]. It’s 
never popular to push them up—except perhaps with savers—but popular or not, the 
Chancellor has done the right thing as you would expect of him’ (Thatcher, Conservative 
Party Conference Speech, 14 October, 1988). It is in the noticeable contradiction between 
Thatcher’s conservative views on debt as a detriment to saving, and the proliferation of 
personal credit through the relaxation of borrowing constraints, that the duality of structure 
and agency is brought to bear on an understanding of the process of subjectivation, as a 
truly incomplete and contingent affair. These are the very tensions with the potential to 
disrupt normative expectations about behaviour and self-conduct envisaged by Foucault 
(1994), and they are made evident thanks to the use of a critical form of narrative policy 
analysis that accounts for the retention of discourses in policy and legislation, as well as 
the physical environments these produce. As I noted in an earlier section of this chapter, it 
is not that discourses perform the disciplines, techniques, and social events they purport to 
describe, but instead that they have causal properties and the ability to change 
circumstances, in that their deployment in official contexts such as policy and legislation 
results in material changes to the social environment that people live in, and the resources 
available to them. Consequently, while it is not the case that Thatcher herself would ever 
have advocated the accumulation of personal debt to make ends meet, her desire to 
stimulate and liberalise the financial sector combined with a belief in the efficacy of 
personal innovation and individual responsibility to the community as a whole provide the 
discursive foundation and framing of personal debt and its repayment as a normative 
component of financial subjectivity. Indeed, in terms of the retention of discourses, the 
eruption of personal debt as a problem enabled by Conservative policies of financial 
liberalisation did little to change the promotion of innovation and self-sufficiency at the 
level of individuals and industry, as it further magnified the importance of the 
responsibility for changing personal habits for one’s self and broader community. 
Importantly, it meant that the problems faced by many individuals could be attributed to 
personal failure—to adequately save or cut back, for example—rather than structural 
deficiencies leading to harsh realities such as insufficient jobs or the failure of the market 
to produce better wages.  
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 The hallmark of Thatcherism is thus not a stringent and immoveable adherence to 
particular kinds of policy, but instead a flexible and pragmatic approach that allowed for a 
reframing of varying results as successful in discursive terms, inasmuch as they moved the 
United Kingdom in the direction of individualism and away from collectivism. Although 
monetarism was strongly advocated as the only solution to high inflation, as a means of 
controlling government overspending and the devaluation of currency in both Party 
Conference and Budget Speeches in 1979, by 1981 strict targets had become tentative, and 
its failure to rejuvenate the economy led to its being ‘quietly abandoned in the 
consolidation phase of the first Thatcher government. However, this did not sideline issues 
of money and credit, taxation and spending nor did it marginalize the interests of financial 
capital’ (Jessop, 2015: 24). Thus in his third budget, delivered in 1981, Geoffrey Howe 
predicted that increased industry and personal borrowing due to a loosening of restrictions 
would result in higher-than-normal levels of borrowing but that, as inflation decreased 
according to plan, it would begin to level out: ‘Financial behaviour should […] revert to a 
normal pattern. The private sector has been moderating its borrowing from the banks, and 
the exceptionally rapid build-up of personal sector liquidity should come to an end as the 
growth of prices and incomes continues to slow down’ (Budget Speech, 10 March, 1981). 
However, by the end of the Conservatives’ first term in government, and indeed ahead of 
their 1983 victory, it became clear that a tight control of the money supply would not 
produce the economic regeneration needed to overcome a ‘severe recession, mounting 
unemployment, and growing unpopularity’, leading to a ‘covert relaxation of monetary 
policy in favour of a medium-term financial strategy’ (Jessop, 2015: 19). In his first budget 
following the 1983 election, Howe therefore proclaimed that he would ‘be proposing 
further significant cuts in the taxes paid both by business and by individuals. These 
proposals will be consistent with our medium-term strategy for effective control of the 
money supply, for lower public borrowing, and for further progress on inflation’ (Howe: 
15 March, 1983). New focuses shifted in the direction of the privatisation of national 
industries to promote efficiency and also allow share ownership, as well as the contracting 
out of public services; tax cuts for business, personal income, and wealth in the form of 
savings and shares or pensions, and the cultivation and expansion of the financial sector 
through liberalisation of the market and loosened restrictions (Jessop, 2015).  
 Favourable tax reductions for corporations and the wealthy were a major part of 
Chancellor Nigel Lawson’s 1987 budget following the Thatcher Conservatives’ third 
electoral win that year, but by ‘autumn, the Lawson boom turned to bust, affecting 
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homeowners, shareholders and jobs’ (ibid., 20). Earl Reitan notes that the money from ‘tax 
cuts had not gone into investment, but speculation, houses, and consumption. Wage 
settlements averaging 9.25 percent and a great expansion of consumer credit through hire 
purchase and credit cards fuelled inflation, which reached 8 percent in 1989’ (2003: 85). 
By 1987, household debt had already reached £45 billion (Office of National Statistics, 
2017), a significant increase attributable to the easy availability of credit cards starting in 
the 1980s, when compared to the £32 million owed in 1973 (Block-Lieb, Wiener, Cantone, 
and Holtje, 2009: 155). The combination of tax deductions on mortgage interest and 
further deregulation allowing banks to lend on mortgages after 1986 further contributed to 
borrowing and spending, leading to striking increases in housing prices: ‘Lending 
institutions were flush with cash; mortgage loans were easily available at 100 percent of 
value and at moderate interest rates. Buyers were willing to take on large mortgages in the 
expectation of further price increases’ (Reitan, 2003: 55). However, a ‘sudden drop in the 
New York Stock Exchange in 1987’ (ibid., 56) brought the boom initiated by the Big Bang 
of 1986 to an end, leading to increases in mortgage rates and payments that had almost 
doubled for borrowers. As a consequence, ‘[h]ouse prices began to fall as people unloaded 
houses they could no longer afford. Millions of people who had bought during the boom 
were stuck with negative equity – the mortgage was higher than the sale value of the house’ 
(ibid., 91).  
Thatcher’s framing of Lawson’s increase of interest rates in 1988 as necessary and 
morally correct in curbing borrowing thus highlights the reality that Thatcherite discourse 
held individuals entirely accountable for their actions, and, indeed, the overall success of 
the economy. And yet, although borrowing and the accrual of personal debt was not 
encouraged by Thatcher, the discourse of household innovation in austere times requiring 
households to cope with inadequate wages often left people in a position to require debt to 
tide them over in the absence of the guarantee of a job. Having stripped away a great deal 
of the authority of local governments or trade unions, as typical forms of appeal for the 
traditional working class, which was fast becoming fragmented itself through industrial 
decline, it is not altogether surprising that the evolution of personal debt would affect some 
of those most sidelined by the enactment of supply-side policy, as the ideology of the 
individual was eventually translated into the particular distribution of resources. The 
traditional working class was indeed split by the infamous Right to Buy Act, which posited 
homeownership as the pinnacle of personal advancement rather than welfare support or 
industrial action, which proved extremely popular with some, and disadvantageous for 
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others. Restrictions on the funds available to local governments for building social housing, 
combined with a requirement to raise rents to market levels, created an inducement for 
tenants to buy their homes. Reitan notes that the ‘increases in rents dictated by the 
government made it advisable for tenants to buy, if they could afford it’, given that tenants 
were eligible for discounts from the market value of the home, including up to 50 percent 
of the cost for long-term tenants (ibid., 33). The sale of council houses undoubtedly reduced 
public expenditure on housing and proved profitable in itself, increasing Treasury income 
from £472 million in between 1979 – 1980 to over £2 billion in 1986 – 1987. It appealed to 
those from the working class who assumed they would never own their own homes, and 
succeeded in shifting some of their party allegiances to the Conservatives (ibid.), proving a 
more desirable form of ‘popular capitalism’ for the traditional working class than the sale 
of shares from denationalised industries (Norris: 1990; Jessop, 2015). But it also 
contributed to deepening social rifts and worsened living conditions that characterise 
today’s precariat: 
By 1990, most of the desirable houses had been sold, with the remaining public 
housing consisting of high-rise flats occupied by the poor in estates riddled with 
crime, drugs, and disorder. Three-quarters of the people in public housing were in 
the lowest 40 percent of income, and 60 percent of them were unemployed (Reitan, 
2003: 33).   
 
It is therefore possible to see the entrenching of new forms of stratification driven by 
individualistic ideology and discourse, in the inclusion and exclusion of groups from 
markets and services. While the notion of a share-owning democracy was never properly 
realised (Jessop, 2015), buyers were overwhelmingly middle- rather than working-class 
(Norris, 1990). Meanwhile, the accumulation of household debt, while manageable for 
those with assets, savings, and regular incomes, proved difficult for those with lower 
incomes. Compounded with the decidedly individualist underpinnings in creating 
prosperous homeowners who aspire to the security of the middle-class, the stratification of 
financial subjects as investors and entrepreneurs, or alternatively debtors, had taken root.  
 There is little doubt among scholars that the discursive approach of the 
Conservatives under Thatcher really did alter the political landscape, and, indeed, the 
expectations placed upon people in their everyday lives. Thatcher’s proclamation in a Party 
Conference Speech during 1988 that it was now the ‘Conservatives who set the pace, 
generate the ideas, and have the vision’ (Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 14 
October, 1988) was more than a rhetorical flourish, in the sense that subsequent 
governments, whether Conservative or Labour, have had to contend with, respond to, or 
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even adopt the ideas and discourses that Thatcher strongly advocated. This went beyond 
a gradual interest on the part of Labour in opposition for selling council estates, as 
suggested in multiple Conservative Party Conference Speeches and Budgets during 
Thatcher’s tenure, to the wholesale adoption of the idea of a responsible stake-holder by 
Tony Blair in his regeneration of the image of Labour as ‘New Labour’. As Jessop points 
out, the Conservative government under John Major from 1990 – 1997 ‘maintained the 
basic thrust of the consolidated Thatcherite project, albeit without the hectoring tone and 
erstwhile charisma of its eponymous leader’ (2015: 21). The adoption of a similar discourse 
by the Labour Party under Blair, however, represented a radical break with Labour history 
which, although it seemed like a new alternative to the electorate which chose Labour in 
a landslide victory in 1997, nonetheless persisted in individualistic discourse ad policy.  
 New Labour was ultimately ‘content to administer much of Thatcherism’s legacy 
in regard to the neo-liberal economic strategy, as if considering their effects to date as so 
many economically or politically irreversible faits accomplis’; this was, in part, to ‘avoid 
frighten[ing] the electorate with the prospects of radical change or a return to the now 
firmly, if unfairly, discredited postwar labour tradition’ (Jessop, 2007: 283). For Norman 
Fairclough, this acceptance is evident in New Labour’s talk of ‘national renewal, 
individual responsibility, maximising competition, and the limitations of government’, in 
addition to flourishing business and innovation as part of an enterprising culture (2000: 
73). Thus, 
A fundamental aspect of what makes New Labour ‘new’ is its abandonment of an 
economic role for the state – its assumption that it is faced with a ‘new global 
economy’ whose nature it cannot change and should not try to change. This is in 
contrast with social democratic and democratic socialist traditions, which have seen 
the state as having the capacity and responsibility to modify the capitalist economy, 
notably through nationalisation and the formation of a ‘mixed economy’. When 
the expression ‘mixed economy’ is used by Blair, it is used metaphorically to refer 
to ‘partnerships’ – ‘we are building new public and private partnerships. There 
needs to be a mixed economy in the funding of welfare comprising the state, private 
and voluntary sectors’ (ibid., 76).   
 
Earlier collectivist discourses advocated by former Labour governments disappeared, with 
a newfound appreciation for the market economy evident in Tony Blair’s policies. Blair 
himself suggested it was the ‘end of the something for nothing days’ in discussing welfare 
reform, invoking recently popularised notions of dishonesty in benefits claims, the need 
for hard work as a personal virtue, as well as fiscal responsibility and personal 
responsibility in the family and community (Blair, cited in Fairclough, 2000: 130).  
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 The retention of individualistic discourses about the economy and state is thus 
evident, insofar as the New Labour government continued to promote financial 
liberalisation and deregulation, as well as the privatisation of state assets (Jessop, 2007). 
As the continuity between Thatcherite conservativism and New Labour’s ‘third way’, 
ostensibly between harsh fiscal conservativism and excessive government spending, shows, 
discourse was not simply a question of rhetoric in successful election campaigns, but rather 
a causal mechanism in shifting overall social attitudes and understandings of everyday 
behaviour and practices. As Fairclough concludes, 
The Conservatives under Thatcher realised that their project for radical social 
change was best achieved through the relatively slow and patient groundwork of 
changing attitudes, moods, and cultures rather than head-on – through ideological 
means, and therefore through discourse. This is one respect in which New Labour 
has followed Thatcherism, and it is of particular interest here because it implies a 
language turn in politics – and enhanced salience for language in achieving social 
and political change (2000: 73 – 4).  
 
The importance of the market in resolving both economic and social issues had thus 
become socially ingrained, rendering such concepts increasingly commonplace. The idea 
of people as responsible for their own destiny in every way, regardless of their 
circumstances, was thus upheld both by the Conservative and Labour Parties, rendering a 
collectivist opposition to individualist discourse absent. In turn, as I lay out in the next 
chapter, individualism and freedom of choice as they were ingrained in government 
policies set in motion the appearance of a range of riskier choices in asset-based welfare, 
which ultimately led to the adoption of entrepreneurial strategies, at least ideally, in the 
management of the home.  
 Addressing the emergence of a neoliberal sensibility, Foucault argued that ‘the true 
economic subject is not the man of exchange, the consumer or the producer, but the 
enterprise’, where enterprise is not simply an institution so much as ‘a way of behaving in 
the economic field—in the form of competition in terms of plans and projects, and with 
objectives, tactics and so forth’ (2008: 175). In the ‘new’ economy, such neoliberal 
discourses of competition amongst individuals who possess the intuition for innovation, as 
well as a responsibility to others as engendered by liberal notions of freedom, have become 
commonplace as forms of complexity reduction that render solutions to economic 
problems in purely individual terms. They were selected by the Thatcher government to 
address the crisis of the welfare state in the late 1970s, but they have been retained by 
subsequent Conservative governments, Tony Blair’s New Labour government, and have 
CHAPTER THREE  Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 104
undoubtedly been present in the policies of recent Conservative governments, with David 
Cameron constantly encouraging citizens to ‘take more responsibility’ for their actions and 
the state of society without relying on the government to create more prosperity (15 
February, 2011).  
 Insofar as Foucault calls economics the ‘analysis of the internal rationality, the 
strategic programming of individuals’ activity’ (2008: 223), however, the aim of the study 
of financial subjectivation through discourse is not simply to illustrate that individuals have 
become more self-sufficient, endowed with certain freedoms that require a degree of 
personal responsibility. It requires, additionally, an examination of how structures and 
discourses promote and refine certain practices and conduct that constitute subjects as 
responsible entrepreneurial individuals in their daily financial decisions so that, in the case 
of financial subjectivity, taking innovative risks actually becomes rationalised. This helps 
explain why, even though there are often barriers to the realisation of the self as an 
entrepreneurial subject, such as dwindling savings with which to invest, individuals may 
still think of themselves in such individualistic terms. Thus, although Foucault consciously 
rejects the Marxist notion of a worker as defined in the extraction of their labour-power in 
the process of production (ibid.), his approach to economic subjectivation still resonates 
with Althusser’s (1971) interest in the institutions and practices that reproduce the class 
structure within the capitalist social formation. In the case of the rise of Thatcherism in the 
United Kingdom during the 1970s and 1980s, it is clear that working households were 
hailed as individuals who could contribute to social prosperity through their own industry 
and financial prudence; this was promoted in government discourse about the need for 
opportunities in homeownership, share ownership, and the personal responsibility that 
results in lifting government regulations and restrictions. Consequently, individuals and 
households were tasked with thinking about their role in the new economic imaginary (cf. 
Kutter and Jessop, 2014) as distinct from an earlier reliance on trade unions and a strong 
welfare state, while the actualisation of these discourses in the enactment of laws and 
legislation gave them different sets of strategies and opportunities to make ends meet.  
 
Conclusion  
The process of financialisation, including market liberalisation and the diffusion of risk 
among a larger portion of the working population, represents a series of complex events 
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that signify the emergence of a new economy. The Thatcher government’s support of 
market liberalisation and the finance sector undoubtedly helped cultivate the city of 
London as a major global centre of finance, at a time when markets were becoming 
increasingly competitive around the world (cf. Clemons and Weber, 1990). Consequently, 
many of the policies introduced in speeches and interviews broadcast to British citizens 
helped frame financialisation as key to economic prosperity, since it encouraged 
competition and global investment in the British economy. In this way, Thatcher’s 
discourses served as a form of complexity reduction in the initial shift toward self-
sufficiency and individual responsibility, by highlighting individual prudence, creativity, 
and appreciation of risk as crucial characteristics enabling individuals to successfully 
navigate their work and personal lives, while also suggesting these strategies helped 
contribute to a thriving economy that could meet the needs of everyone. To this end, 
Thatcher advocated the rollback of the welfare state by encouraging people to meet their 
present and future needs through the private sector. She also insisted that the privatisation 
of assets such as homes and nationalised industries would give people a stake in society, 
in order that employers and employees alike could move away from the ‘collectivism’ of 
trade unions, housing councils, and government regulations. The results included 
substantial increases in homeownership and share ownership, as new legislation enabled 
families in council houses to purchase their homes at reduced rates, while the privatisation 
of national industries allowed employees to purchase shares from the firms that employed 
them. Individuals were thus beginning to acquire forms of capital, and consequently, also 
a certain amount of financial risk, that would lead to their eventual navigation of 
investment, debt, and entrepreneur-like behaviour in managing personal finances.  
This chapter has therefore illustrated how discourse, as a form of complexity 
reduction, structures the meaning that individuals give to the institutions, events, and 
social relations in the course of subjectivation. As particular discourses are selected to 
describe the material conditions of the economy, they shape the perspective that subjects 
take and the strategies they perceive as appropriate within a given circumstance, so that, 
as I have argued, the internalisation of risk as a form of innovation is actually understood 
as a rational approach to daily life. The retention of such discourses over time helps to 
normalise these approaches. In addition to presenting a coherent worldview of complex 
processes, however, discourses also act as causal mechanisms, when they serve as the basis 
for the enactment of legislation or laws that ultimately affect the configuration of social 
relations and the kinds of strategies or opportunities available to financialised subjects. I 
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have maintained the importance of structural factors in the course of subjectivation, but 
also of discourse, to think about how subjects internalise the conditions of subjectivity. 
This chapter has, then, highlighted how the production of meaning through discourse lays 
foundations for financialised subjectivity.  
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Chapter Four: 
Indebted investors and the struggle of saving and borrowing 
 
Introduction 
I have now laid out the ascendance of a strictly individualist discourse, in the context of 
financial development in the United Kingdom, with reference to Margaret Thatcher’s 
infamous three-term premiership from 1979 – 1990. Responding to wide scale work 
stoppages across the country caused by industrial unrest, and economic slumps related to 
declining productivity and escalating inflation, Thatcher’s Conservatives revived in their 
policy an earlier liberal ethos of self-reliance, responsibility, and freedom of choice, to 
assert the need for personal innovation and industry in economic rejuvenation. People, in 
other words, had to be able to work and produce in the absence of restrictions from the 
state, which, Thatcher believed, only served to stifle progress rather than ensuring quality 
and stability. To that end, major cuts were made in the public sector in order to draw back 
state involvement in economic and social life. In the first instance, this served the purpose 
of attempting to control the money supply by limiting spending and reducing inflation, but 
it later enabled the privatisation of national industries, which was aimed at increasing their 
efficiency and involving increasingly more people in economic life through the selling of 
shares. Additionally, and very successfully, the sale of council houses both reduced public 
expenditure on council estates and convinced some traditional working-class voters of the 
merits of Thatcher’s brand of Conservativism. Thatcherism, then, was a useful discursive 
frame for the market-driven changes that were taking place across the United Kingdom, 
exemplifying the supply-side ideology underpinning policy and legislation aimed at 
growing the economy through industry and market expansion, driven above all by the 
notion of personal success as a community benefit. 
 Although Thatcher herself considered socioeconomic inequality as a necessary 
incentive to entrepreneurship and innovation (Schmidt, 2001), the legacy of Thatcherism 
and its implementation in successive Conservative governments thereafter, in addition to 
a variation embodied by New Labour, has been one of consistent disparity for those at 
lower ends of the income spectrum. The manufacturing sector never properly recovered, 
leading to a decline in traditional working-class jobs, while the rise of the financial sector, 
facilitated in part by the Conservatives’ aggressive sale of council houses, ‘promoted a 
consumer boom fuelled by housing equity’ while simultaneously ‘fetter[ing] labour 
mobility from areas of high unemployment to those with labour shortages’ (Jessop, 2015: 
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26). Some unskilled workers were relegated to undesirable council estates with high crime 
rates and social problems, limiting their ability to thrive and relocate. Retraining could be 
difficult, as the ‘Thatcher government systematically reduced its role in training and tried 
to bring education and R & D activities closer to the market. Overall, its policies, 
maintained under New Labour, reinforced the low-skill, low-wage, low-productivity 
character of much of British industry’ (ibid.). The political influence of the traditional 
working class thus diminished, as well-paid manufacturing jobs were lost, while low-wage 
part-time or temporary work increased (Reitan, 2003). The upshot was the emergence of a 
varied class of workers living off of precarious employment and low incomes, known as 
the precariat.  
 Consistent with competitive pressures put on firm managers and the concurrent 
‘middle-class squeeze’ felt by those with moderate income levels, precarious workers were 
encumbered by increasing levels of risk and uncertainty. However, the fact that most of the 
precariat had almost no financial assets made engaging with financial markets difficult, 
perceived as they were to be high risks with little to draw on in case of contingency and a 
probable likelihood of defaulting on obligations as a result. For Charles Moore, writing in 
defence of Thatcher’s popular capitalism in the Wall Street Journal, indebtedness is a huge 
threat to the ‘ideal of ownership’, as the ‘rights of property do not seem so enticing if the 
value of what you own collapses or if that property is trapped by debt’ (2015). Government 
protection of savings is thus seen as crucial to reviving popular capitalism, predicated on 
the ownership of housing, stocks, and pensions, in order to instil an appreciation for 
planning for the future rather than ‘hav[ing] it now’ (ibid.).  
The accumulation of large amounts of household debt is now indeed understood to 
have facilitated the eventual crash in 2007 – 2009. In the United Kingdom alone, personal 
debt exceeded £1 trillion just before the financial crisis (Brown and Taylor, 2007) with 
lending ‘growing substantially faster than household incomes’ and raising ‘questions about 
the ability of people to repay what they owe, especially in the event of sudden change in 
economic circumstances’ (May, Tudela, and Young, 2004: 414). For precarious workers, 
debt acquired to makes ends meet is the limit on the entrepreneurial creativity expected of 
financial subjects with higher incomes and stable jobs: the freedom to choose between an 
array of employer-sponsored or private pension plans, or separate investment options for 
retirement altogether, is meaningless if saving for the future has to be postponed for present 
expenses. For those on low wages, these expenses can follow them throughout their lives: 
‘Young people cite debts and high rent; for those in mid-life it’s the cost of raising a family. 
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For baby boomers, it’s the cost of household bills and financial help they are giving to 
younger relatives’, leading to the sense that ‘saving for the future feels out of reach’ (Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 2016). Two important developments therefore follow from the 
results of the financial crisis, including the lack of saving and the accumulation of debt. In 
the first instance, ‘paternalistic’ pension reform now sees employees automatically enrolled 
in schemes, such as the National Employment Savings Trust, rather than having to 
consciously opt in, as a way of reducing choice and guiding sounder savings decisions 
(Clark, Strauss, and Knox-Hayes, 2012). Secondly, due to the decline of savings and the 
collapse of subprime markets in 2008, lenders began to ration credit in favour of low-risk 
borrowers, leading to the withdrawal of most subprime products (Wainwright, 2009). As 
a consequence, the status of the ‘entrepreneurial’ individual is in question, given the 
conscious promotion of behaviours designed to avoid financial instability and crisis by 
reducing choice and creativity (Clark et al., 2012). In this way, the question of subjectivity 
and the replication or transformation of structures becomes apparent, which is discussed 
further in the fifth and final chapter of this thesis. 
 
The legacy of Thatcherism 
Income disparity was a very real consequence of Thatcherism and its view of wealth as 
created by thriving industries rather than government intervention. Low productivity in 
the real sectors combined with the expansion of capital markets as a highly profitable sector 
led to volatility as Thatcher and successive Conservative and Labour governments sought 
to solidify the pre-eminence of London as an international financial centre. Jessop 
contends that the ‘seeds of later financial crises and continuing economic decline were 
evident’ from the 1980s – 1990s, owing to market expansion and internationalisation that 
occurred as a result of the opening and liberalisation of the stock markets, or the ‘Big Bang’, 
in 1986 (2015: 27): there was a ‘pattern of investment skewed to sectors that service the 
consumption boom (retailing, distribution, personal financial services) rather than those 
involved in producing internationally tradable commodities. This trend continued under 
New Labour’ (ibid.). However, consumption was not matched by increasing productivity 
in British industry, and the entrepreneurial culture of innovation and creativity in the 
classic sense as a driver of industry was largely absent. Low productivity, according to 
Reitan, was attributable to ‘deficiencies in training and education’, as well as managers 
who ‘were slow to introduce technology that would improve productivity’ (2003: 141). 
Attracting employees also proved difficult with workers struggling to move from regions 
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with low employment prospects, and thus low house prices, to regions with better 
employment and higher costs of living. Manufacturing foundered, leading to a changed 
job market that, over the course of nearly 20 years between 1979 – 1997, saw a decrease in 
typically male-dominated jobs and an increase in new part-time jobs. While roughly 
700,000 women became employed as a result, ‘the number of employed men decreased by 
2.7 million’, leaving earning imbalances in its wake: ‘The deindustrialisation of Britain 
destroyed many well-paid jobs for men while creating many low-paid jobs for women’ 
(ibid., 140). Although neither Thatcher nor her Conservative successor John Major 
succeeded in curtailing the influence of unions altogether, with 41 percent of employees in 
the private sector and 78 percent in the public sector still covered under collective 
bargaining agreements by 1990, their power was significantly weakened and legislation 
was adopted promoting the idea of union membership as a choice and something that 
should not intervene in the general management of a firm. Further, in nonunionised 
sectors, Major successfully abolished the Wage Councils that were necessary for setting 
minimum wage levels in service industries such as ‘hotels, restaurants, retailers, janitorial 
services, and other employers of low-paid workers, many of whom were women of 
immigrants’, on the grounds that ‘minimum wage priced unskilled workers out of jobs and 
that “low pay is better than no pay”’ (ibid.).  
A noticeable effect of the faith in free markets to produce and distribute wealth has 
instead been the emergence of a class of precarious workers, with primarily part-time or 
short-term contracts, lower wages, and few benefits, if any, to rely on. The result in living 
standards has been a significant increase in ‘the disparity between the wealthiest and the 
poor’, with ‘the real incomes of the richest 10 percent [rising] by 55 percent, while the real 
incomes of the poorest 10 percent stayed the same’ between 1979 and 1992 (ibid., 141). 52 
percent of the wealth was owned by the top 10 percent of earners, relative to the 8 percent 
owned by the bottom 50 percent. For the precariat, Reitan points out, ‘their job or pension 
was almost all they had’ (ibid.). Although New Labour won a landslide victory in 1997 as 
voters tired of Conservative governments, the Labour Party under Blair was never 
committed to a reduction of this disparity through a return to a strong welfare state. 
Instead, they continued ‘liberalization and de-regulation in many areas’, in addition to 
‘privatization or, at least, corporatization, or most of what remained of the state-owned 
sector as well as […] the extension of market forces into what remains of the public and 
social services at the national, regional, and local level. It was also firmly attached to 
internationalization, especially the free flow of capital’ (Jessop, 2015: 22). Even a 
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particularly national focus on the knowledge-based economy as a solution to 
deindustrialisation in the United Kingdom had a financial angle, with ‘knowledge-
intensive business skills’ fostering ‘cutting-edge financial innovation’ (ibid.). Thus regional 
disparities remained, especially relative to the North where there were higher levels of 
unemployment, due to ‘the structural bias in the economy towards London […] and debt-
led consumption’ (ibid.). Despite the moral imperative to save in Thatcher’s own 
discourse, volatility partially born of debt and flexible labour contracts as an ostensible 
economic benefit meant that saving in practice became much more difficult. 
 
Uncertainty and the contradictions of financial subjectivity 
The ‘financialisation of personal income’ as a social problem had not gone unnoticed by 
policymakers and financial activists seeking more user-friendly approaches to markets. 
Costas Lapavitsas summarises the nature of the defaults the contributed to the financial 
crisis of 2007 – 2009 when he notes that subprime markets enabled even some of the 
poorest households to obtain loans and mortgages in order to become homeowners. As the 
prices of their homes rose, they ‘were encouraged to re-mortgage and use the proceeds for 
other purposes’, leading to the ‘collapse of personal savings’ (2009a: 118). The aggressive 
or predatory nature of subprime lenders thus allowed the issue to be framed as one of 
ignorance on the part of low-income borrowers about the financial system, to be solved 
with proper education and financial literacy. By portraying the indebted as victims of 
predatory lenders, a clear solution then becomes education about how credit works. 
Policymakers in the United Kingdom have also pursued financial literacy campaigns 
designed to encourage responsible investment, in particular among those who would 
otherwise be unlikely investors. Thus, while existing investors are provided with 
information available over the phone, online, via email, and in pamphlets about how to 
invest wisely, those who are not engrained within the world of investment are targeted 
through financial literacy campaigns promoting a public understanding of finance, 
beginning at an increasingly younger age through financial education in schools (Langley, 
2007).  
 Langley correctly suspects that financial education, targeted as it is toward 
individuals and their behaviour, cannot address the inherent future uncertainty associated 
with investment: 
investment as a technology for calculating and embracing financial market 
risk/reward fails to bring order to future uncertainty and instead leads to heightened 
anxiety; and the performance of investment stands in tension with the practices of 
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work and consumption that also appear as essential to securing, advancing, and 
expressing individual freedom in neoliberal society (ibid., 70). 
 
For the precariat, however, the issue is perhaps even less complex than the concern about 
fluctuating markets and their effects on savings for the future, insofar as a basic requirement 
to meet needs in the present tends to outweigh planning for retirement. Debt is not always 
about financing lifestyles or ‘simulating a class position’ (Sullivan, 2008), but of providing 
basic necessities in times of unemployment, or in between paycheques. The precarious 
financial subject therefore exemplifies the contradictions of the process of subjectivation 
and the knowledge about subjects and their competence in the realm of finance that it 
produces (cf. Foucault, 1994). Part of the process, after all, encourages a move toward 
efficient and creative self-conduct in the valuation of everyday life, skills and aspirations 
as a portfolio of personal investment in future prosperity (Feher, 2009). However, the 
acquisition of debt also produces a wide-range of knowledge about the history of habits, 
conduct and trustworthiness of subjects where their ability to repay obligations is 
concerned, framed as having control or responsibility for their situation. As a consequence, 
financial subjects can be disciplined with schedules for repayment, notices of delinquency, 
high rates and fees, or repossession, as part of a financial history that provides a profile on 
which further decisions will be made (Lazzarato, 2012). Unlike the subjects envisioned in 
Discipline and Punish or the History of Sexuality who ‘unwittingly replicate the very structures 
that are the conditions and limits to their claims of self-hood’ (Luxon, 2008: 378), 
precarious financial subjects face a contradiction in that the need for entrepreneurialism as 
a creative answer to difficulties, through investment and risk-taking, is constantly limited 
by the rigid behaviour of repayment, or the uncertain possibility of default. Reproduction 
of the relations as given in the economic imaginary are therefore far from given. I therefore 
turn to developments in saving and borrowing in the following sections of this chapter, to 
understand possible limits on the notion of an entrepreneurial subject of the precarious 
working class. 
 
Pension reform in the United Kingdom: Privatisation and the question of personal 
choice versus paternalism 
Pension reform since the election of Thatcher’s Conservative government has 
predominantly centred on the question of freedom of choice in planning for the future, as 
I have shown in the previous chapter. Beginning in the budgets of 1986 and 1987, Nigel 
Lawson laid out provisions for the launching of the personal pension in 1988, as an 
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alternative to both employers’ occupational schemes and the State Earnings-Related 
Pension Scheme (SERPS) for those who wished to exercise more freedom of choice over 
their investments relative to the requirements of their personal circumstances. The drive 
for pension ownership, as a third major tenet of popular capitalism after homeownership 
and share ownership, nonetheless had a bias in favour of those who were less reliant on 
public provision of state pensions due to their occupations, and who were sufficiently 
financially literate to understand other available options. The debate about whether risks 
should be either borne collectively by society in the name of greater stability, or by the 
individual in the name of greater choice and freedom in planning for retirement has 
ultimately erred on the side of the latter, with individual responsibility touted as a key value 
rooted in the freedom to choose between provisions, make mistakes, and accept 
consequences. According to Karen Rowlingson, New Labour had, ‘[i]n many ways […] 
continue[d] with the same moral tenets as those enshrined by Margaret Thatcher’s call for 
a renewal of “Victorian Virtues”’ (2002: 624), so that pension provision remained firmly a 
question of individual choice and responsibility rather than a collective duty. Thus, in 
1998, the Department of Social Security published its Case for Welfare Reform, in which it 
held, crucially, that ‘society has a responsibility to help people in genuine need who are 
unable to look after themselves’, although ‘individuals have a responsibility to help provide 
for themselves when they can do so’ (cited in Rowlingson, 2002: 624). The New 
Labour government therefore emphasised the importance of both rights and 
responsibilities of the citizen, stating that ‘the government cannot solve problems alone. 
We need to work with people to encourage them to help themselves’ (ibid.). As a result, 
public pension schemes have been scaled back while private and personal pensions have 
thrived, in order that people should have a choice in the kind of services they want without 
relying too heavily on the state.1 
 Writing in the middle of New Labour’s reforms, Robin Blackburn calls British 
pension policy ‘a mess’ (2002), with three public schemes including the Basic State Pension 
(BSP), State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) (which was being phased out), 
and the State Second Pension (S2P) (which was being phased in). Additionally, there were 
three types of second-tier private pensions, including occupational schemes, the 
                                                        
1 Interestingly, Nigel Lawson later wrote of the ‘compulsory choice’ underpinning these policies: ‘It had been 
Margaret – backed by a majority of the [cabinet] committee – who had argued that there would be no political 
support for scrapping SERPS unless an adequate replacement private scheme were made compulsory. I 
disagreed, pointing out that we were the party of individual freedom; that people had different views about 
how much pension provision they required; and that to make taking out a particular level of private pension 
compulsory was contrary to our political philosophy (cited in Blackburn, 2002: 279). 
CHAPTER FOUR  Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 114
stakeholder pension and personal schemes, as well as the Minimum Income Guarantee 
(MIG) for any who did not receive an adequate pension from other sources. With many 
people unsure about the differences between state and private pensions (Clark et al., 2012) 
and complications arising as people ‘move from casual to permanent employment, or from 
a mainly [unpaid] caring role to self-employment, or from convalescence to study leave, or 
any one of a hundred or more permutations on the foregoing’, Blackburn argues that 
instead of ‘the existing moth-eaten patchwork quilt, pension provision needs to be 
integrated and unified’ (2002: 325). 
 
Type of Pension Basic Characteristics Year Established 
Basic State Pension  Mandatory enrolment; first-
tier pension 
1909 
SERPS Second-tier state pension 
(phasing out in 2002) 
1978 
S2P Second-tier state pension 
(replacing SERPS) 
2002 
Occupational Schemes Second-tier pension offered 
by employers. Can be 
defined benefit (which is 
gradually phasing out), 
defined contribution, or 
some combination of both 
1993 
MIG Second-tier state pension, 
for those who do not receive 
adequate amounts from 
other sources 
2000 
Stakeholder Pensions Second-tier private pension. 
Can be a personal pension 
with a defined contribution. 
2001 
Table 4.1: Pension arrangements in the United Kingdom (Sources: Blackburn, R. (2002) Banking on Death. 
London: Verso; Ginn, J. (2003) Gender, Pensions, and the Lifecourse. Bristol: The Policy Press.) 
 
Currently, there is some recognition that there are limits to the individual 
sovereignty and autonomy that are the cornerstones of modern liberalism, insofar as there 
has been an acknowledgement that financial literacy is not always enough to ‘empower’ 
individuals with responsibility for financial choices and decisions. The complexity of 
financial markets and their movements, as evidenced by the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009, 
indicates the importance of having a professional competence in the understanding of 
finance, including a grasp of probability and numeracy, ‘being able to distinguish between 
underlying patterns and contingent events […] and being able to cut through the clutter of 
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events and apply the relevant decision rules and techniques’ (Clark, Caerlewy-Smith, and 
Marshall, 2007). Thus, as Clark et al. note, ‘[t]ranslating these observations about financial 
competence into the realm of self-directed pension savings and investment, it is widely 
accepted that self-interest and an everyday knowledge and understanding of financial 
markets are inadequate’ for planning (2012: 139). Consequently, superseding 
contemporary neoliberal attitudes of self-interest and choice is what Clark et al. refer to as 
a ‘new’ paternalism, which ‘trump[s] individual decision-making with auto-enrollment, 
directed savings vehicles, and behavioural prompts that have as their goal real outcomes 
which are “better” than those which individuals may be able to achieve on their own 
account’ (2012: 151). This means individuals and households are involved in financial 
markets through the decisions of investment and pension fund planners and managers, 
who in turn owe, in theory at least, obligations and duties to their participants (ibid.). 
However, the very need for such a paternalistic approach to pensions and savings indicates 
the potential limits of financial subjectivity, as some lower income precarious working-
class individuals and households come to rely on automatic enrollment and reduced 
investment choice.2 
 
Private pensions: From Thatcher to New Labour 
According to Jay Ginn (2003), pension provision in the United Kingdom under the Labour 
governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan in the 1960s – 1970s was witness to 
significant improvements over earlier occupational pensions: in the first instance, the Basic 
State Pension ‘was formally indexed to rises in national earnings or prices, whichever was 
the higher’, which enabled the elderly to benefit from national prosperity. Additionally, 
the establishment of the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme in 1978 replaced an 
inadequate Graduated Pension, with the result that ‘[b]enefits, based on the best 20 years 
of earnings […] would accrue at 1.25% per annum and entitlements were automatically 
portable across jobs or across gaps in employment’ (Ginn, 2003: 14). By the time the 
Conservatives were elected in 1979, however, the privatisation of welfare, including 
pension provision, was taken up in a serious way in keeping with Thatcher’s individualistic 
discursive reaction against state paternalism. 
                                                        
2 To be sure, Clark et al. suggest that the ‘”new” paternalism also runs the risk of denying the diversity of 
interests and expectations of plan participants by favouring frameworks that apply to all enrolled participants’ 
(2012: 151). Some participants, especially those in higher income brackets and with stable jobs, undoubtedly 
embrace the need for risk and choice in retirement planning, which is why the state of financial subjectivity 
is a stratified and uneven one. 
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 Initially, as Blackburn points out, Thatcher’s indexation of the state pension only 
to rises in prices, rather than to both earnings and prices, seemed to be a minor change, yet 
‘the medium- and long-range impact of this change was to be very great’, with the state 
pension, which had previously accounted for 20% of average earnings dropping to only 
14%. By 2030 the Basic State Pension was projected to amount to only 10% of earnings 
(2002: 286). Although Thatcher scaled back her initial attempt to abolish the State 
Earnings-Relation Pension Scheme entirely, the approach that she did take in the end, 
namely in ‘boost[ing] the incentives to opt out of the public scheme by lowering the rate of 
National Insurance levied on employees who did so’, amounted to a form of ‘implicit 
privatisation’. Effectively, by minimising the benefits of public pensions, Thatcher hoped 
people would be drawn to the private sector to plan for their retirement rather than relying 
on the state (ibid., 287). According to Ginn, the Conservatives pressed ahead with pension 
privatisation in spite of concerns that private pensions would bring poorer returns than the 
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme. As individual defined contribution plans, the 
funds are portable, although a ‘major drawback, played down at the time, is that 
investment risk is individualised, shared neither with the workforce as a whole nor even 
with members of an employee’s scheme’ (2003: 16). Nonetheless, about 5 million 
individuals made the switch, which, for Ginn, represented more of a benefit for the 
pensions industry itself rather than its contributors (ibid.). Thus the Financial Services Act 
of 1986 saw the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme replace only 20%, instead of the 
earlier promised 25% of average earnings which was, according to Blackburn, 
misunderstood by many owing to the complicated nature of pension benefits. Indeed, 
because the ‘earnings-related scheme had been in effect for less than a decade and, with its 
complex promise still largely in the future, few grasped what was happening’ (Blackburn, 
2002: 287). 
 By the mid 1990s, however, it became clear that not all individuals were indeed the 
responsible, ‘unitary selves’, who were envisioned by policymakers as being capable of 
making consistent and informed choices across time (Rowlingson, 2002): that is to say, 
most individuals do not think and plan solely for their futures, in the absence of any other 
concern with money in the present. It was obvious that, since the legislation of 1986, 1.5 
million people had been ‘missold’ private pensions, meaning that, under pressure from 
pension salespeople, they opted out of the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme for 
more expensive, underperforming private pensions. This contributed to scandal and 
disenchantment with the Conservative government under John Major (Blackburn, 2002; 
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Ginn, 2003), who were already suffering from the effects of massive increases in 
unemployment and inequality. For Blackburn, an awareness ‘that the already miserable 
level of the state pension was destined to decline further as a proportion of average earnings 
certainly helped to compound a sense of insecurity’ (2002: 294). Here, the Labour Party, 
under its remade image of ‘New Labour’, gained a foothold among voters. Having quietly 
abandoned a previous plan to restore increases in the state pension with earnings in 
addition to prices on the grounds that the measure would be too costly, New Labour 
instead pledged to continue with Conservative spending for its first two years in office, 
while outlining its vision of a ‘stakeholder society’, in which the interests of everyone as 
contributors to British society were to be taken into account. This included the 
‘stakeholder’ pension, the basis of which was the treatment of employees as stakeholders 
in their respective enterprises, so that the interests of employees would be kept in mind 
where pensions are concerned. Financial institutions, consequently, would have to take a 
larger view of the ‘communities’ they served rather than an entirely self-interested one. In 
practice, British citizens could acquire a claim to a secondary pension (that is, one in 
addition to the Basic State Pension) that was based ‘on a national fund invested in stocks 
and shares’ in order to give ‘all a stake in national prosperity’ (ibid., 295). 
 Additionally, Tony Blair advocated ‘a new contract for pensions between the State, 
the private sector, and the individual’ (cited in Blackburn, 2002: 304). The Basic State 
Pension, accruing at 14% of average earnings, would continue to increase in line with 
prices rather than earnings. Thus, for the poorest of pensioners, Blackburn contends that 
their lot ‘was only to be improved if their lack of other income meant that they qualified 
for a means-tested “minimum income guarantee”’ (ibid.). Blair also proposed the gradual 
withdrawal of the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme in favour of the flat rate State 
Second Pension although in reality, the State Second Pension acts more as a complement 
to the low level of compensation from the Basic State Pension than as an adequate 
replacement to the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme. Blackburn thus suggests that 
the State Second Pension ‘becomes more of a tax on the lowpaid than a benefit’ owing to 
the fact that they pay into the State Second Pension despite the reality that it provides no 
more returns than the Minimum Income Guarantee, which is already guaranteed to all 
those who qualify (ibid., 305). Much like the Thatcher Conservatives, then, Blair’s 
approach was seen as promoting private pensions over state provision by making the latter 
undesirable. 
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Pensions, class and the question of financial subjectivity: Paternalism and pensions 
There is little doubt that saving for old age has often retained a class character in the United 
Kingdom: In the nineteenth century, the ‘savings ethos of the mass of the population 
remained sharply differentiated from the Victorian bourgeoisie’ (Hannah, 1986: 5) owing 
to a shorter life expectancy for the working class, which made a focus on raising families 
or maintaining households in the present more pressing than planning for retirement. And 
while the welfare state has often been praised, in contrast, for looking after the working 
class, a system of occupational welfare in the 1950s and 1960s nonetheless distinguished 
‘middle-class’ or ‘staff’ schemes, from ‘works’ or manual worker schemes (Cutler and 
Waine, 2001; cf. Ginn, 2003), where ‘benefits were substantially more generous in ‘staff’ 
schemes’ (Cutler and Waine, 2001: 110). Consequently, those in management positions 
were far less likely to have to rely on public provision from the state pension, so that they 
were less affected by pension reform. Thus, Thatcher’s ‘implicit privatisation’ and 
subsequent attempts to phase out public provision in favour of private plans certainly do 
not represent the first instance in which the British working class in general became 
disadvantaged in preparing for retirement. 
 However, while notions of individual responsibility and self-sufficiency are touted 
as crucial components of citizenship, individualised pension provision, in which one must 
become a knowledgeable investor, is a key test of one’s success as a financial subject. That 
is to say, the precarious working class is characterised decreasingly in relation to 
occupation, especially with the decline of manufacturing as a traditional locus of trade 
unionism in the United Kingdom. Instead, they are held to the same individualistic 
standards as the upper and middle classes, typically better off both financially and in terms 
of their understanding of financial markets. Although financial planning and literacy have 
helped to constitute the financial subject, as they are regarded as key to overcoming so 
many problems with saving, Skinner and Ford (2000) find that policymakers work on the 
false assumption that all individuals are equally well informed and capable of making 
financial decisions. Instead, they argue, consistent understanding of finance markets and 
planning for the future is to be found mainly among those whose lives are occupationally 
stable, making these ‘already advantaged groups best able to capitalise on policies that 
encourage private provision (Rowlingson, 2002: 626). In contrast, the precarious working 
class faces greater risks, such as unemployment, and has fewer resources with which to 
deal with these issues. As Taylor-Gooby maintains, self-sufficiency through private 
provision ‘may function as ideology, serving the interests of the more privileged classes by 
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obscuring the continuing importance of class divisions in vulnerability to damage from the 
risks we all face’ (2001; cf. Rowlingson, 2002: 627). In spite of so much insistence of self-
sufficiency, both discursively and in the enactment of legislation that makes private 
provision the easiest form of saving, the question as to whether members of the precariat 
can continue as successful financial subjects remains an important one. 
 There has indeed been an implicit acknowledgement by policymakers as to the 
problematic nature of the self-sufficient individual since, as Clark et al. have it, ‘it appears 
that few people are the sophisticated planners that theory assumes, and even fewer appear 
to be sophisticated market players willing and able to save for the future in the context of 
market volatility’ (2012: 136). The Department of Work and Pensions warns that 
‘[m]illions of people are not saving enough to meet their expectation for income once they 
retire’, with 
persistent and powerful barriers to people taking the long-term savings decisions 
that would be needed to address this problem. These include inertia, financial 
myopia, the cost of pension saving and the complexity of the decisions involved 
(2006: 31). 
 
From the outset, the discourse used by the Department for Work and Pensions appears 
consistent with earlier neoliberal discourse that stresses ‘tak[ing] personal responsibility for 
ensuring that their aspirations for retirement are met’ (ibid.). Yet, by introducing a 
‘minimum overall level of contribution’ for employees as well as automatic enrolment in 
pension plans, the Department of Work and Pensions ultimately clarify their intentions to 
promote personal responsibility, by helping overcome the barriers to saving; simplify 
the system for individuals, by clarifying the savings decisions they need to take; and 
make the system fair, by ensuring access to high-quality, low-cost provision for all 
(ibid., emphasis in original). 
 
This kind of approach, according to Jones, Pykett and Whitehead, actually represents an 
outlook termed ‘soft’ or ‘libertarian’ paternalism, a new form of paternalism that ‘exists 
somewhere between neoliberalism and the harder forms of paternalism’ (2011: 51). Thus, 
rather than encouraging self-sufficiency and responsibility by leaving individuals and 
households to fend for themselves, public institutions are better to ‘affect behavior while 
also respecting freedom of choice’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003: 1) through the ‘careful 
design of collective structures of choice in a range of policy areas, which facilitate more 
effective decision-making while enhancing personal freedom’ (Jones et al., 2011: 51). 
 Where pension policy is concerned, the new paternalism considers individual 
choices to be ill-informed, based on ‘framing effects, starting points, and default rules, 
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leaving the very meaning of the term “preferences” unclear’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003: 2 
– 3). In short, the new paternalism acknowledges that people do not make choices and 
decisions in a vacuum, and that they may be different depending on the context an 
individual finds themselves in. Consequently, environments can be structured to actively 
promote saving, through, for example, auto-enrolment in pension schemes at work such 
as the National Employment Savings Trust, or requiring a ‘minimum overall level of 
contribution of 8 per cent for the personal accounts of employees and encourag[ing] 
additional contributions from employees’ (Department of Work and Pensions, 2006: 31). 
This allows ‘citizens [to] be “nudged” into making appropriate decisions’ (Jones et al., 
2011: 53; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), while allowing them to exercise a certain level of 
freedom of choice by opting out of private pension schemes in order to invest elsewhere. 
This development has therefore led Clark et al. (2012) to question how far financialisation, 
with its focus on self-sufficiency, personal responsibility, and entrepreneurial abilities in 
investment really extends. As I argue in the next chapter, it is indicative of the struggles 
over the process of subjectivation, and the subsequent transformation of subjectivity. 
 
Debt, mortgages, and destabilisation: The eventual withdrawal of subprime products 
For as much as Thatcher herself disavowed personal debt as detrimental to saving and 
responsible household habits, the Big Bang of 1986 and the removal of trading restrictions 
such as fixed commissions facilitated the spread of the ‘stock trading, merger, and takeover 
boom in the United States […] to Britain’, resulting in an estimated 50 percent increase in 
national wealth from the financial sector alone (Reitan, 2003: 56). However, the import of 
the process of securitisation, and securities as tradeable commodities from the United 
States (Wainwright, 2009) meant that much investment on the market was geared to 
servicing the consumption boom itself (Jessop, 2015). With stagnant wages, primarily 
affecting the lowest-paid workers, and an increase in lower-paying part-time rather than 
well-remunerated full-time jobs, the new availability of credit and loans could help workers 
and their families forestall their downward mobility by borrowing in times of income 
disparity and hardship (Sullivan, 2008). It is not simply the case that increasing levels of 
personal debt represented reckless spending or irresponsibility, but rather the management 
of volatility with new technologies and instruments made available through the expansion 
of capital markets. These technologies, in turn, indicated a new form of the governance of 
consumer behaviour, which was itself unproblematic in the eyes of Thatcherite 
Conservatives (Payne, 2013). As Sparkes puts it, ‘an imagined figure of the consumer 
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became utilised by the neoliberal movement, both to problematise Keynesian methods for 
governing the economy and as the basis for a new governmental programme’ (2015: 35), 
where the borrowing needs of consumers, rather than just producers, now had to be met. 
In elevating the consumer as an expression of individual freedom of choice whose needs 
had been neglected under the Keynesian national welfare state, neoliberal thought 
displaced the producer as a central figure to focus instead on individual needs and desires, 
which in turn necessitated the expansion of credit as a way of meeting these needs. It was 
therefore Thatcher’s government, in 1980, which abolished the bank lending ‘corset’ 
established earlier under Edward Heath, that had discouraged the origination of too many 
consumer loans above a certain threshold.  
 The normalisation of debt as a legitimate method of dealing with unexpected 
circumstances, however, is accompanied by the equally normalising expectation that the 
debt will be repaid (cf. Sparkes, 2015). The individual as a consumer with needs to be met 
came back to the fore, superseding other notions of the individual as a worker or producer, 
subject to hierarchies and divisions brought on by inequalities associated with income and 
wealth (Sullivan, 2008). These forms of stratification were instead mobilised in the creation 
of models that would predict an individual’s likelihood of default or repayment, to indicate 
not their place within a class-based hierarchy, but the level of risk they posed as a borrower. 
It is hardly surprising as a result that key structural factors such as low income (Orton, 
2009) are predictors of whether an individual is likely to make timely repayments or not 
(Marron, 2007). The treatment of consumers as variables in a technical calculation of risk 
represents a discursive break from previous lending practices based on personal 
assessments of an applicant’s history and personality by the lender, in the direction of a 
quasi-scientific, technical assessment of an individual in the context of a population of 
peers. Marron contends that ‘capitalism is built upon instrumental rationality and the 
capacity for foresight’, so that risk, ‘as a probabilistic analysis of the recursiveness of events 
within complexity, brings the future contingency of default and financial loss within the 
boundaries of consideration in the present, making it knowable in specific ways’ (2007: 
104). The possibility of future default is, in short, brought into the present, in the 
stratification of borrowers on the basis of assets, income and employment history, with the 
precariat scoring highly on many indicators of higher potential for default.  
In the consumer credit boom, risk is managed through credit reporting and scoring, 
which enable lenders to ‘construct, measure, and manage the uncertainties over the future 
meeting of outstanding obligations by cardholders’ (Langley, 2008a: 148), as well as to 
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charge specific interest rates to cardholders on the basis of their likelihood of default, 
known as risk-based pricing (ibid.; Marron, 2007). Here, in the Foucauldian sense, is the 
confluence of a set of circumstances giving rise to borrowers as a varied group of subjects 
who can, nonetheless, be disciplined through similar practices: 
the collective body of borrowers was made visible as a dynamic entity within itself, 
with certain norms of repayment present across its breadth that could be discerned 
and made known and against which the individual could be made subject for the 
purpose of controlling costs, increasingly cohering the body of borrowers as a 
whole, its attributes, extended balances and repayment streams as autonomous, 
self-referential phenomena (Marron, 2007: 106).  
 
The ‘borrower’ thus became active subjects in their own right, certainly in the context of 
Thatcher’s promotion of individualism and choice, but predominantly through the 
development of financial tools of calculation and monitoring that could exercise a 
disciplinary function to promote regular repayment. These schedules were thus at odds 
with the entrepreneurial creativity necessary for saving and investing, both in the sense that 
they divert income for immediate repayment from future saving, while also requiring a 
sense of rigidity in thinking and behaviour that is aimed at reducing rather than embracing 
risk. Nonetheless, financial subjects were firmly consumers measured as a risk to lenders, 
and decreasingly producers with a shared identity among other workers over wages and 
working conditions.3 
 
The housing market and the exclusive nature of homeownership 
It was not only credit card debt that contributed to the stratification of precarious working-
class financial subjects, however, and the collapse of two housing bubbles, in 1987 under 
the Conservatives and in 2007 under New Labour (Jessop, 2015) respectively, gives some 
insight into the further division of financial subjectivity and the potential for instability as 
a result of borrowing practices. As I noted in the previous chapter, the discourse of 
homeownership as providing workers with a meaningful stake in society resonated 
strongly with those who felt limited in council housing, and indeed converted many former 
Labour voters to the Conservative cause through appeals to greater ownership of national 
resources. Discounts ranging from 33 to 55 percent off the market value were offered to 
tenants of council houses and flats depending on their tenure in their home under the Right 
                                                        
3 To be sure, many workers throughout the 1980s retained a strong sense of working-class identity, evidenced 
by the Winter of Discontent from 1978 – 1979 and the Miners’ Strike of 1984 – 1985. However, the end of 
the strike represented a significant weakening of the trade union movement in the United Kingdom and a 
victory for Thatcher. 
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to Buy Act. This resulted in nearly 1.7 million tenants purchasing their homes by 1995, 
acquiring roughly a quarter of the 1980 stock of housing. Where, in the late 1970s, 55 
percent of people owned their own homes, that number had risen to 66 percent at the end 
of the 1980s, alongside a substantial decline in social renters over the same time period, 
from 30 percent to just 16 percent (Clasen, 2003). These developments can be traced to 
changes at the structural level of government and the institutionalisation of an 
individualistic ideology. The 1988 Housing Act ‘provided some tax relief for new 
development and changes to landlord and tenant rights and relationships’, helping to create 
new planning policy to allocated the development of social housing for renters within new 
developments otherwise catering to buyers (Tunstall, 2003: 154). Meanwhile, to 
ameliorate issues with a diminished private renting sector, 26,000 new homes were built 
in council estates, ‘of which over 23,000 replaced demolished council houses’ (ibid.). The 
supply of residential property available under local authorities thus declined, as part of a 
series of legislation encouraging renters to purchase homes. 
 Indeed the Thatcher government offered many incentives to buying, in the form of 
clawing back the control of local authorities over the housing stock by making the prospect 
of purchasing both easier to enter into and more attractive than renting. Government 
spending on social housing decreased, with the cutting back of Housing Revenue Accounts 
and Rate Support Grants, so that local authorities now had to charge market prices for rent 
paid by tenants. The housing benefit thus became a major source of support for council 
tenants who had not purchased their homes (Clasen, 2003), but those who could afford to 
pay could no longer live in social housing (Reitan, 2003). The lower cost of purchasing 
homes, in addition to tax relief applied to mortgage interest, thus became more attractive 
in some cases than continuing to pay a rent increase. Many of the working poor found 
themselves relegated to remaining unattractive council estates which had not been 
purchased due to their association with crime rates and drugs (ibid.), but in the early 2000s, 
prior to the financial crisis, it became apparent that homeownership had spread even to the 
poor and unemployed. Estimates for the period of 2003  
indicate that half of all poor households (income below half average income) are 
homeowners. Home-ownership grew significantly within the lowest income decile 
from 30% in 1979 to 42% in 1997/8, and about half of them have a mortgage 
(Clasen, 2003: 577 – 578). 
 
But low-income buyers were once again subject to welfare reforms intended to stimulate 
the consumption of private insurance products and reduce government dependence. Prior 
to 1995, low income or unemployed homeowners were eligible for the Income Support for 
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Mortgage Interest (ISMI), which originally covered half of interest payments on mortgages 
for the first two months, followed by full interest payments afterward (Pryce and Sprigings, 
2009). However, reforms to ISMI in 1995 resulted in no support for the first ten months, 
and subsequent support for capped interest rates only (ibid.). The take-up of private 
mortgage protection insurance (MPPI) was low among the precariat, with low wages and 
little employment stability, owing to its expense (Clasen, 2003) and a confusing claim 
structure (Pryce and Sprigings, 2009).  By the time of the credit crunch in the United 
Kingdom in 2007, rates of default were nowhere near as high as those in the United States, 
though it is nonetheless telling for Pryce and Sprigings that repossession rose by 230 
percent after 2004 in a climate of mostly minor decreases in employment. However, those 
on low incomes in particular, as the group most susceptible to risks from an unstable labour 
market, were disproportionately affected by rising costs of living, such as energy and food 
prices (2009). The ideal of homeownership often remained just that even for some who 
had ventured into the mortgage and housing markets, owing to the increased pressures 
faced by the precariat, already more vulnerable to unemployment or hardship, in the 
context of fluctuating markets and levels of borrowing. 
 As Pryce and Sprigings (ibid.) note, precarious workers are much more likely to 
have to sell their homes at low points in the housing cycle, due to other economic pressures 
that complicate making payments during a downturn. They are also less likely to be able 
to buy when prices are low, with few lenders will to make favourable terms to those on low 
incomes relative to higher paid, lower risk borrowers. The issue is further complicated by 
the introduction of Buy-to-Let mortgages, also in 1995, which have been popular among 
middle-class borrowers for investing in properties to be used as rental income. However, 
nearly 90 percent of Buy-to-Let mortgages were issued at the peak of the housing boom 
after 1999, making negative equity – a mortgage more than the home is worth – a real 
concern as housing prices began to fall between 2005 – 2007. With flats and terrace houses 
accounting for 80 percent of Buy-to-Let properties, a real danger emerged that low-income 
households would be priced out of the smaller and ostensibly more affordable housing 
markets, due to slumps exacerbated by Buy-to-Let sellers flooding the market with 
offloaded properties, at exactly the time when lenders are unlikely to advance mortgages 
to low-income, high-risk borrowers (ibid.). While cycles in the housing market make it 
appear porous rather than completely exclusive to precarious workers, the upshot is that 
homeownership nonetheless became an unrealistic investment, as it was unlikely to 
generate returns over a long period, or lifetime, as is the case for buyers in the middle and 
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higher classes who command greater job security and a higher level of assets and income. 
Indeed, with rigid and punitive repayment schedules, the borrowing process for precarious 
homeowners is highly disciplined, in contrast to the freedom for creativity associated with 
entrepreneurial investment and saving.  
 By 2004, three years ahead of the financial crisis, outstanding household financial 
obligations amounted to just over £1 trillion (May et al., 2004), with mortgage borrowing 
accounting for £867 billion, credit card debt for £58 billion, and other unsecured consumer 
lending for another £125 billion (Langley, 2008a: 139). As individuals and households 
acquired debt faster than wages had risen, default and bankruptcy became increasingly 
more common, with insolvency rates in the United Kingdom growing from only 0.02 
percent of the population in the 1980s, to 0.10 percent in the 1990s, and reaching 0.22 
percent by 2006 (ibid., 201). The spread of the financial crisis to the United Kingdom was 
not directly related to the American subprime crisis and exorbitant levels of default, so 
much as it was a contagion of securitisation (Lapavitsas, 2009a; Wainwright, 2009): loans, 
mortgages, and credit were parcelled ‘into small amounts, [before] placing them into larger 
composites, and selling the new lots as securities. Particles of subprime debt, therefore, 
became embedded in securities held by financial institutions across the world’ (Lapavitsas, 
2009a: 118). The British credit crunch was thus caused by the subsequent illiquidity of 
credit and mortgage markets worldwide, rather than the ‘credit quality of its borrowers’ 
(Wainwright, 2009: 382), although a concern with unprecedented levels of default led some 
lenders who provided subprime mortgages and credit in the United Kingdom to withdraw 
many of their riskier products as a consequence of credit rationing (ibid., 383) and a ‘lack 
of appetite among investors for portfolios of adverse debt’ (BBC, 2007). They were, in 
short, attempting to forestall such high rates of default in the United Kingdom as had 
happened in the United States. However, the upshot is a clear demarcation between high- 
and low-risk borrowers, with the latter better integrated into a financial system that is 
increasingly necessary for saving and borrowing, while the former struggles on the margins 
with high-cost options that further complicate an already volatile economic condition as it 
relates to employment and income. The contradictions that complicate the process of 
subjectivation in the realm of borrowing are therefore twofold. In the first place, 
entrepreneurial borrowing required of precarious working households turns on financial 
self-discipline, such as the investment in financial markets and leveraged investing in 
property, although these households are least likely to have assets and savings and the most 
likely to be renting (Langley, 2008a: 205), even if they have purchased a house and a 
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mortgage before (Pryce and Sprigings, 2009). This is related to another major 
contradiction, namely that borrowers are assumed, like investors, to be unitary subjects, 
figures that are ‘disembedded from all but his/her financial relations’ (Langley, 2008a: 
204), when in reality precarious working households have to deal with a number of 
pressures including stagnating wages and interruptions in employment. 
 
Investment, borrowing, and the uncertainty of financial subjects 
As the foregoing sections have illustrated, investment and borrowing are far from 
straightforward practices guaranteeing the successful reproduction of financial subjects. If 
anything, they create spaces of contingency and contradiction, owing to the individualising 
nature of financial subjectivation, wherein failures to invest responsibly or manage 
outstanding borrowing obligations are treated solely as an individual failure, in spite of 
many structural inequalities. The failure of subjects to act as purely rational individuals in 
all spheres of life, including employment and financial obligations, illustrates, from a 
Foucauldian perspective (1994), how financialising power operates in the contemporary 
capitalism of the United Kingdom: here, failure to plan for the future through investment 
and adequate saving necessitates forms of educational intervention, indicating that the 
process is one of individual understanding rather than structural concerns over stagnating 
wages, pension reform, and the ability of individuals and households to understand 
fluctuating financial markets. Similarly, with increasing indebtedness and insolvency 
treated as individual problems rather than systemic concerns 
related to the normalisation of borrowing to make up for shortfalls among precarious 
working-class households, the notion of the borrower as a responsible individual is 
legitimated as the correct form of subjectivity, standing in contrast to delinquent, 
irresponsible debtors (cf. Langley, 2008a). 
The contradictions noted in this chapter, namely the inability of precarious 
working-class households to completely fulfil their ostensible duties as financial subjects 
due to structural constraints, represent ‘struggles which question the status of the 
individual’:  
they attack everything which separates the individual, breaks his links with others, 
splits up community life, forces the individual back on himself, and ties him to his 
own identity in a constraining way. These struggles are not exactly for or against 
the ‘individual’ but rather they are struggles against the ‘government of 
individualization’ (Foucault, 1994: 130). 
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While these are rarely coordinated political struggles, the contradictions exemplified by 
saving and borrowing illustrate the extent to which policymakers have had to respond to 
the daily struggles of low-income, precarious working households to save and meet 
borrowing requirements, from instituting ‘paternalistic’ pension reform which reconfigures 
the kind of choice involved in savings decisions, to removing many subprime lending 
options geared toward low-income individuals and families. They are therefore 
‘anarchistic’ struggles manifested in an inability to perform certain financial practices on a 
daily basis, and focused immediately on individuals who might be responsible for certain 
decisions rather than a ‘chief enemy’ (ibid., 129). In so doing, for Foucault, these struggles, 
‘immediate’ to everyday concerns rather than large scale political campaigns, are mainly 
struggles against ‘a technique, or form of power’ (ibid., 130), namely the effects of 
financialisation which render subjects as unitary individuals entirely responsible for their 
own destinies. This, as I will illustrate in the next chapter, forms an inevitable part of the 
process of subjectivation. 
 
Conclusion 
The financialisation of everyday life is a risky process, from the perspective of precarious 
working individuals or households who have to learn to be entrepreneurial in daily 
decisions, and for policymakers who ultimately have to deal with the consequences of 
assuming that individuals are all unitary, rational figures in their choices and decisions. As 
I have illustrated, this assumption neglects the structural inequalities associated with 
declining real wages in individuals’ abilities to save and invest wisely, or to manage 
outstanding borrowing obligations in a timely fashion. In this chapter, I have therefore 
outlined the limits of financial subjectivation in the everyday struggles people face with 
investment and borrowing, which have raised questions about the future of the 
entrepreneurial, risk-taking subject. 
 Where investment for the purpose of savings is concerned, households in the United 
Kingdom are, on average, not saving enough to ensure a substantial retirement income, 
largely owing to a lack of understanding of financial markets and a concomitant adversity 
toward financial risk in the long term. Although the Thatcher Conservatives and New 
Labour under Tony Blair both actively pursued the privatisation of pensions (Blackburn, 
2002), encouraging people to seek provision by opting into private schemes rather than 
through the welfare state, there has nonetheless been an appreciation since at least 2005 
(Jones et al., 2011) that individuals may not always make the soundest choices regarding 
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their retirement due to financial constraints in the present. This had led to a new form of 
paternalism (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), in which 
many employers automatically enrol their employees in plans with the option to opt out if 
desired, rather than requiring employees to opt in out of fears that many will neglect 
possible sources of investment which would give them a better retirement income. As a 
consequence, the notion of the entrepreneurial subject as a self-governing individual has 
been called into question (Clark et al., 2012). 
 Perhaps more obvious, since the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 and the subsequent 
British credit crunch, are the deleterious levels of debt incurred by borrowers, whose loans 
and mortgages have since become ‘adverse risks’ for investors, leading to the withdrawal 
of some subprime products for higher risk borrowers (Wainwright, 2009). When viewed 
as an inconsistency between structural inequalities of wages and work versus expectations 
of individual rationalism, however, the issue becomes less about purely irresponsible 
borrowing and predatory lenders, and more about a systemic contradiction in expecting 
the precarious working class to be both entrepreneurial in their borrowing habits, as well 
as in their capacities as workers who must also accept risk as part of dealing with an 
unstable labour market. With fewer subprime products available on the market, however, 
the question as to whether such individuals and households can still fully participate in 
financial markets as borrowers becomes pertinent, especially where the issue of financial 
subjectivity is concerned. The nature of financial subjectivity after the 2007 – 2009 financial 
crisis is therefore a question that I will pursue in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Five: 
The uneven and contradictory nature of precarious working-class 
financial subjectivity 
 
Introduction 
In the fourth chapter, I explored some of the limitations on the notion of a purely self-
governed individual, guided by entrepreneurial creativity and intuition. In the realm of 
saving and investing, dangerously low levels of saving and inadequate planning for 
retirement caught the attention of policymakers in the New Labour government from 2005 
onward. They began to institute a form of paternalism that persisted through the 
Conservative government under David Cameron (Jones et al., 2011) into the present, in 
which employees are automatically enrolled in pension plans with opt-out rather than opt-
in clauses (Clark et al., 2012). Where borrowing is concerned, higher-risk borrowers in the 
United Kingdom are more likely to be ‘redlined’, or denied loans, credit, and mortgages 
through traditional sources of finance as a consequence of the withdrawal of some 
subprime products after the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, owing to credit rationing and the 
need to prioritise low-risk borrowers with better credit histories (Wainwright, 2009). For 
some commentators, this represents a shortcoming in the conceptualisation of self-
governed individuals (Clark and Knox-Hayes, 2009; Clark et al., 2012): although Sunstein 
and Thaler (2003) argue that a paternalism, in which individual choice is prioritised by 
providing contexts for making appropriate decisions, retains a distinctly liberal character, 
the notion of the neoliberal individual who has internalised risk-taking as key is 
nonetheless in question when policymakers guide their interests. 
 Foucault’s outline of the ‘anarchistic’ struggles of subjects against total 
individualisation is of some help in thinking through the issue of the status of financial 
subjectivity: contingent and contradictory daily struggles, such as the inability to plan for 
retirement properly or make regular payments on loans, credit or mortgages, represent an 
indication of the difficulties faced by the precariat in living up to entrepreneurial 
expectations, creating ‘uncertain subjects’ (Langley, 2007; 2008a) who never completely 
fulfil the role of financial subject. The process of subjectivation, in short, is never a 
complete one (Foucault, 1994). However, his intense focus on liberalism as ‘the most 
effective system of governmental economy’ (1997a: 77) has a tendency to obscure such 
struggle, as he maps the trajectory of the governance of the liberal subject (Du Pont and 
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Pearce, 2001). As a result, it can be difficult to envisage ruptures and discontinuities within 
the theoretical framework of governmentality in order to understand how these struggles 
leave their mark on the process of subjectivation and the experiences of subjects. However, 
when Foucault’s account of individuals as increasingly self-governing is combined with 
Althusser’s theoretically complementary concept of ‘overdetermination’ (1969), it becomes 
possible to see how subjective experience is conditioned by class leading to the uneven 
development of financial subjectivity. Briefly, overdetermination means that the effects of 
multiple contradictions, such as the expectation of financial self-discipline from the 
precarious working class with its limited savings and assets, or the expectation of being 
able to cope with stagnating wages and precarious employment in addition to borrowing 
pressures, are condensed and reflected ‘in a real unity’ (ibid., 100) such as, in this case, the 
limitations associated with being working-class. Overdetermination therefore implies that 
the concept of class is not simply an abstract category for classifying individuals, but that 
it has a material existence in determining the way that people are stratified. 
 Returning, then, to the problem of Foucault’s limited engagement with structure 
and social stratification identified in Chapter One (Joseph, 2004; cf. Sayer, 2012), it is 
possible to see why the suggestion that the struggles of self-governed individuals are 
overdetermined by class actually helps demonstrate the ‘immediacy’ of such struggles 
against the effects of power (Foucault, 1994): different classes engage with borrowing and 
investing differently, as evidenced by responses such as the ‘flight to quality’ low-risk 
borrowers (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995) and the subsequent withdrawal of some subprime 
products leading to a certain level of financial exclusion (ibid.; Dymski, 2005; Wainwright, 
2009); or the need to institute a certain level of paternalism guaranteeing that the 
financially disengaged, which mainly encompass the precarious working class, will as least 
make minimal savings (Clark et al., 2012). Thus the immediate concerns of the precariat 
and their strategies or coping mechanisms may be vastly different from those of the middle 
and higher classes. Additionally even within the precariat, which encompasses people in 
precarious forms of employment from traditional production and manufacturing to highly 
educated younger people struggling to find work, forms of engagement will vary. In 
consequence, the issues of libertarian paternalism or financial exclusion do not necessarily 
spell the inevitable end of financial subjectivity so much as they suggest that the precarious 
working-class experience of finance is more controlled and stratified than that of middle 
and higher classes in the attempt to encourage self-sufficiency. 
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Revisiting governmentality and the self-governing subject 
Current practices in investment and borrowing and the question of the financial subject 
It became obvious, in the fourth chapter, that financial subjectivity in the United Kingdom 
has been seriously complicated following the crisis of 2007 – 2009 by questions concerning 
whether current investment and borrowing practices really engender self-governing 
subjects or not. This issue, of course, is owing to persistent concerns about whether people 
will save enough under their own initiative, evidenced by the emergence and enthusiastic 
uptake of ‘libertarian paternalism’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) 
by policymakers in the United Kingdom on one hand; and the withdrawal of subprime 
products due to fears about the level of risk they pose to investors (Wainwright, 2009) on 
the other. 
 In the first instance, investment in pensions has, since 2005, been guided by the idea 
of a ‘libertarian paternalism’, which sees new developments in the conception of the 
individual navigation of choice. As a result, ‘it is wrong to “blame” people for their short-
termism and it is a mistake to believe that people have the cognitive skills to function in 
financial markets to the level needed to be effective decision makers’ (Clark et al., 2012: 
151). This is primarily owing to work done in the behavioural sciences that details the 
shortcomings and cognitive biases involved in an individual’s decision-making: ‘The 
“new” paternalism is hence motivated by a realization that exhortations to be more 
“moral” or more “rational” lack credibility in the face of findings in behavioral research’ 
(ibid.), meaning that it is not seen as possible to effect rational action in people simply by 
providing them with options to choose from. Thus, libertarian paternalism ‘is willing to 
trump individual decision-making with auto-enrollment, directed savings vehicles, and 
behavioral prompts that have as their goal real outcomes that are “better” than those which 
individuals may be able to achieve on their own account’; this understanding leads Clark 
et al. to wonder if such a policy is actually antithetical to the notion of individualised 
welfare provision (ibid.). I will argue, in contrast, that libertarian paternalism is actually a 
different means of promoting choice than it is a limitation of financial subjectivity, insofar 
as provision for the future still relies on engagement with capital markets. Active pension 
saving displays a high correlation with earnings, to the extent that initiatives, like the 
private pension, that were meant to give people a choice in how they saved, have not been 
taken up by low-earners. 57 percent of adults with a household income of less than £15,000 
do not have any private pension provision, although this number decreases to 30 percent 
among those with household incomes of £15,000 – £30,000. Additionally, the unemployed 
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overwhelmingly lack private pension provision, with 78 percent of unemployed adults 
lacking such support; the self-employed also show high rates of disengagement with private 
pensions, at 51 percent (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017). The use of creative tactics 
that involve personal choice and a more active engagement with pensions and their 
investments is therefore predominantly the purview of those with higher incomes and 
stable employment, but the alternative direction toward informed choice for those who are 
not saving enough still presupposes a contribution toward some kind of investment rather 
than an employer guarantee of benefits. What is important, in reading this policy shift, is 
an appreciation of the way in which individual and household responses to the original 
push for freedom, choice and embracing risk in the household has led policymakers to 
consider the saving patterns of those with low incomes; the relationship between policy, as 
a reflection of the functioning of government organisations, and individual lives is 
therefore not one-directional, but rather the two affect each other even if individual lives 
are ultimately more determined by policy than policy is by individual action.  
 In the second instance, the financial crisis has produced uncertainty about lending 
to high-risk borrowers, inducing ‘what the financial services industry describes as a “flight 
to quality”; that is, a search for “safer” markets, a process which tends to discriminate in 
favour of more affluent and powerful social groups and against poor and disadvantaged 
groups’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995: 312). In consequence, credit is rationed and obtainable 
by those deemed to be low-risk borrowers, while subprime borrowers face the ‘redlining’ 
of their applications, and ‘financial exclusion’ in which they are unable to access finance 
markets through traditional means. This has not diminished over-indebtedness for low 
income working households, but instead means that many have turned to alternative 
sources, such as payday loans, pre-approved credit cards, or a reliance on an overdraft, to 
continue to function financially (Centre for Social Justice, 2015). Thus, as of 2017, the 
Financial Conduct Authority reports that high-cost payday loans were held by 6 percent 
of adults, or 3.1 million people, especially noticeable among the precariat including young 
single parents aged 18 – 34 (17 percent), the unemployed (9 percent), and those with no 
savings or investments to fall back on (16 percent). Credit cards feature highly as a form of 
debt among all income earners, with 62 percent of UK adults holding one, but among the 
19 percent of borrowers who revolve a balance rather than paying it off each month, 13 
percent make less than £15,000 annually. Finally, among the 25 percent of adults who rely 
on an overdraft every year, 38 percent of these are young adults with very little or no 
savings, and 24 percent of all those who went into overdraft were unauthorised. 
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Mainstream products such as personal loans are more commonly used by applicants with 
annual incomes of £30,000 or more, while adults who earn less than £15,000 make up only 
3 percent of holders of some kind of motor finance, which alludes to the urgency of 
borrowing in other areas and through other means (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017). 
It is only very recently, as documented in 2015, that subprime products have re-emerged 
in the United Kingdom, implementing slightly stricter conditions on their loans and 
mortgages (Jones, 2015). The overall difficulty of access for low-income households of 
financial markets (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995; Wainwright, 2009) has led to calls for a 
reform in banking services (Gloukoviezoff, 2006) to provide more ‘control, transparency, 
and certainty compared to higher-income groups who typically place greater value on 
“bonus features” and price when selecting services’ (Centre for Social Justice, 2015: 68). 
Thus, as with investment, many precarious households value more security at the expense 
of self-directed choice between products (ibid.). 
 As I aim to highlight, however, the ability to govern oneself is not the only feature 
of financial subjectivity, which also includes an internalisation of risk as central to one’s 
own goals and prosperity as a result of institutionalised discourses and practices (Althusser, 
1971; see Chapter One). Indeed, I argue that this helps distinguish financial subjectivity 
from earlier, regulated forms of conduct in which, beginning from the sixteenth century 
onward, the development of the ‘art of government’ included ‘the art of self-government, 
connected with morality’ as a precursor to governing other individuals ‘to behave as they 
should’ of their own accord (Foucault, 1991: 91 – 92). For Foucault, it was the discovery 
of the notion of a population as a statistical entity in the eighteenth century when 
governance became key, as a means of managing and encouraging the appropriate self-
conduct of a group of people ‘with its own regularities, […] its cycles of scarcity, etc.’ (ibid., 
99). Consequently, the specific form of governance taken in the case of subjectivation in 
the time of finance concerns individual responsibility achieved through embracing forms 
of risk to make ends meet: the pertinent question to ask, then, is whether people have 
embraced risk as central to their own aspirations and goals or not. 
 Undoubtedly, there is some variation in the answer to this question. According to 
Sharon Collard and Zoey Breuer, attitudes toward investment risk in the United Kingdom 
depend in large part on factors such as income, wealth, and level of education, with those 
on a lower income and with fewer assets tending toward risk aversion (Department of 
Work and Pensions, 2009: 15): 
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A recent DWP [Department of Work and Pensions] survey with individuals who 
would be eligible for automatic enrolment into a qualifying workplace pension 
under the Government’s reforms found that their financial risk profile was fairly 
risk averse. Using respondents’ answers to a lottery-type question it classified over 
four in ten (44 per cent) as risk averse, about two in ten (17 per cent) as mildly risk 
averse, and only three in ten (29 per cent) as risk loving (ibid.). 
 
Although these attitudes can shift as ‘needs alter and people’s capacity to absorb potential 
losses varies’ (ibid., 16), it is clear that only a small portion of precarious working 
households have developed risk-loving appetites in their approach to saving for the future. 
This, however, does not mean that they do not still recognise the significance of taking on 
risks in the contemporary economy, with attitudes toward the acquisition of debt 
increasingly normalised, in spite of the risk it poses: ‘there appear to be major cultural 
changes underway in terms of attitudes to debt’, so that ‘[t]aking on high levels of debt is 
becoming normalised at an earlier age’ (The Financial Inclusion Centre, 2011: 3). 
Moreover, with ‘various socioeconomic trends […] seriously impair[ing] consumers’ 
ability to meet credit commitments and accumulate assets’ (ibid.), it is possible that the 
internalisation of the need to accumulate debt is linked with attitudes toward investment 
risk which are partially dependent on assets. Thus, in some way, the precariat have come 
to include the involvement of financial risk in making ends meet and reaching goals in 
everyday life, although it is a very class-based experience of high levels of borrowing and 
low levels of investment. In order to properly address this phenomenon, it is necessary to 
return not only to Foucauldian governmentality, but also to Althusserian subjectivity as 
outlined in the first chapter, in order to understand how class-based stratification of 
subjects complicates the process of subjectivation. 
 
Governmentality and the subjectivation of individuals 
To reiterate the importance of the concept, governmentality is a type of power found in the 
ensemble of institutions and procedures, which takes the population as its object of power 
(Foucault, 1994). Governmentality refers to 
a historically specific economy of power – in which societies are ordered in a de-
centred way and wherein society’s members play a particularly active role in their 
own self-governance. In such societies there is a concern with both individuals and 
aggregates such as populations (Du Pont and Pearce, 2001: 125). 
 
It is historically specific in that Foucault notes a certain concern with the ‘art of 
government’ emerging as early as the sixteenth century: here, one finds a preoccupation 
with ‘the question of the government of oneself, that ritualization of the problem of 
CHAPTER FIVE  Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 135 
personal conduct which is characteristic of the sixteenth century Stoic revival’, alongside 
‘the government of souls and lives’, ‘the government of children and the great problematic 
of pedagogy’, as well as ‘the government of the state by the prince’, which mirrors the 
government of the family by the head of the household (1991: 87). This process, 
importantly, happens concurrently with the establishment of larger territorial, 
administrative, and colonial states, which renders salient the question of the government 
of a centralised state (ibid., 88). 
 Where the art of government originally took the family as its model of rule, 
however, the ‘discovery’ of the notion of a population in the eighteenth century as an entity 
with its own trends and regularities irreducible to those of the family as a basic unit 
‘derestricted’ the art of government (ibid., 99). The use of statistics to describe populations 
gradually reveals that population has its own regularities, its own rate of deaths and 
diseases, its cycles of scarcity etc.; statistics shows also that the domain of the 
population involves a range of intrinsic, aggregate effects, that are irreducible to 
those of the family, such as epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, ascending 
spirals of labour and wealth; lastly, it shows that, through its shifts, customs, 
activities, etc., population has specific economic effects (ibid.). 
 
Thus, for Foucault, central to the art of government is the introduction of economy into 
political practice – ‘economy’, of course, has taken on several meanings, beginning in the 
sixteenth century with the organisation and management of the home, and ranging into 
the eighteenth century as the state-wide organisation and use of wealth which is now 
commonly known as ‘the economy’ (ibid., 92). The art of government therefore concerns 
the introduction of the economy, ‘that is to say, the correct manner of managing of 
individuals, goods and wealth’ within the management of the state (ibid.). Consequently, 
as I have previously illustrated, power is exercised over a population through institutions 
in the broadest sense, including not only the business sector, schools or hospitals, but also 
the family, with political economy acting as the major source of knowledge about 
populations themselves (Foucault, 2007: 107). In each institutional domain, ‘one finds the 
deployment of distinctive modes of governance—all of which generate knowledge of 
subject populations in order to govern the “conduct of conduct”’, which in turn ‘creates 
the possibility that those human subjects who are so governed are well equipped to govern 
themselves’ (Du Pont and Pearce, 2001: 125). In short, the more that the population is the 
object of study of different structural organisations, each with their own forms of 
surveillance, the more knowledge is generated about the population as a whole. The upshot 
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is that certain behaviour is normalised and promoted, so that subjects begin to conduct 
themselves in a way which is deemed appropriate. 
 In this sense, subjectivation is the process through which subjects are closely tied to 
their identities as a result of self-knowledge acquired and developed in relation to these 
institutional domains (Foucault 1994). For example, borrowers know themselves to be 
either low- or high-risk borrowers on the basis of knowledge generated about them through 
credit histories and scoring, which ultimately culminates in their ability to get a certain 
type of loan, mortgage, or credit to fulfil a certain need in their daily lives. Subjectivation 
also involves, however, ‘subject[ing] to someone else by control and dependence’: 
borrowers’ activities, as has become apparent throughout the thesis so far, are heavily 
mediated by what they are permitted to do, especially in subprime markets where fees and 
interest rates constrain financial activity. Thus, according to Foucault, both meanings of 
the word ‘subjectivation’, or the creation of subjects, ‘suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to’ (1994: 130). 
 As a result, then, many struggles which contest the nature of subjectivity are not, as 
far as Foucault is concerned, large and organised forms of protest directed against a chief 
enemy, such as the upper, bourgeois classes as found in Marx, but struggles which are 
immediate to everyday life, including difficulties faced on a daily basis and those against 
constraints and forms of knowledge imposed on the individual as an autonomous figure 
and separate from all others. Here, Foucault deliberately contradicts the notion of working 
class revolution that had been prevalent within critical theory and in French intellectual 
circles up to 1968: political projects, he holds, were less likely to be directed at a class in 
the abstract sense, in an attempt to liberate another from widespread oppression, but were 
instead more likely to address different institutionalised rationalities in the absence of a 
generalised rationality. As Foucault insists, projects aimed at change 
must turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical. In fact, we know 
from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality 
so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, 
another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most 
dangerous traditions (1997b: 316). 
 
Foucault therefore locates the process of subjectivation and its associated struggles within 
the liberal project which has dominated modern politics, beginning in the eighteenth 
century with the entrenchment of the government of individuals. Here, ‘the participation 
of the governed in the formation of the law, in a parliamentary system, constitutes the most 
effective system of governmental economy’ (1997a: 77). 
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 What is crucial, here, is ‘the way in which specific problems of life and population 
were raised within a technology of government which, without always having been liberal 
[…] was always haunted since the end of the eighteenth century by liberalism’s question’ 
(ibid., 79), namely the ‘critique of the irrationality peculiar to “excessive government” and 
as a return to a technology of “frugal government”’ (ibid., 77). The emergence of American 
neoliberalism, which Wendy Brown calls ‘a peculiar form of reason that configures all 
aspects of existence in economic terms’ (2015: 17), is a drastic and contemporary example 
of this, concerned as it is with too many state interventions within the economy that would 
lead to bloated administration, bureaucracy, and a ‘rigidification of all the power 
mechanisms’ that would engender further intervention rather than self-sufficiency 
(Foucault, 1997a: 78). What is happening on a global scale is not simply ‘that markets and 
money are corrupting or degrading democracy, that political institutions are increasingly 
dominated by finance and corporate capital, or that democracy is being replaced by 
plutocracy’, but instead that neoliberalism, ‘ubiquitous today in statecraft and the 
workplace, in jurisprudence, education, culture, and a vast range of quotidian activity, is 
converting the distinctly political character […] of democracy’s constituent elements into 
economic ones’ (Brown, 2015: 17). While neoliberalism may not have invented 
governmentality itself, it ‘mobilizes its features’ by ‘set[ting] loose the individual to take 
care of itself’ while also ‘discursively bind[ing] the individual to the well-being of the whole 
– demanding its fealty and potential sacrifice to national health or economic growth’ (ibid., 
2016: 4). This is, perhaps, nowhere more evident than in a nation of borrowers whose debts 
are not simply their own, but are, through networks of finance, potentially detrimental for 
everyone and must be mediated through personal responsibility and vigilance. 
 
Structures, power relations, and differential capacities in subjectivation 
Foucault’s work on governmentality therefore provides a meticulous description of the 
processes that contribute to self-government, as expressed through personal responsibility 
for one’s present circumstances and future success. It is unsurprising, then, that it should 
serve as a theoretical underpinning to so many discussions of neoliberal subjectivity amidst 
the dissolution of the welfare state and the ascendance of finance capital. What is 
problematic, however, is that Foucault’s critique of individualisation does not, in itself, 
transcend a discussion of the individual, since he begins to downplay the role of the state 
and other hierarchies of institutions in his work on governmentality (Joseph, 2004). Thus, 
it is difficult to see how class-based stratification continues to operate through neoliberal 
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processes of subjectivation, in which subjects are fiercely individualised and responsibilised 
(Shamir, 2008) for their actions, their circumstances, and their futures, in spite of the fact 
that, as has become obvious throughout this thesis, 
individuals positioned in these relationships are provided with grossly differential 
capacities to formulate and realize their goals; and this is due to both the legal form 
and the economic assets that they possess. Most crudely, mainstream working-class 
men and women find themselves much more constrained in their economic 
activities than do corporate executives and shareholders. While the nation-state, 
partly through law, guarantees the conditions of existence of the corporate form, it 
also constitutes and reproduces the markets within which they operate, however 
‘free’ these are claimed to be (Du Pont and Pearce, 2001: 149). 
 
Without a grasp of overarching socioeconomic structures, in which specific actions, 
reactions and strategies are inscribed for reward or punishment, it is difficult to theorise 
the underlying mechanisms that give rise to new practices or changing circumstances. In 
short, it is difficult to understand how state policymakers can respond to the inability of 
precarious workers to save adequately for their retirement by implementing paternalistic 
auto-enrolment schemes; or how subprime products can be revoked as a result of borrowers 
behaving contrary to expectations of responsibility and self-sufficiency, especially in the 
absence of a population for comparison which includes others of similar economic 
dispositions. What tends to be downplayed, then, are the very ‘discontinuities, historic 
losses, interruptions, displacements, breaks, ruptures, mutations’ (ibid., 134) that Foucault 
is eager to advance in rejecting the Marxist notion of historical and subjective development 
according to an unfolding of a logic of history. To address this, I turn to the concept of 
‘overdetermination’ as formulated by Foucault’s mentor, Louis Althusser, in order to 
understand how the notion of class continues to stratify subjects in spite of 
individualisation, leading to interruptions and mutations of the neoliberal project of 
subjectivity itself. 
 Overdetermination, in the Althusserian, tradition refers to the ‘accumulation of 
contradictions’, or elements of the social structure, that ‘merge into a ruptural unity’, 
thereby forming an overarching contradiction with transformative power (1969: 100 – 
101). Simply put, the build-up of many contradictory elements within the social structure 
condenses into a larger social problem, which is destabilising and therefore requires a 
resolution, which may take the form of political and social transformation. The elements 
of transformation are therefore innately bound up with the social structure that originated 
them, which is why, despite Foucault’s never referencing overdetermination, Catherine 
Chaput finds it complementary to elements of governmentality as they are later developed, 
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such as the ‘notion that multiple governing arts “overlap, lean on each other, challenge 
each other, and struggle with each other”’ (Foucault, cited in Chaput, 2010: 7). This means 
that, although Foucault omits the study of social structure and hierarchies in his own work, 
it is still possible to include these elements in the study of self-governing individuals. In the 
next section, I will outline the notion of overdetermination by class more concretely. 
 
Althusser and Foucault on the process of subjectivation 
Both Althusser and Foucault share a theoretical concern with the formation of the 
individual, not as something given on which the rest of society is founded, but as produced 
through a set of procedures and initiatives within society (Montag, 1995). In the liberal 
tradition, intentions and ‘acts of will’ originate from within ourselves as sovereign 
individuals, which is the basis of our political order founded in consent and democracy. 
Yet, for both Althusser and Foucault, according to Warren Montag, the notion of an 
interior origin is problematic, since interiority is an extension of our exteriority, which is 
to say, of our actions (ibid., 70). Thus the 
‘ideas’ of a human subject exist in his [sic] actions, and if this is not the case, it lends 
him other ideas corresponding to the actions (however perverse) that he does 
perform. […] [T]hese practices are governed by rituals in which these practices are 
inscribed, within the material existence of an ideological apparatus, be it only a 
small part of that apparatus (Althusser, 1971: 170). 
 
Ideology, which is not a set of beliefs and ideas in Althusser’s view, but rather a set of 
apparatuses corresponding to the liberal notion of ‘civil society’ including the family, 
schools, churches, employment, politics and so on, is responsible for the subjectivation of 
individuals by calling upon, or ‘interpellating’ them as individuals with free will and 
intention. The ‘individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit 
freely to the commandments of the subject […] i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures 
and actions of his subjection “all by himself”’ (ibid., 182). Subjects are therefore able to 
internalise externalities as integral to their very being, insofar as ideological apparatuses 
have ‘inculcated children and adults with specific ways of imagining—thinking and 
understanding—their places within and relationships to the societies in which they lived’ 
(Wolff, 2005: 225). In short, ideological apparatuses ‘do more than create 
subjectivities/identities in the individuals whom they interpellate. They also aim to have 
such subjects imagine their subjectivities/identities are internally self-generated’ (ibid., 
226). 
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 This kind of formulation of subjectivity is very much like Foucault’s interest ‘in 
what is at stake in any form of [subjectivation]: the body, the body that works and whose 
power produces value, the body that obeys by acting or refraining from action’ (Montag, 
1995: 71). Despite his turn toward ‘discourses’ stemming from their material surroundings 
in contrast to the use of the loaded term ‘ideology’, Foucault can be understood to have 
written a history of ideas that cannot be separated from the physical, material 
practices in which they are (always already) realized. This […] would appear to be 
what is truly scandalous about his work: his refusal to regard the history of 
psychiatry, medicine, or criminology apart from their institutional forms, namely, 
the asylum, the hospital, and the prison, the forms of ordering and distribution of 
bodies in space in which these knowledges participate (ibid., 73). 
 
Thus for Foucault, as for Althusser, subjects and the institutions that surround them are 
inseparable, as no subject ‘preexist[s] his or her interpellation as a subject but emerges as a 
result of the strategies and practices of individualization’ (ibid., 75; Althusser, 1971: 176). 
The exact nature of subjectivity is therefore highly related to the social entities that 
contextualise its emergence, as is the case in a critical realist understanding of the social 
world. While Althusser considers that subjects work ‘all by themselves’, it is Foucault who 
gives the self-governing subject considerable attention in the specific liberal institutions that 
give rise to governmentality, as I have already shown. But, given that this schema of 
subjectivity appears to leave little room for uncertainty and transformation, it is necessary 
to incorporate overdetermination within the analysis: Althusser was, after all, committed 
to a ‘Marxist program for cultural studies and struggles that would intervene in all 
[ideological apparatuses]’ (Wolff, 2005: 226). A determinism that leaves little room for 
change caused by contingent or unforeseen occurrences would be unacceptable. 
 Althusser’s aim is not to suggest that subjects are entirely determined in their actions 
by external forces, but rather to decentre the notion of the autonomous individual as a 
precursor to society itself—an individual who, crucially, possesses rationality, free will, 
and a desire for choice. Every epoch, he maintains, is composed of different classes, in 
which particular individuals are ‘fashioned in their individuality by their conditions of life, 
of work, of exploitation and of struggle’ (1976: 53). They are therefore ‘overdetermined’ 
by class (1969) in the sense that the class which an individual belongs to influences their 
life chances, habits, preoccupations, employment, and so on, although Althusser 
acknowledges this is not the only cause of such variables since there may be ‘multiple 
sources of determination that converge on a single result’ (Smith, 1984: 520). These can 
include, for example, age, gender, or ethnicity as other determinants which combine to 
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produce certain social conditions alongside class, although Althusser emphasises the 
importance of class in such analyses because it explains how individuals and households 
make ends meet, and therefore reproduce their own household structures: in short, class is 
a condition of possibility of how individuals are able to sustain themselves, in addition to 
contributing to another possibility, the inability to make ends meet. Overdetermination 
therefore enables the analysis of structure and inequality within a social formation, as the 
basis for understanding the origins of struggle and discontinuity within historical 
narratives. It also enables us to think of subjectivity as a process in which subjects are not 
‘fixed and stable groupings’, but are constituted and reconstituted on the basis of discursive 
and institutional changes (Kayatekin and Ruccio, 1998: 88). In short, then, subjectivity 
that is overdetermined by class makes possible the study of inequality within society, as 
well as the possibility for disruption and the potential for change. 
 
Financial subjectivity as an overdetermined social process 
To return to the original argument of this chapter, I contend that financial subjectivity is 
overdetermined by class, as evidenced by three prominent contradictions that complicate 
the process of subjectivation but are nonetheless intrinsic to financialisation itself. The first 
two of these, which were elaborated in the fourth chapter, include the problematic 
assumption of borrowers as unitary subjects, or someone who has only financial interests 
to think about rather than employment concerns and a home life; the second is that 
financial subjectivity turns on the notion of financial self-discipline, although this is 
complicated by the fact that the precariat typically have fewer assets than their higher class 
counterparts, making consistent saving more difficult. The third contradiction, as I alluded 
to at the beginning of this chapter, is very much related to the second insofar as the 
precarious working class have recognised the usefulness of borrowing in daily life and 
embraced it as a way to make ends meet, to the detriment of being able to internalise similar 
attitudes about saving and investing. Each of these contradictions concerns, at some level, 
the hindrance of using finance in daily life as a result of income and employment situations, 
thereby relating each one to the ability to make ends meet and reproduce the structure of 
the household (cf. Althusser, 1971). This means that financialisation is not a given, singular 
phenomenon with specific effects, such as producing subjects who are necessarily self-
governing in all facets of life, but rather that it has different effects depending on the 
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material circumstances of individuals and their households.1 Hence, for some lower 
income working households, saving and borrowing may be complicated – in spite of the 
responsible handling of household finances – by employment or family concerns that can 
be more easily mitigated by those who possess more assets and savings (Orton, 2007). This 
leaves them in a position of having to find other ways to cope or struggle with finances, in 
ways that differ from the typical tenets of financial subjectivity, but include activity that is 
still nonetheless particular to the financialised growth period. Put another way, although 
these financial subjects may not conform to the expectations regarding saving and 
borrowing, their coping mechanisms, such as, for example, putting away less money into 
a defined contribution pension plan for retirement or taking out another high interest rate 
‘pre-approved’ credit card to manage existing debt, are still informed by financialisation. 
 Following Kayatekin and Ruccio (1998), it is important not to view entrepreneurial 
subjects as ‘”objects” of [finance] insofar as processes are exerted upon them’, but instead 
as subjects of finance, which ‘involves the “creation” of subjects who interpret the world 
in the same way’ (ibid., 80). In the former view, subjectivity is simply determined by 
finance, which would make it difficult to understand how a subject could deviate from 
norms, habits and expectations associated with financial subjectivity: ‘Here, not only is 
there no space for the “creation” of [finance] by its interpreters, but the subjects, in 
whatever form and whatever number, appear as mere “recipients” of processes’ (ibid.) so 
that they have no influence over the process of the financialisation of daily life at all. In 
contrast, the latter view holds that subjects share the same frames of reference, but handle 
such expectations with whatever resources they have to do so. They are therefore active 
participants in the process of financialisation, guided by an understanding that their 
everyday conditions are related to a larger process, if not an understanding of that process 
itself. Kayatekin and Ruccio suggest, as a result, that it is necessary to comprehend ‘the 
possible politics of transformation’ derived from such varied forms of subjectivity, where 
transformation suggests that subjects ‘at least offer resistance to unconditional conquest if 
not a set of alternative projects of making and doing. What, then, are the sources of this 
resistance?’ (ibid., 81 – 82). I contend that the turn toward libertarian paternalism and the 
regulation of choice, or the financial exclusion of working class households from financial 
services and the call for financial reform, represent responses to forms of  precarious 
                                                        
1 Hence, in critical realist terms, underlying structural entities possess generative mechanisms or causal 
powers that effect change in individuals (Joseph, 2004; Sayer, 2012). Here, the kind of subjects that are 
produced is a question of which of many real possibilities will be actualised, based on structural limitations 
related to income and employment that are already in place.  
CHAPTER FIVE  Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 143 
working class struggle within the process of financialisation. This may not constitute 
political resistance so much as it does a daily struggle, but it nonetheless illustrates how 
policymakers have had to respond to action on the part of working households with a new 
set of ideas and policies. Thus, as I have shown, subjectivity is an overdetermined social 
process rather than a series of fixed roles (ibid., 88), with class largely overdetermining the 
success or failure of subjects in the case of finance. I now explore the ways in which 
financial subjectivity is shifting in relation to the struggles with saving and borrowing 
outlined in the fourth chapter. 
 
Libertarian paternalism and ‘neoliberal’ freedom and choice 
Failure to invest and save for the future has led to concerns about the security of working 
households in their retirement, so that policymakers inspired by Thaler and Sunstein’s 
‘libertarian paternalism’ (2008) have introduced a range of measures, such as opt-out rather 
than opt-in pension clauses, designed to ‘reconcile the preservation of personal freedom of 
choice, while supporting the establishment of a more caring and supportive government’ 
(Pykett, Jones, Whitehead, Huxley, Strauss, Gill, McGeevor, Thompson and Newman, 
2011: 301). In short, government policymakers are responding to the inability or 
unwillingness of the working class to ‘opt in’ to investing in pensions by automatically 
enrolling workers who are subsequently given the choice to opt out later if they have the 
time and inclination to familiarise themselves with their pension plans and their alternative 
options. The assumption is, then, that workers without sufficient knowledge and 
understanding of pensions and finance markets will benefit from ‘choice architectures’, 
where ‘[e]nvironments are specifically designed to preserve personal choice whilst 
overcoming the varied sociopsychological barriers that prevent people from acting in their 
own (and others) best interests’, including cognitive biases and a lack of understanding that 
contributes to apathy in investment (ibid.). 
 This shift, as Kendra Strauss argues, is not so much indicative of the failure of 
neoliberal processes of subjectivation, in favour of more regulation and involvement in 
subjects’ lives, so much as it represents a reconfiguration of policy designed to once again 
promote freedom of choice where previous attempts had faltered (ibid., 304). As Wendy 
Brown suggests, the neoliberal state is indeed active, rather than absent, in the 
configuration of ‘all aspects of existence in economic terms’ (2015: 17), so that its 
involvement in promoting freedom of choice through structured spaces and policy is hardly 
surprising. As Strauss maintains, 
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Arguments in favour of libertarian paternalist policies have arisen in the specific 
context of pensions policy as the evidence of ‘irrational’ decision making and 
cognitive biases has mounted […]. Rather than interpreting these signals as 
evidence that pension plan members are expressing a clear preference for less 
choice, less risk, and more security, the mainstream response has been to reform 
the ‘choice architecture’ that frames the decisions plan members are expected to 
make (Pykett et al., 2011: 304). 
 
Libertarian paternalism, targeting as it does the behaviour of subjects through the 
institution of mechanisms to encourage responsible choice, nonetheless operates in a 
climate of financial risk rather than adding any greater security. Occupational pensions, as 
a major source of retirement income for Britons, continue to shift in the direction of defined 
contribution schemes and away from defined benefit packages, as 53 percent of pension 
schemes established after 2000 were defined contribution, while prior to 1980 only 5 
percent of pension schemes were. The Office of National Statistics attributes this shift to 
the Social Security Act of 1986, couple with the expanding capacities of financial markets 
in making defined contribution plans possible. Meanwhile, defined benefit plans, 
representing significantly less risk for employees whose contributions are matched by their 
employers, have been reduced since 2000 (2013: 7). Libertarian paternalism is therefore 
another way of instituting the kind of choice earlier envisaged by Thatcherite and New 
Labour policymakers, rather than a response to disaffection as a kind of choice in itself for 
less risk and greater security. In this way, libertarian paternalism ‘is a permutation of 
attempts to “conduct the conducts” of those who are considered to be capable of exercising 
liberal autonomy, but who need assistance or training in the “correct” exercise of that 
capacity’ (Pykett et al., 2011: 304). 
 Consequently, in spite of concerns that libertarian paternalism represents an 
encroachment on the individual freedoms promoted by neoliberalism, the idea that 
freedom of choice is actually produced within the process of subjectivation itself 
(Althusser, 1971; Foucault, 2008) is noticeable to the extent that choice must be actively 
encouraged, whether by removing alternative welfare state provisions, or by redesigning 
enrolment options to ensure the correct choices are made. As Foucault has it, 
Freedom in the regime of liberalism is not a given, it is not a ready-made region 
which has to be respected […] Freedom is something that is constantly produced. 
Liberalism is not an acceptance of freedom; it proposes to manufacture it 
constantly, to arouse it and produce it, with of course [the] constraints and the 
problems of cost raised by this production (2008: 65; cf. Pykett et al., 2011: 303). 
 
Similarly for Althusser, individuals are interpellated as ‘free’ subjects, meaning that they 
are shaped within ideological apparatuses to consider themselves something very different 
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from oversocialised subjects – namely, independent and autonomous subjects whose 
sovereignty is derived from their inherent rights as an individual (1971: 182). Libertarian 
paternalism, then, is more accurately indicative of a shift in the means for promoting 
choice and ensuring individual freedom than it is an encroachment of financial 
subjectivity. Its major difference is a change in discourse which highlights tensions 
‘between governing too much – through rules, regulations, disciplines and punishments; 
and governing too little – with the risk that economic processes, social relations, and 
individual behaviours will fail to operate in dynamic equilibrium’ (Pykett et al., 2011: 303). 
In the terms of the regulation school, libertarian paternalism represents yet another 
institutional fix which is meant to smooth out the destabilising tendencies associated with 
precarious working-class apathy toward investment or difficulty in saving, in order to 
address limited savings without instituting a ‘collectivist’ welfare state approach.2 In this 
way, the struggles of the precariat, set within the structural organisations, institutions, and 
discourses of financial subjectivity, have effected a structural change in the orientation of 
policymakers toward understanding freedom of choice. While it does not indicate a 
wholesale return to safe risk-averse models, the rise of libertarian paternalism is indicative 
of the effects of everyday activity on the change of social structures. 
 
Financial exclusion, overindebtedness, and reform 
To say that the daily struggles of the precarious working class in dealing with debt have 
created a certain amount of financial exclusion is fairly straightforward in itself, given the 
‘flight to quality’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995; Wainwright, 2009) that followed in the wake 
of the UK credit crunch, through credit rationing and the withdrawal of subprime products 
(Wainwright, 2009). Yet, as Georges Gloukoviezoff maintains, financial exclusion has not 
altogether eradicated overindebtedness among those on a low income, but has instead 
exacerbated it: for Gloukoviezoff, financial exclusion is not just the inability to access 
financial services and products, but also includes the social problems and consequences 
                                                        
2 For Thaler and Sunstein (2008), libertarian paternalism is meant to represent a true ‘Third Way’ between 
left- and right-wing politics, in the institution of a more responsible state that nonetheless respects and 
cultivates individual rights and freedoms. For Pykett et al., this kind of paternalism is still inherently political 
despite its presentation as nonpartisan, given that ‘it has been used to justify a smaller government 
(particularly in the UK) […]. It is also political in that whatever ideological direction it has taken, it suggests 
a strategic restructuring of bureaucratic knowledges, practices, and techniques of government. Libertarian 
paternalism redefines the traditional modes of legitimate state intervention within the details of personal life, 
and targets the collective subconscious of populations’ (2011: 301 – 302). 
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that stem from this, such as incurring debt as a result of a reliance on alternative sources of 
finance like payday loans and pre-approved credit (2006; cf. Centre for Social Justice, 
2015). As one debt charity points out, in the absence of 
financial services and types of loans specifically aimed to cover their needs, 
increasingly, desperate families turn to alternative methods for obtaining the cash 
they need to ‘tide them over’ until the end of the month. In many cases, the 
alternative, such as doorstop loans can quickly plunge borrowers into a worse, 
catastrophic hole as the arrears pile up and they are further away than ever to getting 
out of debt. (DebtLegal, 2015). 
 
Those who are indebted predominantly or entirely because of arrears comprise 8.4 percent 
of the adult population in the United Kingdom as of 2014 (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
2015), but these individuals and households are overwhelmingly in low- or unskilled work, 
at 72 percent (Office of National Statistics, 2016). The use of financial services to cover 
basic daily costs is indeed becoming more prevalent with limited support for government 
benefits affecting those in the lowest income bracket. With a modest 1.8 percent increase 
on the minimum wage and 1.5 percent on average earnings in 2014, a study by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation finds there is certainly a ‘growing gap between the costs faced by 
families and their incomes’; further, ‘[m]aking ends meet is harder still for people who rely 
on benefits and tax credits. In 2013, for the first time since the 1930s, safety net benefits 
did not rise in line with inflation. Instead, most benefits and tax credits were only uprated 
by 1 percent’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2015b). High costs of living have additionally 
driven low-income households out of the housing market and into an increasingly 
expanding private renting sector, as social housing has decreased in availability and thus 
as an option. But the upshot is a simultaneous increase in low-income renters, from 74 
percent in the mid-1990s to 90 percent in the mid-2010s, whose housing benefit is 
insufficient to cover the costs of rent (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017: 3). The turn to 
doorstop loans by households in precarious positions, through unemployment, or as single 
parent units, or for lacking other savings and assets (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017) 
is thus unsurprising and indeed in keeping with the adoption of risky forms of behaviour 
as a function of subjectivation, as social safety nets and welfare provisions are reduced. 
 The weight of the contradictions of financial subjectivity – that is, the expectation 
of unitary subjects driven by financial concerns and interests without personal 
circumstances to worry about; the expectation of self-discipline with fewer assets or savings 
to draw upon; and the need to borrow for the present at the expense of saving for the future 
– are perhaps most noticeable in the volatility of the housing market, where the cost of 
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living from day to day can offset or indeed diminish most of the returns a house may have 
brought for precarious buyers as an investment (Pryce and Sprigings, 2009). Across the 
population in general, there is a fairly even distribution of mortgage-holders, savers, and 
renters when examining living costs: as of 2014, 33 percent of homeowners had a 
mortgage, while 30 percent could buy their house from income and savings alone. 29 
percent were renters, either in the private sector or social housing (Office of National 
Statistics, 2016). When income is accounted for, however, housing is polarised far more 
between renters and borrowers, in contrast to comparatively fewer buyers who can afford 
to purchase from their own savings. Among those with annual incomes of £15,000 - 
£30,000, 41 percent held mortgages, and 40 percent rented, with 24 percent renting in the 
private sector and 16 percent in social housing. Only 19 percent were able to use savings 
alone (Alakeson and Cory, 2013). Those on even lower incomes are more likely to be 
renters in general (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017).  
A key factor in gauging the wellbeing and sustainability of low-income 
homeowners is the cost of living associated with the upkeep of their investment. Thus, half 
of all households in poverty are homeowners, amounting to nearly 2 million households. 
According to a study by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, despite the associations of 
homeownership with prosperity and the significant reduction in poverty among 
homeowners over time, this is less often the case for mortgaged households: ‘For these, 
housing cost meant that rates of poverty were higher in 2013/14 than prior to the financial 
crisis, despite low interest rates’ (2018: 1). Although impoverished homeowners exist who 
own their homes outright, they are predominantly retired couples and singles, while 
middle-aged households with children are often mortgaged. Combined with the fact that 
the greatest risks of poverty associated with homeownership includes ‘self-employment, 
routine occupations or part-time work, those who have taken out an additional mortgage 
[and] lone parents’ (ibid.), precarious workers are less likely to be prosperous households 
even if they are able to purchase a home. Indeed, ‘[h]ome-owners in poverty were twice as 
likely to report arrears (14 %) than other mortgaged households (7 %) [not in poverty], and 
were overwhelmingly led by someone in work. Those in work are excluded from the 
current system of mortgage safety nets’ (ibid.). The age of occupation is also growing, with 
57 percent of adults aged 25 living in rented accommodation up from 34 percent 40 years 
earlier (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017: 5), so that younger households are missing out 
on accumulating housing wealth earlier on in life. But even for those mortgaged investors 
on low incomes, the benefits are reduced: ‘equity withdrawal […] represents a greater risk 
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to lower-income households as it increases the risk of repossession. The uneven 
distribution of housing wealth and the capacity to use it therefore makes an asset-based 
welfare system a challenge’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2018: 2). The financial reality 
for precarious households is thus overdetermined by the complications of low income or 
unstable employment, which reduce even the benefits of property investment relative to 
the higher classes, as mortgage payments are harder to make and the cost of upkeep may 
lead to states of disrepair (ibid.). Financial exclusion, in encompassing the social issues 
associated with inadequate access to financial services, is thus not solely about redlining 
or rejection of credit, loan, and mortgage applications, but about the mismatch between 
the services available to the people who need them. 
Gloukoviezoff distinguishes the degree of financial exclusion faced by households 
on the basis of their issues with access to, or use of financial services. Access-based 
exclusion means, straightforwardly, that applicants are restricted in their access to financial 
services and products on the basis of risk assessment, such as in the case of high-risk 
applicants and traditional banking and finance services. In addition to gaining access, 
however, is the use of such services, which is problematised through four additional lenses. 
These include ‘condition exclusion’, in which ‘the conditions attached to financial 
products make them inappropriate for the needs of some people’; ‘price exclusion’, 
whereby ‘some people can only gain access to financial products at prices they cannot 
afford’; ‘marketing exclusion’, which sees ‘some people […] excluded by targeting 
marketing and sales’; and ‘self-exclusion’, where ‘people may decide that there is little 
point applying for a financial product because they believe they would be refused’ 
(Financial Services Authority, cited in Gloukoviezoff, 2006: 3). For Gloukoviezoff, then, 
the study of financial exclusion includes not only access difficulties, but also use 
difficulties, or ‘the mismatch between […] the characteristics of financial services and the 
needs of people’ (Gloukoviezoff, 2006: 3). Taken together, access and use exclusion 
contribute to forms of social exclusion, given how highly intertwined financial services and 
products are with household finances, so that overindebtedness on the part of precarious 
working households represents a social problem erupting out of their financial exclusion 
from traditional financial channels such as banks and building societies. 
 Gloukoviezoff has thus advocated for the reform of banking services as a way to 
counter financial exclusion, in terms of both the quantity and quality of services provided. 
In wondering whether it is ‘possible to entrust these services to establishments that are only 
governed by market forces’, he suggests the need for new forms of financial regulation 
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allowing for both ‘competitive freedom and social necessity’ (ibid., 22). This notion is 
framed within a broader literature of ‘financial citizenship’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995), 
which would put ‘pressure on states to reform their financial systems so that they include 
rather than exclude’, as well as ‘putting pressure on financial system to realize that they 
have some state-like responsibilities which reach beyond consumer sovereignty into basic 
human rights’ (ibid., 336). After all, 
Traditional states are, amongst other things, about boundaries […] States have an 
‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, a ‘here’ and a ‘there’; they have citizens (on the inside) 
and non-citizens (on the outside). Contemporary financial systems also have these 
characteristics. They draw borders which are difficult to transgress and which are 
currently being rolled up (ibid.). 
 
The call for reform is, then, indicative of the need to remedy the exclusion faced by 
precarious working households as a result of their struggles with traditional sources of 
finance, and the situation of overindebtedness which has resulted from this. Additionally, 
more suitable financial services could potentially help with investment and saving, as 
financially secure households are more likely to save and invest money than those with 
exorbitant debts. 
 As Mark Kear maintains, however, the return to a discourse of citizenship, 
inclusion, and regulation is not necessarily a return to the ideals of the welfare state because 
the financial system ultimately ‘possesses a pseudo-natural logic of its own, which imposes 
very real constraints on the “state-like” responsibilities the financial system can shoulder, 
and on the “rights” it is agile enough to confer’ (2012: 936). It is not possible, for example, 
to make credit universally accessible through the forbidding of risk pricing, given that one 
of the causes of the 2007 – 2009 crisis was the inability of financial models to accurately 
price risk in the first place, leading to drastic consequences. This, for Kear, ‘creates a 
quandary: despite the want of a kinder, gentler financial system, efforts to bring such a 
system to fruition through citizenship, inclusion, and rights may threaten the integrity of 
financial institutions, as well as the broader economy’ (ibid.). In addition, the discussion 
of rights implies the simultaneous shouldering of responsibilities which, in the context of 
financial subjectivity, renders ‘the financial citizen […] less the claimant of inalienable 
rights and more the addressee of an interpellative hailing to take responsibility for their 
financial illiteracy and to pathologize their financial marginality as a form of neurosis to 
be diagnosed and treated by financial councilors and coaches’ (ibid., 937). Hence, calls for 
reform and financial citizenship still fall within the process of subjectivation, involving the 
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‘subtle coercion which encourages individuals to produce themselves as financially 
governable subjects’ (ibid.). 
 
The transformation of financial subjectivity 
The foregoing has illustrated the extent to which financial subjectivity, as the experience 
of finance on a daily basis, has been in flux and in question since the 2007 – 2009 financial 
crisis. It is therefore hardly surprising that commentators wonder if financial subjectivity 
(Clark et al., 2012), and indeed financialisation (Krippner, 2011) are on the wane, as 
governments, policymakers, and even financial institutions take a greater interest in the 
level of risk individuals pose to themselves and society as a whole. However, Kear suggests 
that financialisation is such a multifaceted process, affecting everything from global trade 
to household decisions, that it is ‘capable of adapting and finding many forms of expression 
as it seeps into the “nooks and crannies of social life”. Moreover, it is unlikely that today’s 
expressions of financialization exhaust the process’s evolutionary potential’ (2012: 927). 
Thus ‘the more important question is not whether financialization is “coming to a close” 
but how and why which branches of financialization’s family tree terminate, persist and 
mutate’ (ibid.). 
 What seems crucial to address, then, is the manner in which so many contradictions 
that seem detrimental to financial subjectivity manifest themselves – for instance, those on 
low incomes borrow, but do not invest and save; furthermore, as a result of borrowing, it 
is difficult to accumulate assets that may help provide some financial stability. Finally, 
such borrowers cannot live up to the expectations of the ‘unitary subject’ with only 
financial concerns to think about and plan for, because they have other obligations, from 
work or home life, to think about. In short, the interpellation of the financial subject is 
complicated by concerns relating to employment and income, as expressed through class: 
although subjects are constituted as individuals who are supposed to be self-reliant, they 
are hindered in doing this owing to constraints arising out of their inability to make ends 
meet. Their chances as financial subjects are thus overdetermined by their class. It is 
necessary to remember this form of stratification in thinking about subjectivity, in order to 
understand how subjects engage with finance in particular ways specific to their own 
circumstances, rather than in some kind of universalised way that is applicable to all. This 
variation, in which more regulation and intervention into the management of household 
finances is proposed, therefore represents a specifically precarious working-class 
experience of finance relative to other classes which are known to save, invest, and borrow 
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within their means. Crucially, however, calls for reform and regulation still engage with 
the realm of finance, to the extent that they envisage a reformed subject who will eventually 
learn to borrow responsibly or who will invest as a result of reconfigured ‘choice 
architectures’, so that discourses have not shifted from finance at all in spite of concerns of 
its disappearance. It is therefore not altogether clear that financialisation, and financial 
subjectivity, are on the decline just yet, so much as they are changing. 
In light of this theoretical development, which is made possible by thinking about 
the way in which class differentiates groups of people through access to resources rather 
than attributing to them an abstract ‘individualistic’ identity, future research could then 
parse out the breadth of experience in the precariat and their responses to financialisation. 
After all, what constitutes the ‘working class’ in contemporary Britain is now marked less 
by shared experiences of similar types of work than it is by a sense of precariousness over 
the stability of jobs and wages. For Guy Standing, the precariat are distinguished by 
particular ‘relations of production’, meaning they are engaged in ‘unstable labor’ such as 
contract or part-time work, or working a series of temporary jobs (2014: 10). They are 
additionally characterised by ‘distinctive relations of distribution’, as a group that relies 
largely on money wages in the absence of benefits like pensions and paid time off (ibid.). 
As I have indicated in this thesis, these characteristics complicate financial planning. 
However, the diversity of the households who fall into the precarious working class mean 
they may have different attitudes, perceptions and experiences. Standing suggests that 
three notable ‘factions’ exist within the precarious working class. The first ‘consists of those 
who have fallen into the precariat from old working-class families or communities’ (ibid., 
11), who are without high levels of education but were once employed in industries which 
provided job security and benefits. A second group is made up of ‘migrants and ethnic 
minorities who feel they are denied a sense of home’ while the third group comprises a 
younger, increasingly well-educated generation ‘experience[ing] relative deprivation by 
being denied a future, an attractive way of building a life of dignity and fulfilment’ (ibid.). 
The range of experience of risk and deprivation will undoubtedly lead to varying 
perceptions of difficulties associated with the spread of finance.  
Despite a shared frustration over limited resources, precarious households may 
have vastly different access to help and support from family, friends, and the state, 
facilitating varying, rather than consistent, responses to their situations. Those who have 
had access to education may, for instance, come from families with more financial 
resources to help in case of shortfall, while immigrant households could have nothing to 
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tide them over in case of contingency due to delays associated with residency requirements 
or complicated registration processes associated with state benefits. Generational 
differences between older workers who were able to purchase houses and have benefitted 
from equity undoubtedly shape perceptions of what should be possible when compared 
with a younger age group which might barely be able to afford rent. In this sense, cultural 
response to financial scarcity or crisis is inevitably also shaped by discourses emerging from 
within distinct groups, where, for example, traditionally working-class households may 
adopt a right-wing populism that promises a return to past prosperity (which might include 
reducing the perceived threat of immigration), while young educated employees who feel 
overqualified for their employment may consider, in contrast, how current circumstances 
could be made to benefit society as a whole in the future (ibid.).  
The way in which debt is accumulated and the degree of financial engagement will 
thus also vary, with some households adopting high-risk strategies as a conscious decision 
through their education, while others may do so out of ignorance of financial risk and 
markets. Low-risk approaches may be deliberately sought by groups traditionally 
associated with risk-aversion, such as women, and those simply seeking an easier type of 
lifestyle to manage. As such, it is not necessarily the case that attitudes to the accumulation 
of debt and the means of doing so, whether through credit and loans or as a mortgage 
meant to finance an asset, will be uniform throughout precarious working households, 
even if they are generally more likely to find themselves in situations constrained by 
financial limitations. Future research might therefore further differentiate the experiences 
of financial subjectivity beyond the notion of an individual of largely middle-class means 
suggested in some current work on everyday finance, in order to understand the full effect 
of socioeconomic positions on saving and borrowing. Having an understanding of class as 
overdetermining experience does, however, provide a theoretical framework for 
understanding the many facets of financial subjectivity, since it locates groups and 
individuals in relation to production and distribution in order to theorise what limits or 
enables them beyond their characteristics as an individual. Consequently, it is possible to 
fully flesh out what it means to be a financial subject, rather than limiting its definition to 
the financial planning associated with the middle-class individual who enjoys some 
employment and income stability. 
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Conclusion 
Precarious working-class engagement with finance is a particular kind of encounter with 
investment and borrowing, given a set of structural limitations associated with 
employment, income and savings, as well as home life that render the process of 
subjectivation an ‘incomplete’ one (Langley, 2007). So far, however, much of the focus has 
been on processes of financialisation in general, the growing power of elite financial 
classes, or middle class saving (Kear, 2012). This chapter has therefore sought to address 
the ‘[c]omparatively little attention [that] has been paid by critical financialization scholars 
to the ways in which financialization may or may not be affecting class processes at the 
lower end of the income distribution’ (ibid., 943) by insisting on class as overdetermining 
the process of subjectivation. In order to do this, I have invoked not only the work of 
Foucault, with his concern for the individualising effects of governed conduct, but also that 
of his intellectual predecessor and mentor, Althusser, whose focus on class helps to 
illustrate how individualising processes are still inherently unequal and stratified. This 
helps to answer a crucial question raised in the fourth chapter, with the realisation that 
low-income working households are borrowing beyond their means and saving little, if 
anything, which is namely whether processes of subjectivation still produce entrepreneurial 
subjects who embrace risk. 
 I have argued here that libertarian paternalism and over-indebted financial 
exclusion do not represent the end of financial subjectivity, so much as they do particular 
forms relative to the engagement of the working class with finance. Indeed, libertarian 
paternalism simply makes more obvious the role of the state in producing choice. Where 
the Thatcher government had previously encouraged choice among products by fostering 
private pension plans at the expense of maintaining welfare state provision, so libertarian 
paternalism cultivates choice by providing a range of options which pension plan 
participants must opt out of rather than in to in an attempt to keep individual interests in 
mind without infringing on their right to decide altogether. Where financial exclusion is 
concerned, the level of risk low-income households are willing to adopt is fairly obvious, 
given their necessary reliance on alternative sources of finance such as payday loans. 
Unsurprisingly, calls for reform have stressed financial inclusion and the need for user-
friendly products geared toward those on low incomes or with precarious employment. 
This, however, raises questions as to how precarious working households can avoid being 
held responsible for their situations as they pursue courses of financial literacy aimed at 
drawing them in from the margins of finance. In both the realm of saving and investing 
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and that of borrowing, the solutions to their respective problems still lie squarely in the 
field of finance, in asking how financial services and provisions can be made more inclusive 
for the financially-excluded. This means, then, that financial subjectivity is not so much on 
the wane as it means that the precarious working-class experience of financial 
subjectivation is subject to more scrutiny than that of the middle and higher classes as a 
result of inequality and stratification. With this development in mind, is it possible to move 
beyond the idea of the financial subject as a purely financially-stable individual, to think 
about all of the ways in which the logic of finance operates in daily life, through the 
diversity of experiences of those in a differentiated precarious working class.  
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Conclusion 
 
The financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 has brought the concept of financialisation, and the 
levels of inequality associated with it, to the fore of discussions on social stability and 
stratification. It has highlighted the individualistic nature of contemporary social relations, 
while simultaneously illustrating the extent to which individual decisions and actions, such 
as defaulting on loans or credit, nonetheless affect the stability of capital accumulation and 
social cohesion. It has, furthermore, exemplified the encompassing nature of 
financialisation, which occurs not only at the level of firms and banks, but also among 
individuals and households in their daily lives. Financialisation, after all, involves the 
creation of tradeable assets from a cycle of monthly repayments on loans, mortgages, and 
credit (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007), so that financial institutions are able to mobilise ‘idle 
money from across social classes’ as loanable capital (Lapavitsas, 2011: 615). It comes as 
little surprise, however, that those with high levels of debt and low levels of saving, 
investment, and assets are particularly affected by the financialisation of household 
income. The notion of class is therefore pertinent to these discussions, in spite of assertions 
about individualisation as detaching people from traditional social structures to fend for 
themselves (e.g., Bauman, 2001; Giddens, 1991). 
 The notion of a self-sufficient individual who has learnt to monitor their conduct 
and, effectively, governs themselves, has been widely taken up to understand the successive 
incorporation of greater risk and uncertainty into daily life, as a result of Foucault’s studies 
on the neoliberal condition (Foucault, 2007; 2008). Thus, in contrast to the idea of a subject 
as an individual with a distinct identity and personal preferences that drive them to 
maximise personal utility, the neoliberal subject is crucially one which is first and foremost 
an entrepreneur rather than a producer in distinctly employment-related circumstances and 
a consumer at home. The entrepreneur instead ‘produces his [sic] own satisfaction. And 
we should think of consumption as an enterprise activity by which the individual, precisely 
on the basis of the capital he has at his disposal, will produce something that will be his 
own satisfaction’ (Foucault, 2008: 226). Michel Feher (2009) therefore envisages the 
neoliberal subject as an investor in human capital, evaluated in the potential to increase 
future earnings through present investment in education and the cultivation of skills and 
talent that can be monetised. The result is the incorporation of cost-benefit analyses into 
nearly every aspect of daily life, in the assessment of the potential future payoff that 
undertaking activities, training, or various kinds of employment could have. Paul Langley 
(2008a) notably takes up the idea of a self-governed investor subject to describe the 
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simultaneous rise of securities and high-risk investments in capital markets alongside 
patterns of personal investment in pensions, mortgages, and portfolios as a way of 
understanding the configuration of networks of enterprise, finance and creativity in a 
context of dwindling welfare provisions and increasing personal and social risk. The 
acquisition of personal debt is made easier as a function of expanding markets that meet 
borrowers’ demands and investors’ needs, alongside changing household practices in the 
direction of indebtedness. The result is uncertainty at a subjective and social level, owing 
to the link between savings and debt, and the ability of fluctuating markets to diminish 
savings and exacerbate debt. For Langley, however, the notion of a stratified subjectivity 
is absent, and it is unclear whether the investor subject so understood is intended to 
represent financial subjects in general, or middle-class households which are more likely 
to incorporate such practices of saving and borrowing into their household accounting. 
 As I have illustrated in this thesis, the expectation of financial self-discipline has a 
different meaning to individuals and households facing precarious economic 
circumstances for unstable employment, low income, or both. The reconstitution of the 
workforce throughout the 1980s and into the present has resulted in the decline of a 
‘traditional’ working class in manufacturing and production, with stable incomes and 
union representation, and the emergence of a ‘precarious’ working class often called the 
‘precariat’. These low or infrequently paid workers may have part-time jobs or contract 
work without long-term futures; they are frequently younger people who struggle to break 
into full-time work in spite of higher levels of education, or, conversely, low-skilled 
employees working in sectors with higher turnover rates or flexible contracts (Standing, 
2014); the Office of National Statistics associates this group of earners with the lowest 
earning quintile of less than £15,000 annually (Office of National Statistics, 2016). A full 
understanding of the notion of an entrepreneurial, or financial subject, must therefore 
incorporate not just middle-class investors, but precarious working-class debtors, if the 
nature of contemporary volatility and instability is to be grasped. The thrust of this thesis 
is therefore the outline of a financial subject constrained in the ability to be creative and to 
take entrepreneurial risks by the requirements of debt repayment: on one hand, precarious 
economic conditions can make debt a requirement to make ends meet for the short-term, 
limiting the amount these financial subjects have to save and invest creatively. On the 
other, debtors are also subject to the discipline of repayment schedules and obligation fees 
that often further reduce the amount they have available (Lazzarato, 2012).  
CONCLUSION  Niamh Mulcahy 
 
 157 
 To this end, my thesis has examined the emergence of the financial subject in the 
United Kingdom from 1979 onward, with a particular focus on the entrepreneurialism 
expected of the precariat. Here, those in the workforce are required to assume the risks 
previously borne by society as a whole, such as the security for the future provided by 
insurance or pension funds. Instead of relying on defined benefit pension plans and 
collective insurance intended to minimise risks of the future, workers are now expected to 
embrace risk by investing their savings in defined contribution pension plans, unit trusts, 
and investments to maximise their future gains. Similarly, where real wages have stagnated 
or declined, they also now rely on borrowing and credit to make ends meet, or to finance 
large purchases. As the thesis shows, however, they are not always successful at meeting 
and taking up these risks, owing to structural constraints such as precarious employment 
or low wages, which can make consistency—a key feature in both investment and 
repayment—a difficult commitment. What is crucial for the process of subjectivation, then, 
is the recognition that finance is almost necessary in the contemporary age for fulfilling 
demands, regardless of whether one is actually able to conform with its behavioural 
expectations. In this, I follow Langley (2008a), who holds that the financialisation of daily 
life is not the sudden irrationality of individuals in taking risks, but rather the overall 
rationalisation of risk as the best way to make ends meet and provide for the future that 
makes it appealing to individuals and households. Consequently, financial subjectivity also 
takes account of the understandings and meanings that people attribute to their 
management of household finances, in addition to the conditions under which financial 
subjectivity is actualised. 
 My approach differs from Langley, however, in that his understanding of the 
functioning of finance at the everyday level is informed by actor-network theory, which I 
contend makes difficult the task of thinking about social stratification as a result of a 
flattened social ontology that argues against the notion of a social structure and 
corresponding agency. I adopt a critical realist framework, which emphasises structure as 
a precondition of agents as social subjects, without implying that subjects are altogether 
determined by their surroundings. Instead, structural entities such as financial markets, 
non-financial firms that are transformed in their capacities through deregulation of 
markets, government ministries or local authorities and service providers, all play a part in 
contextualising an individual’s surroundings including work and home life. This informs 
the kind of actions or strategies that individuals can engage in, which is to say that 
behaviour and action does not occur in a vacuum. Critical realism provides the 
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groundwork for understanding how these particular configurations emerge, through an 
understanding of emergent properties contained in social structures and subjects 
themselves, which can be activated under specific circumstances to produce a causal 
mechanism that creates a new kind of property, or social change. In short, critical realism 
provides the basis for thinking about the emergence of financial sensibilities out of the 
failing framework of the earlier welfare state in the United Kingdom, in addition to the 
possibility that the actions of subjects contribute to the shifting or changing nature of 
financialisation itself. Consequently, the kind of political economy I advocate is not static 
and deterministic, as a criticism levelled by actor-network theorists who condemn the 
notion of a social structure as too rigid to understand the economic changes that cultivated 
the expansion of financial innovation, but is instead informed by critical realism itself, in 
the form of the political economy advocated by the Regulation School. This understands 
economic development to occur in periods of particular kinds of accumulation, such as the 
mass production and mass consumption of Fordism, alongside the mediating tendencies 
of social organisations of the mode of regulation that prevents the emergence of crises, 
such as the British welfare state. Financial accumulation can therefore be understood to 
emerge from a crisis within Fordist production and the welfare state, as a way of 
understanding the preconditions of labour market and wage volatility as they are related 
to benefit reductions and asset-based welfare.  
 I thus outlined, in the first chapter of this thesis, the causal mechanisms that give 
rise to financial subjectivity, in the form of the structural and institutional changes that 
make risk-taking and household entrepreneurialism possible. In the first instance, the 
liberalisation of financial markets has seen, as Boyer (2000) notes, capital mobility around 
the world, as well as international mergers between firms, which lead to increased levels 
of competition. The appearance of an ‘ideology of shareholder value’ (Aglietta and Breton, 
2001; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) means that the managers of corporations are now 
concerned with maximising share prices to avoid mergers and takeovers, and for their own 
personal reward. With international competition hampering once high profit margins, 
inefficient management techniques are exposed and ostensibly remedied when markets, 
rather than managers, allocate resources (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). The upshot, 
however, is that not only is the security of management positions in question, but so too is 
employee security: benefits and wages, and the overall retention of the workforce no longer 
take priority, as corporations make whatever changes are necessary to avoid a takeover. 
As a result, employees’ wages, and their subsequent ability to make ends meet, are subject 
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to great uncertainty, while benefits are also privatised, meaning the workforce must now 
rely on precarious forms of assurance, such as defined contribution pension plans, unit 
trusts, and private insurance to provide for the future. In short, workers must now be 
prepared to take risks in providing for themselves and their futures, so that risk taking 
becomes a necessity rather than a form of speculative irresponsibility. 
At the same time as uncertainty is produced in the corporate sphere, however, 
banks and financial institutions begin to reshape themselves in keeping with these 
developments. According to Lapavitsas (2011), where banks had previously made a profit 
off of brokering trade deals for corporations, the latter have developed trading capacities 
of their own, so that they no longer rely on banks for such transactions. Banks, in turn, 
have moved toward providing financial services to households, which has enabled the 
latter to find ways of investing and borrowing to make up for the lack in state and employer 
provision. These two major shifts, brought on by the liberalisation of finance from the 
1970s onward, illustrate how individuals and households were confronted with risk as a 
necessary condition of daily life, rather than a reckless form of ill-conceived planning. 
 Because the process of creating subjects is not only about structural surroundings, 
though, I also employed a critical form of critical political economy known as cultural 
political economy, as a complement to Regulation theory, as outlined in my second 
chapter. Cultural political economy holds that it is crucial to theorise the understandings 
and meanings generated in interactions with social structures, in order to conceptualise 
how subjects internalise and rationalise their actions. In addition to noting the 
aforementioned structural changes, then, I also illustrate the forms of ‘complexity 
reduction’ (Kutter and Jessop, 2014) that help people understand their economic 
surroundings and make sense of them. I think about Thatcherism as a form of complexity 
reduction that ultimately ushered in an individualistic way of thinking about one’s place 
in society, in its promotion of self-sufficiency, personal responsibility, and individual 
innovation as key to rejuvenating the economy. I contend that Thatcher’s selection of 
specific discourses on individualism as necessary to overcoming the economic downturn, 
ostensibly caused by stalled labour relations and union bureaucracy, ultimately shaped the 
way people understood their roles within society as innovators whose actions alone could 
fix the economy. 
 I employed a Foucauldian-inspired form of narrative policy analysis in the third 
chapter to examine this process, which looks at the way language is used to frame and 
stabilise emerging political situations by highlighting how systems of knowledge construe 
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power relations as naturalised courses of action. That is to say, Thatcher’s policy 
prescriptions were positioned so as to appear unavoidable, perhaps nowhere more evident 
than in her infamous statement that there is no alternative to hers (TINA). Consequently, 
as I contend in the thesis, the selection of individualistic discourses has been retained since 
the 1980s in Britain, with subjects forced to frame their understandings of economic 
situations in relation to that put forward in an official capacity by the government. 
 By identifying causal mechanisms in not only social structures and institutions, but 
also in language itself, my thesis defines financial subjectivity, in addition to its constitution 
through social relations, as the navigation of financial risk for future reward. By illustrating 
how financial subjectivity emerges, the factors that give rise to it are incorporated within 
the process of subjectivation, or the creation of subjects, itself, so that it is possible to see 
how social relations help create, but do not necessarily determine in a structurally 
functionalist way, the subjective experience of individuals. This is advantageous over an 
actor-network theory approach, which can describe what financial subjectivity looks like, 
without explaining its origins. Yet, in the absence of any concrete understanding of the 
origins of a particular form of subjectivity, it is difficult to conceptualise where potential 
sources of inequality lie, or, likewise, where possible sources of social transformation may 
arise from, owing to the fact that the strategies, kinds of action, or even sources of reaction 
people may take, are embedded within the social conditions that surround subjects (Jessop, 
2001). 
 Hence, the fourth chapter continues an analysis of the logic of Thatcherism in 
further market deregulation and liberalisation up to the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 under 
Tony Blair’s New Labour government, to parse out the implications of an individualistic 
discourse on the contradictory development of financial subjects. Consequently, the forms 
of resistance to subjectivation that take place may not always be large scale acts of protest, 
but are more likely to revolve around the failure to comply with financial expectations as 
a result of daily difficulties in meeting them. This can take several forms. In particular, the 
precariat struggles to conform with entrepreneurial expectations owing to a lack of, or the 
ownership of fewer assets, as well as savings, to rely on. Working households tend to invest 
less in pensions as a result of having less to put away. They also 
often carry more debt than middle- and higher-class households, the repayment of which 
is complicated both by the terms of the repayment of debt, and the precariousness of jobs 
and wages with which to pay it back. Household entrepreneurialism, in contrast, demands 
a consistency in investment and repayment that can often be hindered by these problems, 
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raising questions about whether the precarious working class can reasonably be called 
entrepreneurial subjects. 
 In the first instance, pension privatisation, which was spearheaded by Thatcher and 
continued under Blair’s New Labour government, shifted the burden of providing for the 
future from the social collective to the individual. Pensions no longer operated under a 
defined benefit system, but moved to a defined contribution model, requiring workers to 
opt into plans and make appropriate levels of contributions to be matched by employers. 
However, as Blackburn notes, pension arrangements as a result of moving between jobs 
and employers became very unclear, resulting in a difficulty in making appropriate 
contributions or arrangements with employers (2002). The issue has been further 
complicated, according to Clark et al. (2012), by confusion over the differences between 
state and private pensions, leading to uncertainty about how much one really needs to 
invest. In the second instance, borrowing and high levels of debt, which have led to a credit 
crunch in the United Kingdom following the 2008 crisis in the United States, has caused a 
reduction in the number of subprime loans and mortgage products that were previously 
available. This reduces the options for borrowing, for lower income working households. 
Once again, it is unclear whether the precariat are properly financial subjects, owing to the 
difficulties some households have with repayment of debt. 
 These are crucial issues to contend with, despite the fact that little literature on the 
financialisation of everyday life has specifically addressed the exact nature of precarious 
working-class investment and borrowing, focusing instead on the broad notion of the 
middle classes and their development as financial subjects. While it is true that the idea of 
‘incomplete’ subjects is mentioned by Langley (2007) in discussing the process of 
subjectivation itself, this does not extend to an elaboration of inequality and social 
stratification. This is, in part, because so much of this literature (e.g., Langley, 2007; 2008a) 
appeals to Foucauldian notions of governmentality without interrogating their theoretical 
bases: as I argue with reference to Du Pont and Pearce (2001), Foucault may have a 
theoretical understanding of struggles related to inequality in his conceptualisation of 
subjectivation, when he suggests it is an interrupted process that is never complete. 
However, his articulation of the process itself within the context of liberalism, which he 
sees as highly efficient in creating subjects, makes it difficult to actually theorise 
discontinuities and disruptions that occur even within the process of liberal subjectivation. 
As a result, I incorporate Althusser’s theoretically complementary concept of 
overdetermination (1969) to argue that class continues to condition one’s subjective 
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experience of finance, largely as a result of structural inequalities such as labour market 
fluctuation, that subsequently contribute to forms of financial inequality. There is a tight 
link between finance and employment, with the latter necessary for access to pensions, 
money for investment, and for borrowing. The upshot, then, is that the precarious working 
class have a different experience of financial subjectivity than the middle classes, which 
must be elucidated in order to understand how finance has permeated aspects of everyday 
life for everyone. 
 In keeping with the tenets of critical realism, it is necessary that structure and 
agency, whose distinctions are retained, can nonetheless influence each other through 
underlying causal mechanisms. So, actors are born into an existing set of social relations, 
which influences how they act and behave, or their potential chances. However, their 
actions certainly have the potential to effect change in structures, evidenced by the 
withdrawal of many subprime products following the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 or the 
rise of libertarian paternalism to promote better saving. Consequently, critical realism can 
better explain why some households struggle with the expectations of finance, without 
suggesting that these circumstances are unavoidable or unchangeable. This is a necessary 
component of the emancipatory current of critical theory itself, to which critical realism 
subscribes. 
 The question of the wider embracement of risk is indeed a crucial one, with regard 
to the quality of life that people are able to both afford and enjoy. It is not entirely clear 
that pension reform, targeting the single biggest vehicle for saving as compared with cash 
and investments (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017), has achieved higher saving among 
lower paid employees in the private sector (Ginn and MacIntyre, 2013; Price, 2008), in 
spite of the ‘choice architectures’ that requiring opting out of plans. As Price points out, 
the ’financially stretched are the most likely to opt out – including low earners, lone 
mothers, and people struggling with debt, all part of the target group for new reforms’ 
(2008: 58). Meanwhile, the rise of Lazzarato’s (2012) ‘indebted man’ raises serious issues 
about the emergence of the wide-scale creditor-debtor relationship, which fails to 
distinguish between traditional categories of produce and consumer, or gainfully employed 
and unemployed, as the subjugated are increasingly merely debtors with obligations 
regardless of their household circumstances. The financial subject is, for Lazzarato, ‘the 
indebted man who atones for his error through taxation’ (2015: 67), as the technical 
government of the state embraces economic policy as a mode of governance. The discipline 
of increasingly precarious borrowers highlights the dangers associated with the expansion 
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of finance and financial motives, and the need to consider alternatives as part of a critical 
political economy research programme. As I illustrated in the fifth chapter, work has been 
undertaken to address issues of financial inclusion and exclusion of the precariat as a major 
social problem, from theoretical and policy perspectives that address the accessibility of 
financial services for those who are underserved and in great debt (Gloukoviezoff, 2006). 
But for others, the way forward is not so clear, inasmuch as it seems questionable whether 
any financial system can promote equality due to its fundamentally stratified nature, 
existing precisely because of the ability to distinguish low- from high-risk borrowers, and 
to reward or discipline them appropriately (Kear, 2012).  
Still, alternative policy proposals exist that attempt to bypass the issue of exclusive 
financial services altogether, in that they aim for the basic issue of income relative to work 
and social contributions. This is embodied notably in the work of Tony Atkinson, who 
argues for a basic citizens’ income working concurrently alongside reformed social 
insurance programmes, as a way of eradicating counter-productive means-tested benefits 
that are formatted for household incomes and often hinder independence of those within 
the household. Instead, a ‘basic income would be paid conditional on participation’ (1996: 
68, emphasis in original) in society. This would include those who work or are self-
employed, but also those who make a social contribution in some way such as caring for 
the elderly, getting an education or additional training, or engaging in voluntary work 
(ibid., 69). Atkinson anticipates an improvement for over half of UK families, and women 
in particular, through the implementation of such a model, as part of a reformed welfare 
state. While present political discourses still err on the side of individualistic, choice-based 
policy related to self-reliance and responsibility, the thesis has shown that resistance to 
financialised policy through everyday action and behaviour, which is not always deliberate 
but often undertaken out of necessity, can alter future policy prospects. The critical realist 
approach indeed leaves open the possibility that contingent and unexpected circumstances 
may form out of the combination of structures and causal mechanisms in such a way as to 
produce new and transformed circumstances. In this way, the notion of an overdetermined 
subject provides insight into the question of structural resilience and reproduction, in order 
to explain how instability may be mediated, but it also acknowledges that alternatives are 
possible, including approaches to welfare that are not only asset-based and market-driven.  
In all then, this thesis contributes to an emerging body of literature on the 
financialisation of daily life by probing the mechanisms of inequality that differentiate the 
experience of finance for the precarious working class from that of the middle class. This 
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is an important step, in order to fully understand how, in the first instance, the precariat 
cope with financial pressures, such as spending and saving. In the second instance, it helps 
outline why policy prescriptions, such as financial literacy programmes, have not been 
altogether successful in eliminating overspending combined with a lack of savings, as the 
problem is rooted in structural inequalities innate to the intersection of finance with 
employment. More broadly, however, the study of financial subjectivity itself is an 
important step in the study of financialisation, as it sheds light on the persistence of finance 
itself. That is, it illustrates the way that finance becomes a necessity, not just for actors on 
a global scale, but even for daily household tasks, that helps finance persist as a regime of 
accumulation. This is important for thinking about what might counter such notions of 
necessity in the future. Additionally, it provides a framework for further work on charting 
the diversity of engagement, or lack thereof, and attitudes toward finance and 
financialisation within a class with fewer resources to rely on, in order to fully appreciate 
the scope of subjectivation beyond the abstract notion of the self-contained individual.   
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Appendix One: 
Financial subjectivity and the political economy of daily life in the time of 
finance1 
 
Introduction: Financialisation and the making of everyday entrepreneurs 
In political economy, the term financialisation describes the process of ‘making loans, 
mortgages and offering credit cards [for] the generation of tradeable assets based on the 
cycle of monthly repayments’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007: 106). Consequently, it has been 
used in the analysis of ‘the structural transformation of capitalist economies during the last 
three decades, with its attendant social implications’ (Lapavitsas, 2011: 611): profits are 
increasingly generated in financial markets in Anglo-American economies, rather than 
through production and consumption (Krippner, 2005; cf. French, Leyshon, and 
Wainwright, 2011), with resulting changes in the nature of work (Lapavitsas, 2011) that 
are said to lead to short-term employment (Thompson, 2003; 2013) and, ostensibly, overall 
precariousness (Standing, 2011). In short, financialisation represents an alternative 
description to postindustrialism and the information economy as a new period of 
capitalism, or ‘growth regime’ (Jessop, 2013; Boyer, 2000), characterised by dominant 
sectors of accumulation rather than the dominant sectors of employment and production 
(Krippner, 2005). 
 As the crisis of 2007 – 2009 illustrates, financialisation certainly gives rise to 
economic precariousness and inequality for workers that is not related exclusively to the 
domain of employment, when global finance markets are connected with household 
finances. As individuals and households increasingly rely on loans, credit and other forms 
of borrowing over savings and stable wages, as well as private pensions instead of collective 
insurance, they are more susceptible to the volatility of finance markets, so that daily 
decisions about purchases are more closely linked with broader market trends (Boyer, 
2000; Lapavitsas, 2011). However, the collapse of the subprime housing market in 2008 
also indicates the extent to which global markets are affected by household borrowing and 
personal financial decisions. Accordingly, the interaction of people and personal finance 
with global finance markets is crucial to understanding the stability of finance-led 
capitalism as a growth regime, although most of the academic focus, as Paul Langley 
                                                        
1 This chapter is the original first chapter of the thesis. A version of this chapter appears in the European 
Journal of Social Theory 20(2), 216 – 235 in May 2017 
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(2008a) argues, has been on the emergence of global finance networks rather than everyday 
life (cf. Jessop and Sum, 2006; Lapavitsas, 2011). 
 My aim in this chapter is therefore the elaboration of a concept of financial 
subjectivity, as it emerges alongside, and in relation to, the growth of finance-led capitalism 
in the United Kingdom. Financial subjectivity does not refer simply to the personal 
identities of those directly involved in the business and financial sectors who take pride in 
their taste for risk and entrepreneurialism, but instead to the creation of individuals as 
subjects of finance through institutional discourses and practices, so that they recognise 
themselves and their goals in relation to financial economic and political policies (cf. 
Althusser, 1971; Foucault, 1994). Specifically, personal investment, instead of savings, 
becomes a means of securing economic stability or prosperity for households in the present, 
and in retirement (Langley, 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b). This is made necessary by 
stagnating real wages at work, such that investments, loans and credit are important for 
making ends meet; similarly, employers’ waning commitments to collective insurance 
mean that many people invest in private pensions (Boyer, 2000; Langley, 2008a; 
Lapavitsas, 2011) instead of relying on occupational welfare (Cutler and Waine, 2001). 
 As a result, more households than ever are susceptible to financial loss caused by 
downturns in the market and investment choices, or reckless borrowing despite high 
interest rates, which has highlighted the need for financial education aimed at working 
households. Where personal financial literacy campaigns are intended to combat a lack of 
awareness about market mechanisms or responsible borrowing and investing on the part 
of individuals and households (Langley, 2007), the very need for such campaigns is already 
indicative of the spread of financial logic from the realm of financiers and traders, to the 
population more generally. Consequently, the emergence of a financial subjectivity is 
evident in the promotion of entrepreneurialism in daily life and personal responsibility as 
a means of achieving financial independence, against the decline of the welfare state and 
the rise of austerity measures. The financialisation of households, in addition to the 
economy itself, is what characterises the ‘finance-led growth regime’ (cf. Lapavitsas, 2011; 
2013a; Jessop, 2013), as a period of economic development in which the logic of finance 
is promoted and understood as crucial to economic growth and personal success. Yet, 
although the notion of the individual as the locus of innovation and action is widely 
encouraged over ‘collectivist’ and class-based identities, the success of subjects in the 
financial realm is still highly stratified along class divisions (Lapavitsas, 2009a; 2011), as 
those in lower income brackets are more likely to accrue high levels of debt rather than 
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manage their resources through a balance of investment and borrowing as with the middle 
class. In contrast, then, to sociological accounts that envision the decline of class-based 
stratification in the ‘new’ economy with the rise of individualism (e.g., Beck, 1992; 
Giddens, 1991), my understanding of financial subjectivity concerns the ways in which the 
middle and working classes are financialised, as new forms of stratification arise from the 
reconfiguration of economic institutions and social structures. This chapter therefore 
provides a realist account of the interaction between subjects and structures in the 
contemporary capitalism of the United Kingdom as a way of understanding how new 
forms of stratification are produced and sustained. 
 
Approaches to financialisation and the question of subjectivity 
The study of financialisation has gained prominence since the 1990s, following the 
deregulation of finance markets in the late 1960s – 70s and the climate of ‘financial 
liberalisation’ (Lapavitsas, 2009b) that fostered financial accumulation. Financialised 
economies, according to Boyer, are characterised by ‘giant mergers, capital mobility 
between countries, pressures on corporate governance, [and] diffusion of equity among a 
larger fraction of population’ (2000: 116). Financialisation is approached by political 
economists charting the global rise of financial accumulation (e.g., Epstein and Jayadev, 
2005) against declining profits in production (e.g., Jessop, 2013), as they examine both the 
macroeconomic development of profit rates (e.g., van Treeck, 2009) and the 
microeconomic behaviour of firms and managers devoted to maximising their firm’s share 
value on the market (e.g., Aglietta, 2000; Aglietta and Breton, 2001; Crotty, 2005; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Krippner, 2005). Financialisation is also studied by actornetwork 
theorists interested in technology, and economic models themselves (cf. MacKenzie, 
2006), as facilitating the rise of finance. They subsequently hold that there ‘is no singular 
“global financial system”, […] but a web of diverse networks of finance, each “made of up 
of human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, 
etc.”’ (Callon, cited in Langley, 2008a: 23). Some of the most important contributions to 
the nascent field of ‘everyday finance’ (e.g., Langley, 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b) have 
therefore been made by theorists who consider that personal investment and borrowing 
form networks that develop alongside, but are not determined by, financial networks of a 
global scale. 
 This paper advances an approach that situates household investment and 
borrowing within a process of subjectivation (Foucault, 1994), or practices that engender 
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subjects who see finance markets as the most effective way to provide for themselves. This 
does not necessarily mean that all subjects are encouraged to, or capable of, becoming 
successful entrepreneurs controlling large amounts of wealth within business sectors so 
much as it suggests that they embrace independence and risk in household financial 
decisions. The persistence of social stratification and class divisions is thus still prevalent, 
so that its study requires an understanding of pre-existing structures and institutions, into 
which individuals and groups are born and with which they engage. While appreciative of 
Langley’s work on networks of everyday finance, this paper retains a realist understanding 
of the social relations and structures particular to a period of capitalist growth, as causal 
mechanisms actualising certain conditions or strategies for some subjects, but not others: 
according to Jessop, the interaction of groups and individuals with their surroundings 
enables an understanding of ‘the strategic possibilities any given period provides for 
different actors, different identities, different interests, different coalition possibilities, 
different horizons of action, different strategies, different tactics’, rather than the simple 
determination of agents by structures (2001: 285 – 86). 
 In this respect, my theoretical approach follows some of the developments of the 
regulation school, in thinking specifically about financialisation in the United Kingdom as 
a period of capitalism called a ‘regime of accumulation’ (Aglietta, 1979), or ‘growth 
regime’ (Jessop, 2013) that succeeds the industrial production and accumulation of 
twentieth-century Fordism, in which profits were primarily derived from mass production 
(Aglietta, 1979). According to Boyer, a finance-led regime of accumulation 
would combine labour market flexibility, price stability, developing high tech 
sectors, booming stock market and credit to sustain the rapid growth of 
consumption, and permanent optimism of expectations in firms (2000: 116). 
 
The configuration of structures and institutions in a growth regime give insight into the 
‘institutional fixes’ (Jessop, 2013) that help explain the stability of finance-led capitalism, 
such as market liberalisation and the subsequent corporate restructuring around 
shareholder value, leading to the emergence of a competitive business sector from which 
profits could be derived (Boyer, 2000; French et al., 2011). Regulation theory therefore 
provides a template for understanding how different strategies, by institutions, policy 
makers and individuals, are necessary if new growth regimes are to be sustainable against 
economic uncertainty and crisis. However, the regulationist approach has also drawn 
criticism for giving insufficient weight to the instability that does occur in a growth regime 
as a result of ‘contradictions and […] incoherence at the level of […] households’ (Froud, 
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Johal and Williams, 2002: 135): it is not altogether clear, in short, what the effects of 
individuals and households are in the ability of a growth regime to sustain itself or, indeed, 
give way to something else as a result of instability and crisis. As Bob Jessop and Ngai-
Ling Sum put it, 
regulationist work [tends] to neglect the specific subjectivities, modes of calculation 
and strategic action that help reproduce the capital relation. This is reflected in the 
tendency to describe the structural context for social forces’ actions without actually 
explaining these actions (2006: 256). 
 
This shortfall can be addressed with reference to cultural turns in political economy, which 
consider the meanings that subjects derive from their material surroundings, as influences 
on their action, beliefs, and priorities (cf. Jessop and Scherrer, 2014). Discussion of how 
working households and individuals have become ‘financialised’, so that they understand 
finance as a way to make ends meet and achieve future success, is therefore just as 
important in understanding the basis of finance-led growth as the financialisation of firms 
and the restructuring of banks within finance markets (Lapavitsas, 2011; 2013a; 2013b). 
 
Subjectivity and the creation of subjects 
In keeping with concerns within political economy about structures of inequality and 
stratification, I will therefore outline a critical realist notion of subjectivity that accounts 
for the integration of individuals and households within the logic of finance. Critical 
realism, I hold, has explanatory potential in its search for causal mechanisms that goes 
beyond the thick descriptions of actor-network theory, in order to explain the 
normalisation of financial sensibilities in everyday life. I address these mechanisms, which 
are both structural and discursive, in the following two chapters. Here, I outline how the 
Foucauldian process of subjectivation works; importantly, I supplement the notion of 
governmentality, which takes little notice of the social relations in which subjects govern 
themselves, with Althusserian class-based subjectivity. In doing so, I propose an 
understanding of subjectivation that adequately emphasises how this individualising 
processes is still inherently stratified, owing to structural inequalities in the class system. 
 Actor-network theorists are often hesitant to consider broader social structures, and 
their effects on subjects, for fear of suggesting that subjective experience is an 
epiphenomenon of an abstract social structure. However, the process of subjectivation, or 
the formation of subjects through power relations (Foucault, 1988; 1994; Sayer, 2012) does 
not necessarily mean that the particularities of subjective experience and daily life are 
determined unidirectionally by broader social structures operating on a global scale. 
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Indeed, Michel Foucault is explicit in thinking about the government of subjects as the 
actualisation of power within a discursive field through which ‘the individual is led to 
constitute him or herself as subject’ (2008: 5): governmentality is 
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very 
complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major 
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument 
(2007: 108). 
 
For Paul Langley, then, ‘the concept of governmentality suggests that all subjects’ 
perceived self-interests as investors are discursively framed and manifest in their reflective, 
intentional and aspirational practices’, although ‘contingency, contradictions, tensions and 
ambiguities are also likely to be present in the making of investor identities’ (2007: 73) as 
a result of struggles against constraints in everyday life (Foucault, 1994). 
 In its attempt to avoid reducing subjects to products of ideology, or ‘docile bodies’ 
constituted through discipline, however, the concept of governmentality ‘suffers from a 
lack of structure and social stratification’ which is ‘reflected in [Foucault’s] refusal to see a 
hierarchy of social institutions’ (Joseph, 2004: 162). Andrew Sayer argues that ‘enduring 
structures are not reducible to chance configurations of force relations coming together […] 
important though these may be. They are in many cases intentionally constructed, on the 
basis of cultural and legal templates that successfully mobilise materials’ (2012: 186 – 87). 
Paul Datta similarly notes that power relations are always situated within particular 
social relations since ‘the structure of the social formation […] allows us to account for the 
place of dominance, allowing us, then, to account for how strategizing is possible and 
effective’ (2007: 293), or, conversely, how some subjects are only able to react to their 
situations. In order to provide more than a thick description of subjectivation as ‘the 
analysis of the pragmatics of the self and the forms it has taken’ (Foucault, 2008: 5), it is 
necessary, in critical realist fashion, to examine ‘underlying structures and generative 
mechanisms’ (Joseph, 2004: 162) of a particular growth regime as having causal powers 
on subjects who are ‘susceptible to certain influences, in particular those of discourse’ 
(Sayer, 2012: 187). Although ‘what results from the possession of these powers is 
contingent’ (ibid.), and any form of subjectivity remains ‘only one of the given possibilities 
of organization of a self-consciousness’ (Foucault, 1988: 253), I contend that the 
actualisation of real possibilities contained within the material conditions of a growth 
regime, rather than the combination of chance events that somehow form concrete and 
enduring subjectivities always susceptible to disruption through ‘contingency, difference 
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and discontinuity’ (Joseph, 2004: 164). Indeed, as Sayer maintains, both ‘the resistance 
and the complicity of subjects in their own domination presuppose that they have causal 
powers’ (2012: 188), in their ability to produce change ‘in virtue of the structure of their 
objects – defined broadly to include individuals, social institutions, and relations’, as well 
as ‘discourses and speech communities or audiences’ (ibid., 181). Causal powers are 
therefore inherently relational, dependent as they are on external structures and internal 
things and relations, making it possible to understand subjectivation as a process activated 
by power relations within a given social formation, rather than simply as a configuration 
of contingent relations and elements. 
 I argue, then, that it is necessary to theorise subjectivation and subjectivity within a 
given social formation or growth regime, inscribed with a structural coherence, so that 
actions of subjects ‘that are compatible with the recursive reproduction of the structure(s) 
in question’ are ‘differentially reward[ed]’ (Jessop, 2001: 285). Subjects can be strategic in 
the reproduction of structures, but also in their transformation, owing to ‘their different 
capacities to persuade, read particular conjunctures, displace opponents, and rearticulate 
discourses and imaginaries in timely fashion’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 204). By virtue of 
structural constraints, however, they may also be reactive, rather than active, in the 
reproduction of such structures. Here, Louis Althusser’s work on the role of historically 
constituted individuals in the reproduction of the conditions of production serves as a 
complement to Foucauldian subjectivation insofar as it examines how subjects internalise 
and act on the objectives of a social formation ‘all by [themselves]’ (1971: 169), while, 
much like Foucault, it questions ‘how certain concepts functioned in specific historical 
conjunctures’ (Montag, 1995: 57). As each adopts a theoretically anti-humanist approach 
to the study of subjectivity by problematising the very notion of the individual, their work 
forms a reciprocality with a certain level of theoretical continuity in spite of Foucault’s 
rejection of ideology and scientific Marxism (Montag, 1995; Youdell, 2006). 
 Where Foucault’s study of subjectivity turns on the ways that individuals are ‘tied 
to [their] own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’ (1994: 130), one of which 
includes ‘the objectivizing of the productive subject […] in the analysis of wealth and 
economics’ (ibid., 126), Althusser (1971) considers knowledge of the self as an individual 
who acts freely within a given social formation as a condition of its reproduction and, thus, 
its existence: the economic is not simply one among many modes of subjectivation, but 
one which, in thinking about how subjects produce and consume their means of existence, 
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grounds the distribution of resources within the social formation, and the subsequent 
stratification of subjects. Hence, in capitalism, the working class are, infamously, 
‘interpellated’ as individuals with specific roles to play in the accumulation of capital: 
the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he [sic] shall submit 
freely to the commandments of the subject, i.e. in order that he shall freely accept 
his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his 
subjection ‘all by himself’ (ibid., 182). 
 
Constituted as free individuals by apparatuses like the family, religious or educational 
systems, legal and political institutions, or within culture (ibid., 143), members of the 
working class regard themselves as freely engaged in their actions in spite of the structural 
constraints that maintain class divisions. This free acceptance is crucial to reproducing sets 
of social relations. 
 Although Althusser’s understanding of subjectivity has been called structurally 
functionalist, for ostensibly reducing subjectivity to the function of reproducing relations 
of production and denying ‘oppositional forms of subjectivity’ (Benton, 1984: 107; Hindess 
and Hirst, 1977), a subtler reading, according to Montag, concerns the ‘history of ideas 
that cannot be separated from the physical, material practices in which they are (always 
already) realized’ (1995: 73). In realist terms, subjects respond to their environments by 
developing ideas about themselves as people, and about their surroundings and appropriate 
forms of conduct, action or strategies, as a result of pre-existing conditions into which they 
are born. The contingency of causal power emphasised by Foucault, which can produce 
struggles over previously unforeseen circumstances in the process of subjectivation, serves 
as a reminder that subjectivity is never passive and fully 
determined by external structures, but that those who respond to structures nevertheless 
are in possession of causal powers of resistance or complicity themselves (Sayer, 2012). In 
emphasising individuals as situated within historically specific class contexts, Althusser’s 
work on subjectivity (1971; 1972; 1976) highlights the reproduction of inequality and social 
stratification in spite of the pervasiveness of individual thought and freedom. Although the 
contingency of subjectivation means that the process is rarely ever complete, at times 
producing ‘uncertain subjects’ (Langley, 2007), inconsistencies and contradictions 
in subject formation cannot only be read at the level of discourse, but should also be sought 
in relation to enduring structures and existing, or indeed newly produced, forms of 
stratification. 
 The stratification embedded in subjectivation is, I hold, a particularly crucial point 
to consider in thinking about financial subjectivity, given the highly individualised nature 
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of discourses about personal responsibility and entrepreneurialism so prevalent in the 
making of financial subjects (Langley, 2007; 2008a). The necessity of taking initiative and 
risk within markets undoubtedly permeates discourses at the upper levels of corporate 
management seeking to maximise shareholder value in order to avoid takeovers (Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan, 2000), and at the level of daily life in household spending and personal 
investment. Yet, the practices of subjectivation are, unsurprisingly, qualitatively very 
different, since the latter ‘involve[s] finance that is not directly involved in generating 
surplus value in accumulation’ (Lapavitsas, 2011: 620), and financial decisions on the part 
of the working class are ‘subject to noneconomic conditions that include moral 
commitments, familial obligations, personal aspirations, and so on’ (ibid., 621). Influenced 
by Althusser and Foucault, then, a conception of subjectivity that locates causes and 
contingent outcomes within material social relations of institutions and discourses is a 
useful theoretical lens for examining the individualised, and yet socially stratified, terrain 
of contemporary capitalism. 
 
Financial subjectivity 
The notion of a financialised subjectivity refers to the process in which individuals 
internalise entrepreneurial attitudes toward personal success, as well as financial stability 
and freedom in the present and future. Entrepreneurial attitudes represent successful 
subjects as ‘responsible and self-reliant figures who embrace risk and reward’, so that 
financial markets ‘appear to present opportunities for individuals who want to progress’ 
(Langley, 2007: 83). In the language of literature inspired by Foucauldian governmentality, 
individuals are ‘responsibilised’: their actions are a ‘necessary ontological condition’ for 
social improvement (Shamir, 2008: 7). As such, subjects are ‘”empowered” to deal with 
their problems responsibly’, meaning that they should address issues and take action with 
an eye to ‘governing future harmful consequences’ in addition to those of the present 
(O’Malley, 2008: 458; cf. Foucault, 1985; Rose, 2000). Subjects are therefore seen as 
largely accountable for the decisions they make and their consequences in the future. 
 While individual responsibility and entrepreneurialism have taken root in a number 
of facets of contemporary life, largely related to employment, management, and fiscal 
concerns (Amoore, 2004; Sayer, 2001), they have a specific incarnation in the government 
of working-class subjects at the level of personal investment, and the ways in which they 
make ends meet on a daily basis. In short, everyday decisions regarding household finances 
and savings are influenced, to some degree, by the performance of finance markets. As 
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Langley asserts, the practices of saving and borrowing in Anglo-America ‘have 
fundamentally changed in the last three decades or so’ (2008a: vii), with ‘thrifty savings 
practices of making deposits in commercial bank accounts and purchasing 
government bonds’ (2007: 69) having been gradually replaced by personal investment in 
pension plans and mutual funds (2008a), mortgages and homeownership (2006; Cook, 
Smith, and Searle, 2009; Smith 2015), and ‘day trading’ (Langley, 2007) as a means of 
generating income. Many households acquire debt as part of the growing ‘acceptance that 
credit facilitates consumption and is part of modern society’ (Szmigin and O’Loughlin, 
2010: 599), leading Lapavitsas to argue that they ‘have been increasingly drawn into the 
realm of private finance to meet basic needs, including housing, consumption, education, 
health, and provision for old age’ (2009a: 146; cf. Lapavitsas, 2011; Langley 2008b). In 
short, personal investment, which requires a level of financial literacy (Langley 2007; 
2008a) and a degree of individual choice, is touted as key to stability and independence, 
while the acquisition of debt is no longer seen as a moral failing, but a necessity for 
purchasing assets or financing consumption. 
 The shift from savings to investment, and the spread of risk to working households, 
has been facilitated by institutional changes and new discourses about entrepreneurialism 
and competition over approximately 30 years, many of which have occurred at the expense 
of concessions made to workers until the 1970s (Bakir and Campbell, 2006). Deregulation 
of global finance markets created a climate of competition and corporate takeovers, leading 
to the restructuring of firms in an attempt to increase shareholder value and avoid takeovers 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). This has resulted in downsizing, accompanied by 
stagnating or declining real wages (Aglietta and Breton, 2000), as well as the scaling back 
of occupational welfare (Cutler and Waine, 2001), making workers’ present and future 
livelihoods more precarious. As a consequence of corporate restructuring, corporations 
have also ‘developed skills in independent financial trading, including trade credit but also 
securities and foreign exchange trading’ (Lapavitsas, 2011: 620), so that banks, in the 
absence of drawing profits from corporate investments, are progressively relying on lending 
to individuals and households as a source of profit (ibid.). Costas Lapavitsas (2011; 2013) 
calls this process the ‘financialization of the personal revenue of workers’, as the working 
class is increasingly drawn into the realm of investment, borrowing and risk to make ends 
meet. Additionally, however, is the rise of Margaret Thatcher’s ‘neoliberal’ discourse in 
the United Kingdom, from the late 1970s onward, which promoted both market 
liberalisation, foreign investment, competition, and the flourishing of the financial sector 
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as part of economic policy, but also personal responsibility and innovation at home as key 
to solving the crisis of the welfare state. Consequently, in Foucauldian terms, the effects of 
the emerging strength of financial sectors are discursively framed as a conduit to personal 
success for individuals and households in the process of financial subjectivation. 
 There is, then, no singularly determinant, structural cause of change at the level of 
daily life, but rather, an interplay between structures such as institutions, markets and 
banks, and government discourse and policy that results in a new set of strategies and 
sensibilities about the need to take risk even in everyday decisions. A closer examination 
of these changes is, owing to its scope, the subject of the following two chapters. Here, I 
limit myself to a focus on the definition of financial subjectivity as the belief in 
entrepreneurialism and self-reliance fostered by increasing links with financial markets and 
financial risk. It therefore suffices to say that the major shifts identified above, bearing 
directly as they do on the daily financial activities and concerns of workers and their 
households, constitute a change in the way people think about meeting their basic needs, 
and evaluating their personal success with regard to their perceived levels of comfort and 
security. In other words, the conditions of possibility of everyday life are now more closely 
linked to the performance of finance markets, as income or job security may no longer be 
sufficient to guarantee stability from the present into the future. Subjects are thus ‘called 
up’ (Langley, 2007) or interpellated (Althusser, 1971) as investors and borrowers with a 
responsibility to provide for themselves rather than relying on overburdened resources of 
the state. This, I argue, indicates a particular kind of subjectivity within the relations of 
contemporary capital in comparison with previous forms of subjectivation commonly 
associated with the post-war period of 1945 – 1970, where the working class was 
specifically constituted as a consuming class (Aglietta, 1979; Karatani, 2005; 2008; Resnick 
and Wolff, 2003; Wolff, 2005) whose regulated wages enabled them to live more 
comfortably in the ‘house owners’ culture of the mid-twentieth century. 
 While consumption is undoubtedly still a major component of daily life in finance-
led capitalism, its spread and promotion among the working class during the later 
twentieth century (Jessop, 2013) represented a stark contrast to the ‘proletarian culture’ of 
late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century capitalism, where workers and the 
poorer strata of society had ‘been encouraged to defer consumption as a moral duty’, in 
contrast to the view that consumption from the wealthy was necessary for ‘creating a 
prosperous economy’ (Hilton and Daunton, 2001: 4; cf. Marx, 1906; 1973). In short, 
subjectivity in the post-war era was characterised, in part, by more comfortable, but also 
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more individualistic, lifestyles among workers, given the ‘virtuous circle of mass 
production and mass consumption reinforced by the Keynesian welfare national state’ 
(Jessop, 2013: 14). In finance-led capitalism, however, consumption is carried out with 
wages and credit (ibid., 19), so that it always entails a certain amount of responsibility for 
future debts, in addition to the responsibility for supplementing one’s income. Individuals 
are now financially accountable for the choices they make and the lifestyles they cultivate, 
if they are to be successful at reproducing their ways of life in a stable and consistent 
manner. 
 
Financial risk and the classification of subjects 
The financialisation of individuals and households is, then, predominantly realised in the 
‘transfer of risk’ (Cutler and Waine, 2001: 105) from the state and employers, to the 
workforce, in order to discourage dependency on welfare provisions and encourage self-
contained households that manage themselves (cf. Martin, 2002). The eclipse of personal 
savings and collective insurance by personal investment underscores the conceptualisation 
of risk ‘as an incentive to be calculated and grasped by the individual’, rather than ‘a 
possible hindrance, danger, or loss to be shared collectively and therefore minimized’ 
through savings and insurance (Langley, 2008a: 53). An ageing UK society and the 
emergence of a pensions crisis in the 1970s resulted in the Thatcher government’s 
discouraging the reliance on state insurance and occupational welfare (Blackburn, 2002; 
Langley, 2008a), so that households began to rely on private pensions, the success of which 
is dependent on the performance of a fund on the market rather than contributions by the 
state and employers. Likewise, increased levels of borrowing among large portions of the 
population with the spread of asset and mortgage-backed securities to the UK in 1986 
(Wainwright, 2009) are contingent on the transfer of the risk of default to households in 
the form of fees and interest payments: the extension of credit to low income, ‘high-risk’ 
households was initially considered a ‘social welfare gain’ (Chinloy and MacDonald: 
2005) that enabled them to borrow, while ensuring a profit could be made off loans with a 
higher risk of default by charging higher rates and fees (Dymski, 2005). 
 There is thus a certain level of responsibilisation in the need to take initiative with 
investments, borrow wisely within one’s constraints, and to become financially literate to 
properly engage with the markets that appear to be the source of provision and opportunity 
for even household affairs. In short, the kinds of action, whether strategic or passive, 
available to subjects engender a new way of thinking about how to best manage their 
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finances, spending and future obligations, so that those subjects, in turn, begin to 
internalise new goals and aspirations, in addition to interacting with their surroundings in 
new or different ways. In Foucauldian terms, then, subjectivation happens as an individual 
‘turns him or herself into a subject’ (1994: 126) of finance, engaged in investment and 
borrowing as ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1994; Langley, 2007; 2008a). 
 However, in both Althusserian (1971) and Foucauldian (1994) notions of 
subjectivity, the process involves the stratification of individuals as delineated from others 
according to individual characteristics. Employment, income levels, and assets all play a 
role in differentiating subjective experience of financialisation, as well as the classification 
of subjects which enables specialised forms of government over a range of subjects. For 
working-class subjects who inhabit lower ends of the income spectrum, the experience of 
financialisation is likely to be oriented around the acquisition of debt and strategies (or lack 
thereof) for future repayment rather than strategic personal investment for a prosperous 
future. Indeed, the decline of real wages in the UK since the 1980s (Office of 
National Statistics, 2014a) is compounded by an increased ‘proportion of household 
income accounted for by expenditure on “essential” household goods’ including utilities 
and electricity (ONS, 2013a), so that working-class households are acquiring increasing 
levels of debt simply to make ends meet rather than actively investing savings in pension 
plans and unit trusts: those with lower weekly earnings and no qualifications are, according 
to the Office of National Statistics, ‘the most likely not to have any form of private pension 
saving’ (2014b). Thus, the financialisation of British households in general is a stratified 
process involving the inclusion of families and individuals with widely different 
understandings of, and abilities to use finance in daily life. 
 The inclusion of working class households within the realm of finance therefore 
requires a study of financial risk, as the classification of individuals and households 
according to their likelihood of repayment or default (cf. Langley, 2006; 2007; 2008a; 
2008b). This is instructive of the way in which the transfer of risk also stratifies and creates 
a contemporary hierarchy of borrowers and investors among contemporary working 
households: lending to high- and low-risk borrowers takes a very different form depending 
on the characteristics and classification of the borrower, with riskier borrowers allocated 
to second-tier, or subprime markets. They therefore take on a different social role than low-
risk borrowers: as risky sources of profit, second-tier lenders must consider future 
repayment obligations by attempting ‘to pre-emptively fold those future uncertainties into 
the present’ (Langley, 2008a: 177). Consequently, anyone classified as ‘high-risk’ has to 
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bear the burden of uncertainty almost immediately in the form of high rates and fees, which 
can make borrowing sufficiently more difficult, and with it, the possibility of successfully 
managing finances or navigating financial markets. 
 Langley (2008a) contends that financial risk does not represent a ‘set of real dangers, 
[…] multiplied through market innovation and increased speculative trading’ (26; cf. 
Watson, 2007) that threaten the stability of society with future uncertainties, but is actually 
a set of technologies and calculations for making future events and possibilities predictable 
(Langley, 2008a: 26; cf. Caouette, Altman, and Narayanan, 1998). However, while the 
idea of dangers or future events to be accounted for may not be inherently real in the 
present, the prediction and calculation for the purpose of ordering the future in certain 
ways has real consequences (Rigakos and Law, 2009: 81), making the study and prediction 
of risk a causal mechanism in itself. Particularly notable in this regard is ‘the manner in 
which the category of “risk” itself makes possible market innovation and trading’, such as 
‘the charging of interest in everyday saving and borrowing’ (Langley, 2008a: 26), which 
stratifies individuals in certain ways according to their employment histories, levels of 
income, marital status, homeownership (Caouette et al., 1998: 159). As a result, 
individuals are subjectivated as their real attributes, characteristics and histories are 
mobilised around the prediction of financial events such as their likelihood of repayment, 
or defaulting on loans, mortgages, or credit cards, while ‘investment technologies of risk 
actually license the calculative taking of chance by the individual’ (Langley, 2008a: 53) in 
planning for, and actualising some aspects of their futures. The 
following two sections deal with investment, and borrowing, as technologies of the self, 
that situate subjects within the class-based social relations of contemporary capitalism. 
 
Subjectivation and investment: household finances and risk on the stock market 
The rise of personal investment and the connection of household finances with stock 
markets does not necessarily mean that UK households are purchasing and holding more 
stocks, collectively engaging in riskier investment practices in the pursuit of greater returns 
or profits, or controlling larger amounts of social wealth. Instead, it entails a turn toward 
financial markets to meet needs, like being able to draw an income in retirement from a 
portfolio of investments managed by mutual fund or unit trust managers. Indeed, the 
predominance of investment as a new form of saving is not reflected in the ownership of 
value on the stock market by individuals and households alone, which, in the United 
Kingdom, amounts to 10.7 %, having dropped from just below 50 % in 1969 (ONS, 2013b). 
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The Thatcher Government undoubtedly promoted share ownership extensively in the 
1980s, beginning ‘with the British Telecom privatisation in 1984 in which 2 million people 
bought shares’, followed by the ‘TSB and British Gas flotation, in September and 
November 1986 [which] attracted 3 million and 4.5 million shareholders respectively’ 
(Donabie, Hughes and Randall, 2010: xxxiii). Share ownership was predominantly the 
realm of the middle class, with 46 % of individuals in professional occupations buying 
shares, compared with only 13 % of workers engaged in semi- or unskilled labour (Norris, 
1990: 69). However, it is estimated that ‘some new shareholders with an eye for the quick 
profit sold in the first few months to institutional investors’, so that ‘nearly 40 % of shares 
bought in privatisation schemes [had] been resold’ (ibid., 67).  
Instead, the increase in personal investment is related to the indirect ownership of 
equities, with individuals investing in portfolios and institutionalised funds in order to 
draw returns from their savings (Langley, 2008a: 49 – 50) rather than making a profit from 
trading stocks. As a result, many households have, since the 1970s, increasingly been 
drawn into financial markets as a form of saving, by investing in the indirect ownership of 
equities like unit trusts or mutual funds, and private pension plans. According to Langley, 
individuals and households invest heavily in unit trusts, or mutual funds: 
Mutual funds are investment trust companies that pool investor’s savings, investing 
those savings in a portfolio of securities according to the objectives stated in their 
prospectuses. Everyday investors own a share or ‘unit’ […] in the fund, but have no 
ownership claims on its assets (ibid., 57). 
 
Household investment in unit trusts has grown over the last four decades, so that, as of 
2012, unit trusts comprised 9.6 % of holdings on the stock market in the United Kingdom, 
relative to 1975 when they accounted for only 4 %, and less than 3 % in 1969 (ONS, 2013b). 
 Froud, Johal, Haslam and Williams maintain that the UK has ‘created a massive 
savings flow from households onto the stock market’ (2001: 78), since households and 
individuals now also rely on the services of financial markets, instead of the welfare state, 
to obtain an income for the future in retirement. As Langley contends, 
‘Ownership’ of pension provision now lies with the individual worker who no 
longer relies upon the collective insurance of occupational welfare and Social 
Security, but instead creates and carefully manages an ‘asset base’—largely through 
equity-based mutual fund investment—that is to be drawn upon in retirement 
(2008a, 67). 
 
Thus pension fund holdings on the stock market rose substantially from less than 10 % in 
1969 to reach 32.4 in 1992; they have since dropped to 4.7 % in 2012, likely reflecting ‘fund 
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managers broadening their portfolios to seek higher returns and spread risk’ (ONS, 2013b). 
Holdings by insurance companies sit at 6.2 % in 2012 (ibid.), so that individuals have some 
stake in 20.5 % of the stock market in the United Kingdom through the indirect ownership 
of equities, in addition to the 10.7 % of stock market value owned directly by households 
and individuals.2 
 In addition to the indirect ownership of equities, households also invest in assets, 
most notably in the form of property investment, with homes serving as an investment to 
be maintained and improved for the purpose of ‘trading up’ rather than a simple expression 
of place and security (Langley, 2006; 2007; although see also Smith, 2015). As a result of 
the expanding securities market, which has led to the origination of so many cheap 
mortgages associated with the housing boom, household security and prosperity is often 
tied to the value of the home as a property that can be ‘flipped’ through renovations aimed 
at increasing the price, or let out, as a means of generating rent to cover the cost of the 
mortgage In addition to the indirect ownership of equities, households also invest in assets, 
most notably in the form of property investment, with homes serving as an investment to 
be maintained and improved for the purpose of ‘trading up’ rather than a simple expression 
of place and security (Langley, 2006; 2007; although see also Smith, 2015). As a result of 
the expanding securities market, which has led to the origination of so many cheap 
mortgages associated with the housing boom, household security and prosperity is often 
tied to the value of the home as a property that can be ‘flipped’ through renovations aimed 
at increasing the price, or let out, as a means of generating rent to cover the cost of the 
mortgage. 
 
Subjectivation and borrowing: the rational calculation of risk 
It is not only savings and investment that have been transformed through the concept of 
risk and its associated returns and rewards, but the process of borrowing, wherein the 
management of risk is associated with the creation of hierarchies of borrowers, further 
stratifying distinctions between those who invest and borrow, and those who merely 
borrow and acquire debt. In contrast to earlier forms of lending which tended to rely on 
trust between customers and merchants (Caouette et al., 1998), making lending decisions 
and consumer credit nearly impossible on a global scale, the development of credit scoring 
                                                        
2 By comparison, 53.2% of UK shares are owned by world investors, while many other UK shareholders 
such as banks (2.5%), the public sector (3.1%), nonfinancial corporations (2.3%), and charities or churches 
(0.8%) own fewer shares than investment and pension funds. 
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techniques in the 1960s standardised borrowing according to ‘details on occupation, [as 
well as] length of time in current residence’, in order to ‘calculate the probability that a 
credit cardholder will default, given their employment, financial, and residential/family 
histories’ (Langley, 2008a: 149; cf. Ritzer, 2001). As Langley notes, credit scoring has 
constituted the boom in consumer borrowing as rational, scientific, and controlled. 
This is especially the case as lenders have come to embrace would-be borrowers 
that were previously excluded and deemed too ‘risky’, as credit scoring provides the 
foundations for so-called ‘risk-based pricing’ (2008b: 136). 
 
In short, holders of credit cards may pay higher or lower interest rates, according to their 
credit scores and risk of default (cf. Langley, 2008a: 150). This development is, in itself, 
crucial, since it divides borrowers between low- and high-risk categories, where the latter 
pay higher interest rates as borrowers and on credit cards, regardless of whether they have 
actually defaulted on payments. Such a demarcation is deemed necessary, given the risk 
lenders take in extending loans, credit and mortgages to borrowers who are more likely to 
default. As a result, the distinction between precarious, high-risk borrowers, and low-risk 
borrowers who conform to lending requirements is seen as crucial to the functioning of 
markets. 
 This division is, of course, not entirely unproblematic, both because of the 
stratification of high-risk individuals and the immediate application of stringent, 
unforgiving conditions to their borrowing; but also for the regime of accumulation itself. 
Although Chinloy and MacDonald (2005) consider ‘market completion’—‘the completion 
of the credit supply schedule with the market pricing for poorer quality credit’ allowing 
subprime lenders to ‘reduce borrowing constraints’ on high-risk borrowers—to be a ‘social 
welfare gain’ (153) in making finance markets accessible to more households, it is true that 
high-risk borrowers have been targeted by exploitative lenders, looking to take advantage 
of the high interest rates and repayment cycles applied to their borrowers. Owing to the 
rationalisation of risk and uncertainty, subjects can be classified as either ‘conforming’ or 
‘prime’ borrowers (Langley, 2008a: 163) or subprime borrowers, who may qualify for 
credit, loans, or subprime mortgages. However, subprime borrowers have, as a 
consequence of the high interest rates applied to them in accordance with already 
precarious conditions like low income or unpredictable employment, struggled to perform 
as successful financial subjects, opening up the possibility of instability in their own 
households, as well as among society more generally. The UK witnessed this on a large 
scale when, in 2007, the US subprime mortgage crisis began to spread, causing a ‘global 
evaporation of liquidity’ and a ‘credit crunch’ in which high-risk loans and mortgages were 
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withdrawn from the market (Wainwright, 2009: 382). 
 However, even low-risk or conforming borrowers are subject to uncertainty in their 
borrowing, since techniques associated with credit reporting and scoring rely on career and 
income stability: 
Just as investment is not a one-off event but a set of on-going calculative practices 
that are undercut by uncertainties over employment, so the meeting, management, 
and manipulation of on-going borrowing obligations are reliant upon relatively 
predictable wages (Langley, 2008a: 204). 
 
High-risk, subprime borrowers are, then, particularly likely to struggle with financial self-
discipline, but in general, financial subjectivity takes as a precondition in the calculation of 
risk, a level of stability in an individual’s life chances that does not account for uncertainty 
in the wage relation, or the extra-economic concerns that workers, unlike firms, must factor 
into their daily lives. Yet because ‘the borrower that is summoned up […] appears as a 
disconnected and unitary subject, a figure that is disembedded from all but his/her 
financial relations’ (ibid., 203), solutions to financial problems are addressed, in keeping 
with the responsibilisation of subjects, as individual issues of financial literacy 
rather than systemic problems related to the long-term stability and reproduction of 
households. Thus, although financial subjectivity entails individualisation and 
entrepreneurialism, the process of subjectivation produces contingencies through the 
struggle against the individualising nature of the knowledge about individuals and groups 
(Foucault, 1994) as borrowers and investors working with the framework of overarching 
power structures. 
 Financial subjectivity is therefore all but solidified through the very practices of 
investment and borrowing that ground it, insofar as they carry the risk of default and 
insolvency, leading to a disruption in ways of life centred on financial responsibility. In 
Foucauldian terms, the process of subjectivation is never fully complete, owing to struggles 
with self-discipline that occur as a result of structural constraints such as job loss or market 
downturn, in addition to political struggles stemming from a conscious rejection of self-
reliance at the expense of state welfare and social assistance. The Althusserian concern 
with the differential interpellation of subjects on the basis of class especially highlights how 
the immediate expectation of default among lower-income households reinforces the 
potential for insolvency in the charging of higher fees and rates; these in turn exacerbate 
structural constraints on such families, in contrast to more successful everyday 
entrepreneurs who may be able to channel income into investments and assets while 
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managing debt. Even where investment is possible among working-class households, it is 
still no guarantee of stability and long-term prosperity. 
 
Financial subjects and wage relations 
The ‘democratisation’ of finance (Lapavitsas, 2009a; cf. Nocera, 1994) has therefore not 
necessarily made daily life substantially easier, by allowing the working class and the poor 
access to finance through subprime, or ‘secondary’ markets; rather, it makes it easier to 
enter finance markets, although these can be difficult to navigate when workers face the 
constraints of uncertainty in employment and wages. The emergence of personal 
investment as a rational technology of the self has, additionally, not resulted in a shift in 
the ownership or control of social wealth (Martin, 2002), but instead in the promotion of 
household independence within the constraints of the wage relation: the entrance of 
numerous individuals and households into capital markets has largely reflected a shift in 
‘patterns in the ownership of financial market instruments (especially equities), with an 
increasing proportion of the total by value held by pension and mutual funds’ (Langley, 
2008a: 49, emphasis added). However, ‘everyday investment has done little to challenge 
the privileged place of the wealthy in the direct ownership of equities’ (ibid.), even if more 
households are involved in the market by virtue of owning shares in investment trusts and 
pension plans. 
 Lapavitsas therefore suggests that the involvement of working-class households in 
financial markets is still inherently stratified on the basis of exploitative class relations, 
given how ‘[b]anks and other financial institutions have been able to extract profits directly 
out of wages and salaries rather than surplus value’; additionally, they ‘have also been able 
to make profits out of [personal] assets, particularly as public provision of pensions has 
retreated, encouraging the channeling of [household] savings to pension funds, insurance 
companies, money funds and thus the stock market’ (2011: 620). The examination of 
relations of distribution, such as wages and profits (Skotnes, 1979), is crucial to 
understanding contemporary class inequality, although much of the focus has, to date, 
been on declining job security and career prospects as a result of financialisation 
(Thompson, 2003; 2013) and the enterprising attitudes working individuals must adopt 
while at work in order to further their careers (Amoore, 2004) if they are to be successful 
in a labour market which is not rapidly expanding (Lapavitsas, 2011). Indeed, it is precisely 
because of the stagnation or decline of wages, partially as a result of outsourcing (Boyer, 
2000; Leamer, 1996), that finance begins to take an important role in the everyday lives of 
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workers. Yet, insofar as finance requires one to account for future risks in the present, it 
does not always alleviate problems associated with declining wages or job loss. 
Consequently, providing for oneself or a household has not necessarily been made easier 
by finance, so much as it is the case that the logic of finance appears to be the most viable 
or rational means of making ends meet. 
 Financial subjectivity, as the intersection of risk and financial markets with daily 
decisions involving household reproduction, is thus intricately related to the social 
relations of contemporary capitalism, rather than a contingency produced by the 
interaction of conflicting sources of power. As Sum and Jessop hold, following Foucault, 
‘[s]ubjectivation involves not only the creation of subject positions but also of “willing” 
subjects, that is, subjects who are willing and able to play their allotted roles’, alongside 
the ‘objectivation’ of the natural and social world through ‘different technologies of 
power/knowledge’ (2013: 112), so that courses of action that correspond with discourses 
about the world and help to reproduce it are ‘differentially reward[ed]’ (Jessop, 2001: 285). 
Subjectivation in finance undoubtedly produces contingencies since ‘[i]nvestment as a 
technology of the self is contradictory. It rests on calculating market risk/reward, but 
necessarily cannot bring order to future uncertainty’ (Langley, 2008a: 111 – 112), which is 
coupled with similar issues in borrowing. 
 However, these processes must be understood as situated within existing social 
relations which are, through the causal powers of underlying structures and generative 
mechanisms, transformed and recreated. The call, or interpellation, to entrepreneurialism 
and self-sufficiency is inherently related to broader social and economic changes that 
render reliance on welfare state provisions problematic, or even the cause of crisis, while 
finance markets themselves emerge as a source of opportunity, so that the working class 
responds by reorganising and adapting their lifestyles. Yet, financial subjectivity is still 
situated within the wage relation, which is itself a source of hierarchy, inequality, and thus, 
a potential source of contingency in the process of creating successful entrepreneurial 
subjects who can reproduce their households and contribute to the economy. Contingency, 
while indicating that causal relations are never inherently deterministic or structurally 
functionalist in producing subjects to prop up capitalist growth, still has antecedents in 
existing material, social and power relations. 
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Conclusion 
Despite the growing importance of, and interest in finance-led economies as a distinctive 
feature of contemporary capitalism, the connection between financial markets as a major 
source of accumulation and the regularisation of finance in everyday life remains under-
theorised by critical theorists working to understand new forms of inequality and 
stratification in contemporary capitalism. Although cultural accounts of neoliberal 
subjectivity stress the significance of personal experience, they rarely make broader links 
with the broader forces that give context to the actions of subjects. Thus, in this chapter, I 
examined financial subjectivity as a process that constitutes individuals as entrepreneurial 
subjects who, through the development of technologies associated with the calculation of 
risk, manage their affairs and financial futures as a series of investments and returns. 
Specifically, from the 1970s onward individuals become ‘everyday investors’, relying on 
returns from mutual funds and pension plans to supplement income and prepare for 
retirement, in contrast to an earlier reliance on regulated wages, collective insurance, and 
provisions set out in workplace collective agreements from 1945 through to the 1970s. 
They also increasingly borrow and make use of credit to make ends meet. Consequently, 
household finances are, in a finance-led regime of accumulation, intricately bound up with 
global finance markets. 
 In order to understand this process, I diverged from actor-network theory 
approaches to Foucauldian governmentality, which stress contingent power relations in 
the creation of entrepreneurial subjects who learn to govern themselves in a neoliberal 
fashion. Instead, in critical realist terms, I emphasised underlying causal mechanisms, 
found in the structural transformation of post-war capitalism and the emergence of finance-
led growth, to understand the sources of power in the subjectivation of the working class 
as financial subjects. In order to address the persistence of class relations in the 
stratification of society, it is possible to invoke Althusser’s understanding of subjectivity as 
constituting a class of individuals, historically-specific to capitalism, alongside Foucault’s 
outline of the study and separation of individuals from each other in the process of 
subjectivation. Stressing pre-existing social relations gives a context, I hold, to the exercise 
of power in a particular time and place. In the next chapter, then, I examine the social 
relations of finance-led growth, through the institutional and structural changes in the 
United Kingdom since the 1970s that have given rise to financialisation. 
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Appendix Two: 
Shaping entrepreneurial subjects: How structural changes and 
institutional fixes shape financial strategies in daily life1 
 
Introduction  
The late 1970s mark a period in the United Kingdom in which discourses began to shift 
from the politics of the Keynesian national welfare state, to the need for privatisation, 
market liberalisation and greater individual freedom and responsibility. This undoubtedly 
set the tone for a period of flourishing finance, alongside the global deregulation of 
markets, so that the United Kingdom became a major centre of finance: as growth in 
productive industries began to fall, accumulation, or profit, was increasingly recorded in 
the financial sector (Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Lapavitsas, 2009b; 2013a; 2013b; Krippner, 
2005; Sweezy, 1997). Insofar as the economy has become ‘financialised’ (Cutler and 
Waine, 2001; Dore, 2000; Jessop, 2013), this particular growth regime, characterised by 
‘giant mergers, capital mobility between countries, pressures on corporate governance, 
[and] diffusion of equity among a larger fraction of population’ (Boyer, 2000: 116), 
represents a new period of capitalist development, in which finance predominates. As 
Costas Lapavitsas (2011; 2013a; 2013b) points out, however, structural changes in markets 
and institutions also engender, and occur alongside the financialisation of workers’ wages 
and household finances, so that the emergence of financialisation is characterised as much 
by the integration of UK households into financial markets as it is by the expansion of 
financial trading among firms and the provision of financial services by banks. 
Consequently, it is important to understand the ways in which finance-led growth and its 
institutional fixes cultivate entrepreneurial subjectivity among people. 
 In the first chapter, I outlined financial subjectivity as the constitution of self-reliant 
subjects, who internalise the entrepreneurial attitudes needed to take risks that may earn 
rewards in financial markets, as the most efficient way of managing household money and 
measuring personal success. I therefore examined how individuals and households have 
become less risk-averse as wages are increasingly integrated into financial markets, through 
a reliance on pensions and personal investment, as well as the accumulation of debt 
                                                        
1 This chapter is the original second chapter of the thesis. A version of this chapter appears in Thesis Eleven 
142(1), 5 – 17, in October 2017. 
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through credit and borrowing. The second chapter thus situates the emergence of 
entrepreneurial, financial subjects within changes at the level of the market in the United 
Kingdom, which include the integration of household revenue into finance markets as a 
result of the restructuring of banks, and a growing business sector fostered by market 
liberalisation. This configuration of institutions contributes to the rationalisation of risk 
and financial sensibilities in everyday choices and decisions, in the process of 
subjectivation. 
 This chapter therefore focuses on the causal mechanisms that give rise to financial 
subjectivity. The study of financialisation as a particular period of growth and development 
provides a crucial insight into the material mechanisms of subjectivation, since a ‘key 
feature’ of the periodisation of capitalism is its ‘concern with the strategic possibilities any 
given period provides for different actors, different identities, different interests, different 
coalition possibilities, different horizons of action, different strategies, different tactics’ 
(Jessop, 2001: 285 – 86). Consequently, the ‘transfer of risk’ from employers (Cutler and 
Waine, 2001: 105) to the workforce (ibid.; Amoore, 2004) and households (Langley, 
2008a) through private pensions and the need for personal investment over occupational 
welfare; the ‘democratisation’ of credit and the integration of many households into credit 
markets as borrowers; or the emergence of securitisation in Britain in the 1980s 
(Wainwright, 2009) promote entrepreneurial strategies among working individuals and 
households for looking after themselves and their futures. Taking risks to earn rewards in 
everyday life is therefore not only encouraged as a form of individual self-improvement, 
but is inscribed within the structural framework in which subjects work and live. 
 
Explaining Financial Subjectivity: Changing Structures, Strategies, and Forms of 
Subjectivation 
In the first chapter, I provided an analysis of financial subjectivity as a set of practices 
undertaken in daily life, that reorient the relationship of individuals and their households 
to the notion of risk as a necessary precursor to success and rewards. Self-sufficiency is also 
seen as crucial to achieving goals, rather than relying on the provisions of a welfare state. 
Here, I aim to explain why a particularly financialised form of subjectivity emerged in the 
United Kingdom after the 1970s, in the light of Althusserian and Foucauldian 
understandings of subjectivation as a process, rather than a simple experience, involving 
the struggle over the structures and norms that promote, or constrain certain forms of 
identification and conduct (Althusser, 1971; 1972; 1976; Foucault, 1994). This requires a 
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grasp of emergent structures and institutions and their effect on subjects, since subjectivity 
involves the constant interplay between structures on one hand, and subjects on the other: 
subjectivation is, after all, accomplished as a result of the susceptibility of subjects to the 
influences of the structures and discourses surrounding them (Sayer, 2012). 
 Understanding how different regimes of growth instill different capacities, actions 
and reactions in subjects is key to grasping shifts in power relations over time. The 
‘periodisation of capitalism’, or the identification of the rise and fall of various growth 
regimes in the development of capitalism, is crucial to the study of the growth and 
reproduction of capitalism in general: as Peck and Tickell note, examining different periods 
of accumulation ‘provides a framework for understanding that paradox of contemporary 
Marxist theory—that, in spite of its inherent contradictions and deeply-embedded crisis 
tendencies, the capitalist system appears capable of reproducing itself’ (1992: 349, 
emphasis in original; cf. Dunford, 1990). According to Jessop, the 
expanded reproduction of capitalism is never based, as Marx’s simple reproduction 
schemas might suggest, on purely self-identical repetition. Instead it involves an 
ever-changing balance among repeated cycles of self-valorization, continuous self-
transformation, bouts of crisis-induced restructuring, and other modalities of 
change (Jessop, 2001: 284). 
 
He thus maintains that ‘[t]hese different spatio-temporal aspects provide solid ontological 
grounds for attempts to periodize capitalism’ (ibid.). The periodisation of capitalism is, 
importantly, not a chronology of capitalism since it does not merely ‘recount temporal 
coincidence or succession’, but instead ‘classifies actions, events and periods into stages 
according to their conjunctural implications (as specific combinations of constraints and 
opportunities) for different social forces over different time horizons and/or for different 
sites of social action’ (ibid., 285). The notion of different periods of accumulation, such as 
‘financialisation’ in the period after the decline of production, is therefore the basis of an 
‘economic imaginary’, or the process of mentally reducing economic complexity through 
an understanding and elaboration of features that predominate in the economy (cf. Kutter 
and Jessop, 2014). 
 Such an understanding of economic development thus suggests that, in keeping 
with a Foucauldian conception of subjectivation, different states and growth regimes are 
constantly ‘(re)constructed through changing practices of government’ in the absence of 
any ‘general essence’ of power (Jessop, 2008: 150; Foucault, 2007). With the development 
of new structures and institutions come new strategies and forms of action or reaction that 
people engage in to live and thrive within their circumstances. As Jessop argues, all 
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‘structures privilege the adoption, as a condition for success, of certain spatial and temporal 
horizons of action by those seeking to control, resist, reproduce, or transform them’ (2008: 
46). As a result, ‘some practices and strategies [are] privileged and others 
hindered according to how they “match” the temporal and spatial patterns inscribed in the 
relevant structures’ (ibid.), although there is certainly room for resistance and the 
exploitation of conjunctures over the long term, when forms of mediation give way and 
regulation is disrupted (cf. Jessop, 2001). 
 The period during the 1970s, both in the United Kingdom and abroad, provides a 
useful marker of change in accumulation strategies and subjective sensibilities, with the 
decline of the Keynesian national welfare state triggered by stagnating or decreasing profits 
in production and tensions between unions and employers. The Conservative government, 
under Margaret Thatcher, notoriously framed the problems plaguing the British economy 
in terms of industry held hostage by trade unions and stifled by government regulations, 
so that the privatisation of national industries and the deregulation of markets became a 
crucial way of encouraging innovation and investment. Market liberalisation subsequently 
led to a flourishing financial sector in London, which did not entirely resolve many of the 
issues in the productive, or ‘real’ sectors (Jessop, Bonnet and Bromley, 1990), but instead 
inaugurated the beginning of a new, ‘financialised’ growth regime in the United Kingdom. 
 The emergence of a structure of financial accumulation itself can, following Costas 
Lapavitsas, be traced to changes in trading and financial activities on the part of non-
financial corporations, in addition to the concurrent restructuring of banks, which helps to 
facilitate the financialisation of household wages and income: ‘non-financial enterprises 
have become increasingly involved in financial processes on an independent basis, often 
undertaking financial market transactions on their own account’. They ‘have become 
relatively more remote from banks’, which have consequently ‘turned toward individual 
and household income as a source of profit’, rendering individuals and households more 
reliant ‘on the formal financial system to facilitate access to vital goods and services’ 
(2013a: 794). In short, a newly liberalised, competitive business sector means that firms are 
progressively developing their own capacities in trading, leading banks to develop a wider 
range of financial services and products outside the commercial realm and targeted at 
households. The following section looks at the increasing financialisation of firms and the 
rise of market-based finance in the work done by the regulation school and their studies of 
the emergence of a new, finance-led growth regime, before focusing in later sections on the 
integration of individuals and households into finance markets. 
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Regulation Theory and the Periodisation of Capitalism: Structures, Institutions and 
Strategies Over Time 
Regulation theory has provided useful insights about the growth and reproduction of 
different periods of capitalism over time within political economy, given that it outlines a 
‘series of historical-institutional epochs in which modes of regulation perform a critical role 
in internalizing (for a time and in particular geographical locations) the inherent crisis 
tendencies of the capitalist accumulation process’ (Peck and Tickell, 1992: 349). Most 
notoriously, regulation theorists have provided an account of the ‘Fordist’ growth regime 
of the North American and British economies following the Second World War, in which 
a period of mass production was sustained by mass consumption, and the 
‘institutionalisation’ of class struggle in the process of collective bargaining (Aglietta, 
1979). The strength of the Keynesian national welfare state furnished a consistent source 
of domestic demand for products by regulating labour conditions and wages, while also 
ensuring many basic necessities were met. This allowed for ‘more or less consistent 
evolution for capital formation’ (Boyer, 1991: 107). However, the gradual 
internationalisation of the conditions of production began to undermine national 
institutions, giving rise to a crisis of Fordism and ‘trigger[ing] struggles to induce a new 
growth regime’ (Jessop, 2013: 15). Initially, regulation theorists were agnostic about what 
kind of growth regime would succeed Fordism (Peck and Tickell, 1992), holding that the 
emergence of neoliberalism and its free market sensibility represented ‘the politics and 
economics of sustained capitalist crisis’ rather than ‘a renewed period of sustained growth’ 
(Tickell and Peck, 1995: 357). A closer examination of finance-led growth more specifically 
indicates the emergence of institutions that bolster the growth and reproduction of forms 
of financial accumulation (Jessop, 2013). 
 This section therefore provides an overview of the regulation school’s account of 
the rise of finance as a regime of accumulation, focusing specifically on the prominent 
work of Parisian regulationists Michel Aglietta and Robert Boyer. I examine the 
importance attributed to market finance and the ‘ideology of shareholder value’ in the 
landscape of accumulation, and its contribution to the rise of entrepreneurial managers 
focused on the maximisation of share value over employee benefits within the firm. I then 
suggest that this only narrowly addresses financial subjectivity by treating what happens at 
the level of households as an epiphenomenon of corporate restructuring, before turning in 
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the next section to the integration of individuals and households within finance markets as 
a major condition of the creation of entrepreneurial subjects in daily life. 
 
Market-based Finance and Shareholder Value in the Finance-led Growth Regime 
The development of capitalism in Anglo-American economies since the 1970s has been 
largely understood by sociologists and political economists to be unstable or unpredictable, 
particularly in the deterioration of welfare state provision that mediates between capital 
interests and the social reproduction of households and families (Jessop, 1991). For 
regulation theory, which has never sought to predict future phases of capitalist 
accumulation so much as it aims to explain the mechanisms that distinguish periods of 
accumulation from others (Peck and Tickell, 1992; Tickell and Peck, 1995), the largest 
issue has been in determining whether a period of instability can crystalise into a 
reproducible regime of accumulation. Thus, the examination of finance-led growth turns 
on the identification of new institutional fixes, or ‘complementary set[s] of institutions’ 
that provide ‘structural coherence’ to a growth regime (Jessop, 2013: 9), which are capable 
of sustaining growth and reproduction in the context of global financial markets 
characterised by the mobility of capital outside of the ‘territorial logic’ (ibid., 18) of national 
economies. In short, it is necessary to understand whether finance, as a domain which 
currently generates greater profits than the realm of production, is actually reproducible as 
a regime of accumulation in spite of the contradictions and levels of inequality it is 
associated with. 
 According to Jessop, the ‘principle structural form’ of Anglo-American Fordism 
was the wage as a source of domestic demand, so that Fordist institutional fixes centred 
on the ‘Keynesian welfare policies’, ‘welfare rights and social redistribution’ and 
‘infrastructure provision’ made possible by economic growth (ibid., 14). In a stark contrast 
to Fordism, the principle structural form of the finance-led growth regime is ‘money as the 
most abstract expression of capital and its disembedding in a space of flows’, which is 
complemented institutionally by the deregulation of finance markets (ibid., 19) and 
financial liberalisation (Aglietta and Breton, 2001). Thus, for many proponents of 
regulation theory, financial institutional fixes are predominantly market-based, as they 
move away from state regulation or domination by banks (ibid.). 
Indeed, financial liberalisation in the terms set out by Aglietta and Breton is ‘the 
nexus of the new economy’ (ibid., 435) insofar as it has innovated financial markets by 
removing ‘controls on interest rates and quantities of credit advanced by financial 
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institutions’ (Lapavitsas, 2009b: 13) in developed countries. This changes both the supply 
of financial services, as well as the management strategies of firms seeking to maximise 
their share price to avoid take overs, resulting in the growth of the business sector. This 
interrelation ‘is a building block of the new growth regime and hence of the new economy’ 
(Aglietta and Breton, 2001: 435), which is more susceptible to the booms and busts of 
business cycles as profits are derived from asset price inflation instead of inflation in goods 
markets (ibid., 434). The development of information technology plays a mediating role, 
as opposed to driving the new economy, since it has ‘given a powerful impetus to the 
building of formal models of asset price evaluation and risk assessment’ that make financial 
engineering possible: it is, for example, ‘obviously impossible to price options, let alone 
complex, structured, customized products, without the help of networks of micro-
computers’ (ibid., 436). Thus, rather than constituting a formal growth regime in itself, 
regulationists hold that the information economy developed alongside financial markets, 
particularly in the United States during the 1990s (Boyer, 2000), with the development of 
information technology acting as a complementary innovation to finance in the role of 
accumulation (Aglietta and Breton, 2001). 
 What is of particular significance for regulation theory is the way in which the 
liberalisation of finance, through the deregulation of markets, has encouraged a shift in the 
strategies of corporate management to emphasise the maximisation of shareholder value, 
at the expense of ‘employee sovereignty’ within the firm (ibid., cf. Dore, 2000). As 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan argue, corporations prior to the 1970s were run on the principle 
of retaining ‘both the money that they earned and the people whom they employed’, while 
investing ‘in physical capital and complementary human resources’: ‘Retentions in the 
forms of earnings and capital consumption allowances provided the financial foundations 
for corporate growth, while the building of managerial organizations to develop and utilize 
productive resources enabled investments in plant, equipment and personnel to succeed’ 
(2000: 14 – 15). However, as Anglo-American corporations grew in size, it became difficult 
for a centralised management body to make effective decisions about the investment of 
corporate resources, leading to poor performance. This was, additionally, ‘exacerbated by 
an unstable macroeconomic environment and by the rise of new international competition’ 
(ibid., 15), which proved more innovative than their Anglo-American counterparts. 
 Aglietta therefore notes that the managerial control of firms through the process of 
retaining and reinvesting was, in the 1970s, ‘contested by principal-agent theory which was 
designed to rehabilitate shareholders’ interests’ (2000: 149) by emphasising the superiority 
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of the market, rather than managers, in allocating resources. Consequently, ‘in the 
governance of corporations, shareholders were the principles and managers were their 
agents’ (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: 15 – 16): 
Given the entrenchment of incumbent corporate managers and the relatively poor 
performance of their companies in the 1970s, agency theorists argued that there was 
a need for a takeover market that, functioning as a market for corporate control, 
could discipline managers whose companies performed poorly. The rate of return 
on corporate stock was their measure for superior performance, and the 
maximization of shareholder value became their creed (ibid., 16; cf. Aglietta, 2000). 
 
The emergence of a takeover market was made possible by institutional investors, as the 
lifting of ‘legal restrictions on the extent to which life insurance companies and pension 
funds could include corporate equities in their investment portfolios’ saw the ‘transfer of 
stockholding from individual households to institutions such as mutual funds, pension 
funds and life insurance agencies’ (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: 16). 
 Institutional investors, Aglietta suggests, can influence corporate behaviour 
through ‘the collective power of opinion wielded by capital markets in the new era of 
information technology’, as financial markets can publicly value corporations: 
This process of evaluation takes place under the permanent scrutiny of investors, 
because rules and standards have made it possible to abstract from specificities of 
the firm’s organization. Charters of corporate governance embody the principle-
agent relationship in a set of formal procedures, require transparent information 
reporting, certified accounts and quantified prospects for future profit, so that 
performance of the firms can (without difficulty) be measured against objectives 
and benchmarks (2000: 149). 
 
In short, the liberalisation of finance provides the institutional framework that is the basis 
for strategy and action on the part of financial subjects. As money increasingly circulates 
internationally, having been disembedded from national economies as a newly private 
source of demand rather than a localised cost of production (Jessop, 2013), the 
deregulation of finance markets facilitates the provision of financial services and the 
growth of the business sector. As a result, the strategies that actors engage in to secure their 
own success and reproduction within the realm of capital accumulation must shift from 
earlier forms of regulation under a Fordist growth regime. 
 There is thus a great deal of institutionalised uncertainty in Anglo-American growth 
regimes, which, in contrast to the monopolistic, stabilising mode of social regulation 
associated with the Fordist Keynesian national welfare state (Peck and Tickell, 1992), 
engenders active strategising and entrepreneurialism to ensure the accumulation of capital 
at the level of firms, and thus the reproduction of the livelihoods of the workers they 
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employ. Indeed, it is generally understood among political economists from the regulation 
school, as well as the broader Marxist tradition, that the recovery of profitability during 
the 1980s came at the expense of labour (Bakir and Campbell, 2006), with the workforce 
subjected to uncertainty on the job and squeezed wages to facilitate the recovery of profit 
by firms. Labour forces have been restructured ‘in ways that have eroded the quantity of 
jobs that offer stable employment and good pay’ when ‘managers downsize the 
corporations they control […] in an attempt to increase the return on equity’ (Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan, 2000: 18). The threat of unemployment can act as a disciplinary measure 
for employees (Lapavitsas, 2009b), who are tasked with embracing risk displaced from 
upper management in order to thrive at work (Amoore, 2004). Thus, Lapavitsas contends, 
‘[f]lexible employment, invasion of private time by work, unpaid labour and intensified 
labour have characterised the period. Real wages, meanwhile, have been relatively 
stagnant in all advanced capitalist countries’ (2009b: 13; cf. Duménil and Lévy, 2002; 
Jessop, 2013), meaning that, as I illustrated in the previous chapter, the working class at 
times must rely on credit to make ends meet, while being expected to take risks in order to 
increase the possibility of reward. 
 Stagnating wages, flexible labour contracts and pronounced levels of debt relative 
to savings have led to what many commentators describe as a ‘squeezed middle’ class (e.g., 
Carré and Heinze, 2013; Mishel and Shierholz, 2013; Parker, 2013; Smith-Ramani and 
Mehta, 2013), whose present and future are far more unstable than the life chances 
typically associated with the middle class. With even some higher-level managerial jobs at 
stake due to a focus on the maximisation of shareholder value, even the upper middle 
classes are affected as a result of financial restructuring. Meanwhile, an overall household 
saving ratio of only 1.7% in the UK in 2010 and ‘UK debt currently averaging 160% of 
household income’ (Smith-Ramani- and Mehta, 2013: 118), an increasing number of 
British households are facing financial shortfalls, lower standards of living, and precarious 
futures: 
Typical wages have been falling flat for nearly a decade. Home ownership has 
moved out of the reach of a fast-growing swath of the working population, and rents 
are climbing fast. Less than half of employees are in an employer pension scheme, 
falling to less than a third in the private sector. A worryingly high portion of 
households are already paying such chunks of the income to meet mortgage costs 
that they risk going underwater when interest rates eventually return to normal 
levels (Parker, 2013: ix). 
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For these reasons, a deeper understanding of the financial stratification that happens within 
the subjectivation of the working and middle classes is necessary, in addition to an 
understanding of the changing motives of financial and corporate actors. 
 
Class, Unequal Subjects, and the Limits of the Regulation Approach to the Study of Financialised 
Subjects 
In elaborating not only the macroeconomic developments that give rise to finance-led 
growth, but also the ways in which such changes shift subjects’ perspectives on possible 
strategies for success, the regulation school is acutely aware of the importance of 
collective actors and institutions, which are viewed as pre-existent – in other words, 
formed by a historical past. [Regulation theory] is thereby able to define the result 
of interactions between individuals who are always socialised through a complex 
network of norms, customs, rules, beliefs and membership in many different groups 
(Boyer, 2005: 3).2 
 
For Henri Nadel, then, ‘régulation theory agrees with Marx as to the importance of 
specifying in the historical context structural (or institutional) forms which may produce 
mutually compatible accumulation regimes and wage norms’ (2005: 31 – 32). In the study 
of the ‘institutional mediations of [the wage relation] in the technical and social division 
of labour and its antagonistic, historical dimension’, regulation theory is meant to capture 
the ‘social relation’ between capital and labour, which is irreducible to ‘a contractual 
relationship between employer and employee’, or ‘a simple relation of hierarchical 
domination’: as Nadel points out, ‘[t]he “beauty of the wage form”, the fetish of the “price” 
of labour, creates an illusion of measurement and equity between a service and its 
remuneration’ (ibid., 33), the character of which is specific to the context of the regime of 
accumulation that structures the wage-labour nexus. Consequently, regulation theory 
advances explanations of capitalist growth that extend beyond ahistorical understandings 
of individual action, and into the social stratification of groups and individuals through 
institutional practices, norms and habits of the mode of social regulation (Boyer, 2005). 
 Yet, perhaps as a result of the attempt to distance themselves from the mechanistic 
Marxist reading of contradictions that manifest in the mode of production and facilitate 
                                                        
2 The ‘pre-existence’ of institutions and actors as evolving from a historical context is a crucial clarification 
to make, in light of work done by actor-network theorists, and in particular Langley’s (2008a) assertion that 
regulation theory tends to treat finance as a ‘material reality’ which ‘pre-exists’ individuals, shaping them 
while it is ‘legitimated through ideological representation’ (31). While regulation theory, in realist fashion 
(Jessop, 1990), undoubtedly treats the social contexts into which groups and individuals are born as material 
realities, these contexts are not static, but ever changing as a result of crises or contradictions, meaning that 
they do not wholly determine the actions of individuals from ‘”outside” of everyday life and in the hands of 
financial capital as an identifiable collective interest’ (Langley, 2008a: 31). 
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the capitalist transition to socialism (Nadel, 2005), the regulation school’s focus on 
institutional mediation as a form of historical change lacks a concrete analysis of the 
struggles faced by working individuals and households in general on a daily basis. Indeed, 
it may be possible to see in regulation theory that financial liberalisation is the cause of ‘in-
built instability’ (Aglietta, 2000: 153) within the finance-led growth regime, which 
threatens jobs and livelihoods, although far less attention is given to the explanation of 
strategic action taken by the working class in the maintenance of their daily lives. As I 
noted in the first chapter, this primarily revolves around the level of risk that households 
internalise and regard as necessary to making financial decisions. However, these strategies 
are ultimately contextualised within ‘the overall dynamics of capitalism’ which, according 
to Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, 
were determined by new class objectives that worked for the benefit of the highest 
income brackets, capitalist owners, and the upper fractions of management. The 
greater concentration of income in favor of a privileged minority was a crucial 
achievement of the new social order. […] In this respect, a social order is also a power 
configuration, and implicit in this latter notion is ‘class’ power (2011: 8, emphasis in 
original; cf. Duménil and Lévy, 2004). 
 
The emphasis on strategy at the level of firms and management in regulationist work that 
focuses on market-based finance as characteristic of the new growth regime has the 
potential to overlook the ways in which structures and institutions shape the daily life of 
working-class households, which are disproportionately affected by the distribution of 
wages and resources. Jessop thus warns that regulation theory errs on the side of ignoring 
‘the broader dynamics of class domination’ and ‘repressive measures to maintain class 
power’ (2013: 18), in thinking about how growth regimes are reproduced. 
 I therefore argue for the necessity of returning to the analysis of how structures and 
institutions subjectivate (Foucault, 1988; 1994) individuals and their households, or subject 
them to social norms and conventions of stratification (Althusser, 1971), while they 
internalise and freely act on the practices of entrepreneurialism associated with financial 
liberalisation. The creation of subjects is in fact a crucial complement to the regulationists’ 
adherence to the notion of a ‘process without a subject’ (Nadel, 2005: 31), a hypothesis 
advanced by Louis Althusser (1972; 1976) to explain the progression of history in the 
absence of an essentialised subject (such as the Hegelian ‘spirit’, or the liberal 
notion of ‘Man’). In place of individuals as the teleological drivers of history, Althusser 
emphasises the role of class struggle in Marx as ‘the motor of history’ (1976: 51), precisely 
because, as Marx previously argued, ‘society is not composed of individuals’, but of ‘social 
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relations in which its individuals live, work and struggle’ (Marx, cited in Althusser, 1976: 
53). The nature of individuals is therefore specific to the conditions in which they live, and 
the kinds of limitations or difficulties they face are derived from contradictions and 
inequality produced by broader structures and institutions of a growth regime. 
 I hold that it is important to understand how these conditions disproportionately 
affect individuals and households in the transfer of risk. In spite of the emergence of 
discourse on risk-taking and entrepreneurialism in recent decades as solutions to 
everything from corporate takeovers to planning for retirement, the regularising effects of 
the institutional fixes of finance-led growth are still inherently class-based, inasmuch as 
workers are merely encouraged to become self-sufficient through the acquisition of debt as 
a supplement to wages; they are not a group with substantial control over any wealth itself, 
with worker ‘ownership’ referring primarily to any indirect ownership of equities a small 
number of workers incur through unit trusts, pensions or insurance (cf. Martin, 
2002). In the next section, then, I trace the development of the financialised subject through 
institutional changes beyond the rise of shareholder value. 
 
Hilferding’s Approach to Finance, and the Class-based Stratification of Subjects 
The approach highlighted so far in regulation theory outlines how the ideology of 
shareholder value has introduced a level of risk and instability into the workforce, so that 
workers must cope with a level of precariousness in both employment and benefits. 
However, in order to understand how working individuals and households can internalise 
the necessity of taking risks in everyday life, it is important to illustrate how the 
reorganisation of financial markets and institutions actually renders financial risk 
accessible to people as a feasible path to potential future reward. I therefore turn to 
Lapavitsas’ work on the permeating effects of financialisation, to parse out the implications 
of financial liberalisation on everyday life. 
 Returning to the earlier systematic development of finance in the Marxist tradition, 
Lapavitsas follows Rudolf Hilferding by asserting that the ‘roots’ of financialisation as a 
‘structural transformation of advanced capitalist economies’ are to be found in the 
expansion of financial activity across both financial and non-financial enterprises, rather 
than focusing on ‘the escape of capital to the realm of finance’ and away from production 
(Lapavitsas, 2013a: 798; Lapavitsas, 2011; Lapavitsas, 2013b). However, in contrast to 
Hilferding, who holds that corporations become financialised the more they rely on banks 
for investment (1981), Lapavitsas suggests instead that the modern firm has ‘been able to 
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finance investment without relying heavily on banks. The primary mechanism has been 
retention of own profits’, with external finance derived from trading in markets at a lower 
cost (2011: 620). As firms developed their own financial capacities, banks have also 
restructured themselves by ‘mediating in open markets to earn fees, commissions and 
profits from trading’, as well as those to be earned in lending to individuals and households, 
or ‘handling savings and financial assets’ (2013a: 800). The result is the integration of 
wages and incomes into finance markets, as households begin to invest their savings in 
insurance, pensions, or unit trusts, while obtaining credit and loans with which to make 
purchases. 
 The major difference in such an approach, I argue, is the ability to examine the 
subjectivation of middle and working classes under financialisation as a necessary 
component to the emergence, maintenance, and reproduction of a finance-led growth 
regime, rather than studying decreasing working conditions, such as job insecurity and 
lower pay, as mere consequences of the domination of the ideology of shareholder value 
and indicators of household struggles. To be sure, stagnant or declining wages and a 
climate of insecurity likely contribute to the reliance on credit by households at given times 
as they attempt to make ends meet. However, an explanation of how working individuals 
internalise the objectives of entrepreneurialism and self-sufficiency requires the elaboration 
of the financialisation of everyday life as a result of financial deregulation within markets 
and restructuring at the level of banks. What will become apparent is that, individual 
subjectivation at the level of the household is not simply an offshoot of the financialisation 
of managerial classes through efficiency and competition, but is instead predicated on a 
sense of independence from the welfare state, rendering it a related, but crucial aspect of 
financialisation itself. 
 
The Ascendance of Finance 
In spite of a crisis of profitability in production in the 1970s (cf. Aglietta, 1979) and 
stagnating real accumulation (Glyn, 2006), the emergence of a finance-led growth regime 
cannot, in itself, be traced to the escape of profit into the realm of circulation and finance. 
As the reorganisation of corporate management to maximise shareholder value in a 
climate of takeovers should indicate, finance ‘is a well-defined field of economic activity’ 
rather than ‘surface phenomena sitting atop the “real” economic activities of production 
and exchange’ (Lapavitsas, 2013a: 799 – 800): finance was, here, necessary for the 
reinvestment and allocation of capital at the corporate level that was facilitated by the rise 
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of institutional investors, rather than a new realm of profitability in market speculation for 
owners of money capital. The notion, in Marxist terms, of a credit system premised on 
‘”monied” capitalists who possess money capital available for lending (loanable capital), 
and “functioning” capitalists, who possess industrial and other projects’ (Itoh and 
Lapavitsas, 1999: 84) is an abstraction that misses the mobilisation of idle funds from all 
classes by financial institutions as loanable capital (Lapavitsas, 2011; cf. Marx, 1992). 
Consequently, the treatment of financial liberalisation as an institutional fix for finance-
led growth cannot simply focus on the free reign for investment and speculation unleashed 
by deregulation, but must instead account for the reorganisation of structures to facilitate 
their own reproduction in a new climate of accumulation. 
 The account provided by Lapavitsas (2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2013a; 2013b) is 
particularly compelling in its outline of the global emergence of finance as historically and 
institutionally mediated, so that any general tendencies that might be shared at an 
international level refer to the extent to which the logic of finance has permeated non-
financial institutions, rather than to the rates at which profit has declined across individual 
national economies. As I have illustrated earlier, the development of the business sector 
out of the drive to maximise share prices has led to a climate of takeovers, but it also 
enables the growth of corporate skills in financial trading, as corporations are increasingly 
involved in stock markets (Lapavitsas, 2013a). As a result, 
Large multinational corporations are typically able to finance the bulk of their 
investment without relying heavily on banks and mostly by drawing on retained 
profits. In so far as they require external finance, they are able to obtain significant 
volumes in open financial markets, relatively independently of banks. Even the 
wage bill of large non-financial corporations is frequently financed through the 
issuing of commercial paper in open markets (ibid., 799 – 800). 
 
The consequence of this, for employees, has been the spread of the logic of finance across 
operations in the workforce which were previously non-financial, which introduces a 
certain level of instability associated with finance market fluctuation into the lives of 
working individuals. While this can create hardship for a number of workers, 
financialisation on the whole does not necessarily represent the worsening of all labour 
conditions relative to Fordist mass production, so much as it changes the scope of action, 
the kinds of strategies available to subjects, and the level of risk they must embrace. 
 On one hand, there appears to be indifference on the part of finance to stagnant or 
declining wages, and employees’ reduced purchasing power (Duménil and Lévy, 2011) in 
the pursuit of shareholder value at the level of corporate management. This engenders the 
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deterioration of labour conditions for some of the workforce and the attenuation of 
employee benefits at work such as, in the United Kingdom, collective insurance and 
occupational welfare encompassing pensions and insurance, or the provision of healthcare, 
childcare, housing or education (Cutler and Waine, 2001; Langley, 2008a; Shalev, 1996). 
However, the decline of occupational welfare in the United Kingdom and its replacement 
with private occupational pensions reflects what Tony Cutler and Barbara Waine describe 
as the ‘transfer of risk to the workforce’ in the ‘pursuit of shareholder value’ (2001: 105), 
which, as much as anything else, shifts the dependence of the households from the 
volatility of job markets to that of finance markets: while occupational welfare was 
previously viewed as providing insufficient coverage to workers, who were ‘vulnerable to 
changes in levels and patterns of employment’ (Cutler and Waine, 2001: 97; Pfaller, 1991), 
workers are now dependent on the fluctuations of equity markets, as well as relying on 
stable employment prospects. Occupational welfare, which encompassed flat rate state 
pensions, was grounded in ‘the employer’s guarantee that, on retirement, the scheme 
member would receive a proportion of earnings with entitlements determined by the 
accrual rate […], the salary level, and the length of service with the company’ (ibid., 104), 
while private occupational pensions with defined contributions ‘involve an obligation on 
the employer to make only a definite contribution to an employee’s pension plan. In 
defined contribution schemes the pension is determined by the contributions made and the 
investment performance of the plan concerned’ (ibid., 107). Where occupational welfare 
was premised on the ‘social right to retirement income’ in which ‘society as a whole has a 
liability towards the holder of such a claim’ (Aglietta, 2000: 157), private pension plans 
underscore the ‘ageing society’ and the ‘pensions crisis’ facing the UK (Langley, 2008a) as 
a result of the slowdown in growth relative to, during the 1970s, escalating wages and the 
subsequent increase in state scheme liabilities (Cutler and Waine, 2001). 
 The encouragement of private pensions dependent on the performance of a pension 
fund is thus, as Langley (2008a) has it, a question of ‘disciplinary disincentives that 
discourage the reliance upon state insurance’, evidenced by the Thatcher government’s 
indexation of basic state pension benefits to prices aimed at eroding pensioners’ incomes 
(cf. Blackburn, 2002). It is, then, possible to categorise a shift in attitudes about the 
provision for future retirement from an obligation collectively borne by society for staving 
off potential future risks, to an individualised concern for generating an income in the 
‘popular capitalism’ and ‘individual ownership’ promoted by the Conservative Party 
during its reform of pension policy in 1985 (Waine, 1995). As financial subjects, success 
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partially depends on the competent navigation of finance markets in the act of personal 
investment, insomuch as people are required to take risks as ‘individual owners’ of equity 
capital. Indeed, as Randy Martin points out, ‘the link between wages and pensions’ is 
currently what ‘labor unions negotiate or strike over’, in contrast to the earlier relation of 
wages to consumerism in the Fordist era of mass production, when wages were viewed ‘as 
the means through which the market might be reshaped’ to meet the needs of the workforce 
through consumption (2002: 133). Framed relative to wages and employment, ‘individual 
ownership’ retains a distinctly class character, inasmuch as the growth of pension funds 
has resulted in the concentration of wealth among their managers and corporate CEOs, 
rather than working individuals and households. Indeed, at the other end of the spectrum 
among households characterised by low weekly earnings and few or no qualifications 
(ONS, 2014b), 24 % of UK households hold no wealth in private pensions at all (ONS, 
2014c). For those who do have pensions, stagnating wages and the rising cost of bills and 
utility fees, in addition to childcare and housing costs, make it difficult for lower income 
households to actively contribute to pensions and save for retirement from a young age 
(Cumbo, 2015). The benefits gained from personal investment in private pensions are 
therefore primarily enjoyed by the upper and middle classes rather than the working class. 
Additional ‘financial disengagement’ on the part of low-income working 
households means that few households have investment products or savings accounts, and 
have little understanding of economic and financial indicators (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 2015a) so that their engagement with finance markets is largely through the 
use of credit and the acquisition of debt. 
 The construction of financial illiteracy and minimal or no investments as social 
problems plaguing older, lower income households in planning for their futures (ibid.) 
indicates the extent to which the welfare state has ceded to financialisation by illustrating 
the kinds of options and choices subjects have planning and structuring their livelihoods. 
Thus, as private pensions eclipse occupational welfare and the provision for one’s future 
becomes a private responsibility rather than a social right, personal investment in unit trusts 
and portfolios with greater returns than interest accrued through savings accounts 
becomes an important fixture in planning for retirement or supplementing income. As I 
noted in the first chapter with reference to Langley (2008a), the rise in personal investment 
is touted as a more rational form of saving in this context, rather than an ‘irrational 
exuberance’ of speculation driven by ‘herd-like’ market speculation (ibid., 43 – 44). This is 
part of what is entailed in the ‘financialization of […] income [and] savings’ (Lapavitsas, 
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2011: 620), as they are channelled through pension funds and unit trusts into the stock 
market. 
 Owing to the effects that corporate restructuring has not only on the workforce 
itself, but additionally in creating a space for the need, and provision of new personal 
financial services, it is also necessary to take Lapavitsas’ concern with the reorganisation 
of financial institutions, namely banks, into account. To be sure, the restructuring of banks 
is, in part, related to ‘the enormous growth of open financial markets in recent decades’, 
so that in response to ‘the altered conduct of non-financial enterprises’ they have ‘moved 
toward mediating in open markets to earn fees, commissions and profits from trading’ 
(ibid., 2013a: 800). Crucially in the development of financial subjectivity, however, is the 
way banks have also ‘turned toward individuals (and households in general) to obtain 
profits from lending but also from handling savings and financial assets’ (ibid.), meaning 
that household income and wages become a source of profit rather than the surplus value 
produced by firms (ibid., 2011). There is, then, a change both in the kinds of services 
provided by banks, and the way in which they are handled, stemming largely from the re-
regulation of the financial system in the United Kingdom during the year 1986, in which 
the Financial Services Act and the Building Societies Act dissolved institutional divides 
and encouraged competition among financial enterprises (Leyshon and Pollard, 2000; 
Wainwright, 2012). 
 Andrew Leyshon and Jane Pollard (2000) conclude that there has been a regulatory 
convergence in the provision of financial services between American and British banks, as 
‘a traditional and largely informal system of regulation was swept away [in Britain] and 
replaced with a more codified US-style system of statutory regulation’ (2000: 208). As a 
result, retail banking in the United Kingdom has undergone a process of centralisation, 
designed to concentrate operations and provide services, more efficiently, to a larger 
population. While bank branches previously served as sources of information about their 
local customers, as well as the site for the provision of services, retail banking now focuses 
on the generation of fees by offering services to large, diverse populations, which are better 
understood through databases and rating techniques (Langley, 2008a; 2008b), than in face-
to-face interaction (Leyshon and Pollard, 2000): 
[i]n terms of market intelligence, local, face-to-face knowledge has been supplanted 
by the growing use of customer databases and associated credit-rating systems 
which enable banks to analyse their customers at-a-distance […]. A related 
development has been the use of automated loan application processing systems, 
typically operated outside the branch at specialized loan centres. These centres 
enable banks to reap scale economies in processing while simultaneously removing 
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loan processing work (and lending authority) from branches. Other innovations, 
such as telephone and ‘direct banking’ are now widely used by banks on both sides 
of the Atlantic to deliver products and services more cheaply to customers (ibid., 
205). 
 
The upshot is that branches now focus primarily on the generation of income through fees, 
by providing a range of personal investment products. There has, then, been a decline in 
bank branches, as customers move to direct or online banking (Coppock, 2013; Leyshon 
and Pollard, 2000). 
 The rise in technologies of personal investment, and with it the financialisation of 
household income made possible by re-regulation, has additionally been accompanied by 
increased borrowing, as the Financial Services and Building Societies Acts also opened 
British markets to restructuring at the level of investment banks. Most prominent in this 
respect was the arrival of the process of securitisation to the United Kingdom in 1986, 
which was re-engineered from its American origins to channel international capital into 
the United Kingdom (Wainwright, 2009). Securitisation is ‘the process of “bundling” 
together a stream of future obligations arising from mortgage repayments to provide the 
basis for the issue of, and payment of principle and interest on securities’ (Langley, 2006: 
283). This can include asset-backed securities, or the ‘repayments arising from everyday 
borrowing’ (Langley, 2008b: 136) for ‘credit cards, consumer loans, car finance and 
infrastructure’ (Wainwright, 2009: 374), as well as mortgage-backed securities in which 
residential mortgages are bundled together (Langley, 2006; 2008b; Wainwright, 2009). 
 At the level of financial markets, the introduction of securitisation within the United 
Kingdom hinges on the re-regulation of financial markets to promote competition among 
enterprises, making them more compatible with American securitisation. According to 
Thomas Wainwright, the passing of the Financial Services Act ‘opened the markets to a 
myriad of new financial institutions such as banks and centralized lenders, while the 
Building Societies Act (1986) allowed building societies to demutualize and become banks’ 
(2009: 377; cf. 2012). Consequently, American investment banks established lending 
subsidiaries in the United Kingdom, while retail banks began to originate loans and 
mortgages (ibid.) as new financial products. For banks and lenders, securitisation 
represents ‘a cheap way of borrowing, since a company or lender can realize its income 
streams early’, while some ‘lenders also benefit from the off-balance sheet nature of 
securitization, which has led some banks to originate profitable, high-risk mortgages as the 
credit risk is shifted from their balance sheets to investors’ (Wainwright, 2009: 374; cf. 
Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; Dymski, 2007). For borrowers, securitisation enabled the 
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incorporation of larger populations, including riskier households, into financial markets, 
as was elaborated in greater detail in Chapter One. By providing structured finance 
services, investment banks could concentrate the risk of default into tranches or fractions 
of capital in order to isolate credit risk as a smaller proportion of securitised notes available 
to investors looking for higher returns by taking on more risk (Wainwright, 2009). 
 The result, as I have indicated in the earlier discussion of the democratisation of 
finance and credit, has been the expansion of services available even to higher risk 
individuals and households, which constitutes the main form of participation in financial 
activities for many working-class households. For Ann Pettifor, the liberalisation of 
finance responsible for opening finance markets, removing caps on interest and the amount 
of credit advanced by financial institutions, is the root of the easy availability of money 
that has led to middle-class indebtedness and low-income households borrowing beyond 
their means: while those who own assets are enriched by credit, which ‘enables them to 
leverage their assets to obtain more’, others ‘who do not already own assets have had to 
borrow well beyond their means’ (2006: 10), at times leading to insolvency. The expansion 
of credit even to high-risk households therefore exacerbates a longstanding history between 
poverty and indebtedness, given the strong relationship ‘between indebtedness and low 
relative income’ (Parker, 1990: 201), by rendering credit a necessity in making ends meet 
and easy to obtain. 
 In sum, then, the conditions that give rise to the need to think about finance at the 
level of everyday household finances include the transfer of risk from employers to 
employees in the workforce, as a result of corporate restructuring in a financially liberal 
climate; as well as the concurrent restructuring of retail and investment banking which 
provided more scope for household investment and borrowing. These changes, overall, are 
indicative of a larger shift from provision for individuals and households through the 
Keynesian national welfare state, to financialised economies that are entwined with each 
other on a global scale, each with particular localised structures and institutions 
(Wainwright, 2012). Working-class households, in addition to the managerial classes 
which are forced to adapt to market competition, are increasingly subject to the 
fluctuations of finance markets in the course of adapting their circumstances to their 
conditions. As Lapavitsas has it, 
the most striking aspect of the recent period has been the financialization of the 
personal revenue of workers and households across social classes. This 
phenomenon refers both to increasing debt (for mortgages, general consumption, 
education, health) and to expanded holdings of financial assets (for pensions, 
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insurance, money market funds). […] In this context, the consumption of workers 
and others has become increasingly privatized and mediated by the financial system 
(2013a: 800). 
 
It is commonplace in the literature on ‘new’ economies of ‘late’ and ‘postmodernity’ (e.g., 
Bauman, 2001; Giddens, 1991), ‘postindustrial’, ‘information’ societies (e.g., Bell, 1973; 
Lash and Urry, 1994), or neoliberalism (e.g. Harvey, 2005) to suggest that families, 
households and groups are increasingly individualised within contemporary capitalism, as 
a result of the declining welfare state and economic deregulation. However, insofar as the 
process of subjectivation is, by definition, one of individualisation (Althusser, 1971; 
Foucault, 1994), it is necessary to specify the mechanisms through which the ‘individual’ 
is constituted as such: what requires emphasis, I hold, is the particular way in which the 
process of financialisation individualises people, as entrepreneurial risk-takers who learn 
to view finance markets as a means of subsistence and success. This stands in contrast with 
the subject which had previously been individualised through the expression of affluence 
as a product of hard work, in an era of mass production and mass consumption. 
 Indeed, this is a particular type of individualisation relative to the emerging 
prominence of finance markets within the workforce, through the financialisation of firms 
and management, and within daily life, in the withdrawal of welfare state provision and 
the rise of investment and borrowing in its place. It is a different form of individualisation 
than that promoted over the course of the Fordist mass production and consumption of 
the post-war years, when regulated wages and benefits sought through institutionalised 
collective bargaining solidified a certain level of stability for the working class; this enabled 
them to become consumers and, importantly, homeowners, who could live further away 
from work and cultivate comfortable lifestyles suited to their unique tastes, outside of their 
roles as wage-earning workers (cf. Aglietta, 1979; Jessop, 2013; Wolff, 2005). In this 
respect, individualisation previously concerned the expression of success in the present in 
consumption, while financial subjects are individualised in the level of responsibility they 
are expected to take for their future success, mediated by finance markets. Thus, while 
mass consumption is still a major driver of the economy, it is not always undertaken as an 
expression of household and economic wealth, so much as it is linked with indebtedness 
and the need for future repayment. Exemplary of this shift is, as Langley notes, the way in 
which homeownership has become an asset for the future, rather than a status symbol of 
current earnings: ‘future autonomy and welfare for owner-occupiers and would-be owner-
occupiers increasingly appears to turn less on the home as an individual space of shelter 
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and refuge, and more on the financial returns achieved from house price rises. In short, 
liberal suburban subjects are now explicitly neo-liberal property investors’ (2006: 290; 
Lowe, Searle and Smith 2012). Martin even considers that securitisation has functioned as 
a new form of dispossession for the working class, since ‘[p]ossession has been rendered 
liquid so that it can be revalued daily. The active pulse of money in motion is the medium 
through which occasions arise to move physically from place to place as a job or home can 
no longer bear the demand for increased value placed upon it. Expanded capacity for risk 
tolerance is crucial to […] the willingness to dispossess oneself in order to recombine with 
greater return elsewhere’ (2002: 141 – 42). Thus, as I have emphasised, the combination of 
structures and institutions of any given period of accumulation is crucial to the 
understanding of the formation of subjectivity, as a range of knowledge about groups and 
individuals and actions that they can reasonably take within the context of their 
surroundings. In the course of the accumulation of capital and emerging finance-led 
growth, the class-based wage relation is sustained, and recombined to form financialised 
subjects. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the institutional fixes and structural changes that give rise both 
to finance-led growth in the United Kingdom, and the financialised subjectivity that helps 
sustain it. I have stressed that financialisation, as a period of accumulation with 
institutional fixes such as financial liberalisation dating back to the 1970s, represents a 
sequence in the periodisation of capitalism and therefore has its own particular 
configuration of interactions between structures and subjects. In the case of 
financialisation, this encompasses the increasing prominence of finance in the 
management even of non-financial enterprises, brought on by the restructuring of markets 
and the drive for shareholder value. I examined this in the regulation school’s approach to 
the emergence of financialisation, which, I suggested, focused too narrowly on the effects 
of shareholder ideology on the managerial class, rather than for working-class subjects. 
 Consequently, I followed Lapavitsas in considering the effects that market 
liberalisation had on the restructuring of investment and retail banks, in order to 
understand how the reorganisation of firms and banks gave rise to the financialisation of 
household income, in the prevalence of personal investment and borrowing to account for 
declining welfare state provision in the United Kingdom. My contention has been that this 
process has, undoubtedly, produced individualised subjects, although they are still oriented 
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by their relation to employment and wages. Financialised subjects of the working class are 
not necessarily those whose entrepreneurialism results in large gains or control of value on 
the markets, but instead those who have internalised the mechanisms of risk from finance 
markets as those most conducive to personal success and management of household 
finances. This means, then, that risk taking and financial speculation in the course of 
personal investment is conditioned by the rise to prominence of financial institutions: the 
need to take risks is structurally inscribed within the arrangement of such institutions as a 
result of declining welfare provisions and market liberalisation, so that risk as a precursor 
to reward seems, in itself, a rational formula for making ends meet. 
 This chapter has thus focused specifically on the material configuration of 
institutions and social structures of the financialised growth regime, in the creation of 
subjects who internalise the need for risk and pursue it as a path to reward. However, as I 
have emphasised in the first chapter, subjectivation is accomplished as a result of the 
susceptibility of subjects to the material influences of their circumstances, but also to the 
discourses that are produced within and give meaning to these circumstances. The third 
chapter, then, will address the Thatcherite discourses of the late twentieth century, with 
their insistence on individual innovation and personal responsibility, as another set of 
causal mechanisms giving rise to financial subjectivity, through their ability to frame 
economic matters in a particularly neoliberal way. 
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